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INTRODUCTION

Within a six-month period, the regulatory model of the "bulge-bracket"
investment bank that dominated Wall Street for three-quarters of a century became
obsolete. The acquisition of Bear Steams' and Merrill Lynch 2 by commercial

* George Den~gre Associate Professor of Law, Tulane University Law School. A
prior version of this Article was presented as a work in progress at the 2008 Annual
Meetings of the Canadian Law & Economics Association. I would like to thank James
Spindler, Charles Whitehead, Kevin Davis, Alicia Davis Evans, Jonathan Nash, and Stephen
Williams for their insightful questions and helpful comments. I would also like to thank Ian
McDonald and Kevin Wells for their research assistance, and Toni Mochetta for her
invaluable technical support. Finally, I would like to express my deep gratitude to my dear
colleague, the late A. Brooke Overby, who gave me much needed feedback on earlier drafts
of this Article. All errors are mine.
1. Bear Steams, like many investment banks, financed its operations in part through
short-term borrowings secured by a portfolio of investment-grade assets. In March 2008,
after the demise of two of its hedge funds that were invested heavily in collateralized debt
obligations backed by subprime mortgages, rumors began circulating regarding Bear
Steams' financial condition; in response, customers began withdrawing funds, and
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banks, the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers, 3 and the transformation of Goldman
Sachs and Morgan Stanley into bank holding companies 4 have all but ended the
role of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in the prudential oversight
of major investment bank holding companies for the time being.5

counterparties declined to provide short-term financing on customary terms. These
developments placed enormous stress on Bear Steams' ability to meet short-term liquidity
demands. To avoid insolvency, Bear Steams obtained $30 billion in funding from the
Federal Reserve Bank of New York (FRBNY) through JPMorgan Chase, pending
acquisition and assumption of its obligations by JPMorgan Chase. See In re Bear Steams
Cos., Inc. S'holder Litig., C.A. No. 3643-VCP, 2008 WL 959992, at *2-3 (Del. Ch. Apr. 9,
2008); Turmoil in US. Credit Markets: Examining the Recent Actions of Federal Financial
Regulators: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 110th
Cong. (2008) (LexisNexis Congressional) [hereinafter Turmoil in the U.S. Credit Markets]

(testimony regarding the role of the regulators in the Bear Steams transactions); Bryan
Burrough, Bringing Down Bear Stearns, VANITY FAIR, Aug. 2008, at 106 (describing the

liquidity crisis).
2. Financial regulators orchestrated Bank of America's eleventh-hour acquisition of

Merrill Lynch once it became apparent that Merrill Lynch was on the brink of insolvency as
a result of its exposure to subprime mortgages through synthetic collateralized debt
obligations. See, e.g., In re Bank of America Corp. Sec., Derivative & ERISA Litig., 258
F.R.D. 260 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (discussing the circumstances surrounding the acquisition of
Merrill Lynch); see also infra note 320 (describing the alleged pressure brought to bear on
Bank of America to close the merger). The House Committee on Oversight and Government
Reform is currently investigating the circumstances leading up to the acquisition. See, e.g.,
Louise Story, Congress Presses for Details from Bank of America on Talks, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 21, 2009, at BI.

3. Lehman Brothers' failure has similarly been attributed to its overexposure to
subprime mortgages, coupled with high leverage and strong reliance on short-term financing.
See, e.g., The Causes and Effects ofthe Lehman Brothers Bankruptcy: Hearing Before the H.
Comm. on Oversight and Government Reform, 110th Cong. (2008) (testimony of Professor
Luigi Zingales), available at http://oversight.house.gov/images/stories/Hearings/l 10th
_Congress/ZingalesStatement.pdf; GILLIAN TETr, FOOL'S GOLD: How UNRESTRAINED
GREED CORRUPTED A DREAM, SHATTERED GLOBAL MARKETS AND UNLEASHED A
CATASTROPHE 230-33 (2009); James B. Stewart, Eight Days, NEW YORKER, Sept. 21, 2009,

at 59 (describing the circumstances that led to financial regulators' decision to let Lehman
Brothers enter insolvency and to negotiate an acquisition of Merrill Lynch); Louise Story &
Ben White, The Road to Lehman's Failure Was Littered With Lost Chances, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 5, 2008, at BI.

4. As bank holding companies, The Goldman Sachs Group, Inc. and Morgan Stanley
are regulated at the holding company level by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System (the FRB or "Federal Reserve Board"). Fed. Reserve Sys., Order Approving
Formation of Bank Holding Companies (Sept. 21, 2008), http://www.federalreserve.gov
/newsevents/press/orders/orders2008O922al.pdf (approving applications of The Goldman
Sachs Group, Inc. and Goldman Sachs Bank USA Holdings LLC to become bank holding
companies); Fed. Reserve Sys., Order Approving Formation of Bank Holding Companies

and Notice to Engage in Certain Nonbanking Activities (Sept. 21, 2008),
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/orders/orders20080922a2.pdf
(approving
similar applications of Morgan Stanley, Morgan Stanley Capital Management LLC, and
Morgan Stanley Domestic Holdings, Inc.).
5. See, e.g., Press Release, SEC, Chairman Cox Announces End of Consolidated
Supervised Entities Program (Sept. 26, 2008), available at 2008 WL 4370014.
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6
These events, together with the ongoing turmoil in the financial services sector,
have reignited debate over the regulation of securities, derivatives, and other
activities of U.S. financial services conglomerates, 7 be they bank holding
companies (BHCs), investment bank holding companies, or other financial service
providers. 8 Regulators' inability, unwillingness, or lack of authority to intervene in
the affairs of troubled firms has raised the question whether a new regulatory
paradigm is necessary to prevent (or mitigate the severity of) recurring market
crises involving financial firms other than deposit-taking institutions. 9 At the center
of the debate, the Treasury Department, under successive administrations, has put
forth various regulatory proposals that would assign primary responsibility for the
monitoring of systemic risk across all financial services conglomerates to the
Federal Reserve Board, while delegating authority for prudential and businessconduct regulation of individual firms to other federal agencies.iO
I question whether any regulatory agency or collection of agencies can possess
the authority, independence, and incentive to combat the inherent procyclicality of
the systemic risk inherent in the financial services industry.1 i Financial

6. See, e.g., Emergency Economic StabilizationAct-One Year Later: HearingBefore
the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 11 th Cong. (2009) (describing
progress toward stability in financial markets); Alex Berenson, A Year Later, Little Change
on Wall St., N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 11, 2009, at Al (describing the state of the financial services
industry one year after Lehman's failure).
7. For purposes of this Article, I use the phrase "financial services conglomerates" to
refer generally to holding companies of depository institutions, broker/dealers, insurance
companies, and other financial services providers, and I use the terms "commercial banks"
and "investment banks" to refer colloquially to the holding companies of depository
institutions and broker/dealers respectively. I use the terms "bank holding company" (BHC),
"financial holding company" (FHC), "supervised investment bank holding company"
(SIBHC), "consolidated supervised entity" (CSE), and "Tier 1 FHC" to refer to specific
statutorily defined entities as defined herein throughout the footnotes.
8. Systemic Risk and the FinancialMarkets: Hearings Before the H. FinancialServs.
Comm., 110th Cong. 46-66 (July 24, 2008) (Serial No. 110-130), available at
http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-in/getdoc.cgi?dbname= 10_househearings&docid=f:
44903.pdf (testimony of SEC Chairman Christopher Cox and Timothy F. Geithner, President
and Chief Executive Officer, Federal Reserve Bank of New York). See generally Lawrence
A. Cunningham & David Zaring, The Three or Four Approaches to FinancialRegulation:A
CautionaryAnalysis Against Exuberance in CrisisResponse, 78 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 39, 39
(2009) (summarizing the "bewildering proliferation of alternatives" for reforming financial
regulation in response to the current crisis).
9. See generally Modernizing America's Financial Regulatory Structure, Hearing
Before the CongressionalOversight Panel, 111 th Cong. 10-34 (2009) (statement of Gene L.
Dodaro, Acting Comptroller General) (describing the fragmented nature of the current
regulatory system and proposing a framework for crafting and evaluating reform proposals).
10.

See generally DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, BLUEPRINT FOR A MODERNIZED FINANCIAL

REGULATORY STRUCTURE (2008) [hereinafter PAULSON BLUEPRINT]; DEP'T OF THE
TREASURY, FINANCIAL REGULATORY REFORM: A NEW FOUNDATION (2009) [hereinafter
GEITHNER REPORT].

11. Several commentators have written about the relationship between the business
cycle and the regulatory cycle in financial regulation. See, e.g., Erik F. Gerding, The Next
Epidemic: Bubbles and the Growth and Decay of Securities Regulation, 38 CONN. L. REv.
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professionals have exercised considerable dexterity in eroding, avoiding, or
arbitraging burdensome regulation to reap substantial profits from financially
innovative products.' 2 Moreover, as models for measuring the risks inherent in
financial activity become more refined, regulators have-whether begrudgingly or
enthusiastically-come to rely upon proprietary risk management, rather than
agency-promulgated rules or bank supervision, to manage capital and liquidity in
commercial and investment banking.' 3 The efficacy of regulation thus may well
turn less on defining the proper rules or standards by which to measure risk
management, and more on the mechanisms by which regulators may intervene in
the affairs of troubled firms or remediate the fallout of a failed entity.
In this respect, the divergent philosophies of investment bank and commercial
bank regulation have traditionally pointed to different conclusions. In the world of
commercial banking, history has created an expectation that federal authorities
(whether by statute or on an ad hoc basis) will save diffuse and unsophisticated
depositors from default, whereas in the world of investment banking, the
marketplace-that is, one's counterparties and creditors-has determined whether a
bailout or a bankruptcy is the more cost-effective way to resolve the marketplace's
exposure to a failing firm.1 4 On the one hand, extending the safety net for
commercial banks to investment banking would raise the questions of whether the
speculative activities of investment banks create an undue risk of moral hazard and
whether the risks inherent in investment banking may be prudentially regulated to
limit such moral hazard.1 5 On the other hand, eliminating or further restricting
393, 423-24 (2006); Joseph A. Grundfest, PunctuatedEquilibria in the Evolution of United
States Securities Regulation, 8 STAN. J.L. Bus. & FIN. 1 (2002) (describing the evolution of
securities law as "punctuated" by capital market events spurring regulation); Steven L.
Molinari & Nelson S. Kibler, Broker-Dealers' FinancialResponsibility Under the Uniform
Net CapitalRule-A Casefor Liquidity, 72 GEO. L.J. 1, 25-3 3 (1983). See generally Larry
E. Ribstein, Bubble Laws, 40 Hous. L. REV. 77 (2003) (discussing the cycle of trust and
distrust in boom-bust cycles and the regulatory responses thereto).

12. See infratext accompanying notes 129-32.
13.

BASEL

COMM.

ON

BANKING

SUPERVISION,

BANK

FOR

INT'L

SETTLEMENTS,

A
REVISED FRAMEWORK (2006), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbsl28a.pdf
[hereinafter BASEL II FRAMEWORK]. A "significant innovation" of the Basel II Accords is
"the greater use of assessments of risk provided by banks' internal systems as inputs to
capital calculations" under the first pillar of the Basel II Framework, subject to "a detailed
INTERNATIONAL CONVERGENCE OF CAPITAL MEASUREMENT AND CAPITAL STANDARDS:

set of minimum requirements designed to ensure [their] integrity ....

" Id.

6, at 2.

Moreover, "[wihile the Framework ... stops short of allowing the results of [internal] credit
risk models to be used for regulatory capital purposes, the Committee recognises the
importance of continued active dialogue regarding both the performance of such models and
their comparability across banks." Id. 18, at 5.
14. See, e.g., David A. Skeel, Jr., Governance in the Ruins, 122 HARV. L. REV. 696,
733-42

(2008)

(reviewing CURTIS J. MILHAUPT & KATHARINA PISTOR, LAW AND

CAPITALISM: WHAT CORPORATE CRISES REVEAL ABOUT LEGAL SYSTEMS AND ECONOMIC

DEVELOPMENT AROUND THE WORLD (2008)) (contrasting the role of federal regulators in

traditional commercial bank failures with the actions of the Treasury and the FRB in
rescuing Bear Stearns from bankruptcy and describing the consequences that would have
followed from alternate approaches).
15. See Ben S. Bemanke, Chairman, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Speech
at the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City's Annual Economic Symposium: Reducing
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investment banks' access to the FRB's lending window might simply encourage
unorthodox and arbitrary actions by financial regulators in extreme situations in
spite of legal constraints.16
I argue that the most efficient way to regulate investment banks for financial
responsibility is to formalize the existing expectation that financial services
conglomerates participate (at least, to a degree commensurate with their interest) in
the rescue of an insolvent competitor that the industry deems "too interconnected"
to fail. To that end, this Article proposes a self-regulatory framework for holding
companies of commercial banks and other financial service providers both to make
such determinations and help shoulder the burden in addressing the consequences.
As discussed below, Congress should enact legislation creating the framework of
such an organization, as well as principles for information sharing among
participating firms, to be implemented by specific rules. The organization would be
responsible for identifying risks, determining the flow of information necessary to
contain those risks, and building mechanisms to share that information. More
importantly, the organization would be expected to participate in the financing (and
share in the profits or loss resulting from) any bailout of a member entity, pursuant
to rules established by the organization.
The organization must play a significant role in making a determination whether
an industry bailout is preferable to a privately negotiated bailout or bankruptcy,
along with the extent of such a bailout. Thus, an industry regulator (similar to the
SEC) would be responsible for overseeing rule making that establishes procedures
for making such determinations and enforcing compliance with those rules; such a
regulator might also manage the flow of confidential information among members
to ensure that they are apprised of emerging risks, without revealing proprietary or
counterparty positions. The FRB, meanwhile, would have the authority to monitor
the activities of individual member firms, to set the terms for any acquisition of an
insolvent member firm within the parameters established by the industry
framework, and (at its discretion) to finance or fund a bailout, in part or in whole, if
it is determined to be in the public interest.
Part I of this Article summarizes the history of SEC regulation of broker/dealers
and investment banks for capital adequacy and systemic risk. Part II discusses the
ends and means of financial regulation. Part III reviews some of the alternative
structures for reforming the regulation of investment banks and the financial
markets generally, and Part IV analyzes recent proposals against their light. Finally,
Part V sets out a proposed framework for combining the participation of the FRB,

Systemic Risk (Aug. 22, 2008), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov
/newsevents/speech/bernanke20080822a.htm; see also Richard W. Painter, Bailouts: An
Essay on Conflicts of Interest and Ethics When Government Pays the Tab, 41 McGEORGE L.
REv. 131, 156-57 (2009) (analyzing the incentives of government officials under such an
approach).
16. Steven M. Davidoff & David Zaring, Regulation by Deal: The Government's
Response to the FinancialCrisis, 61 ADMIN. L. REv. 463, 541 (2009) ("There is no question

that executive and independent agencies have stretched their legal authority during the
bailout crisis. In some cases they have done so beyond recognition; the Federal Reserve's
broad interpretation of the set of candidates to whom it could open its discount window
during the crisis has made a mockery of the view that the law should not be interpreted to
disturb the settled expectations of those affected by it.").
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SEC, and the financial services industry in addressing systemic crises in the
financial community.
I. HISTORY OF THE FINANCIAL REGULATION OF INVESTMENT BANKS

While investment banking exhibits many parallels to commercial banking, the
regulatory regimes applicable to such activities in the United States differ
significantly. 7 The core business of commercial banks is financing illiquid assets
(loans) with liquid assets (short-term deposits).' 8 Because of the significant risks to
the integrity of the financial system posed by bank runs, the bank regulatory system
entails both significant ex ante supervision and examination, as well as significant
supervisory and remedial authority with respect to troubled institutions.' 9 By
contrast, the core business of broker/dealers has historically been brokerage,
dealing, and underwriting financed by private capital. Because such activities have
historically been deemed too speculative to provide any sort of federal guarantee,
the focus of broker/dealer regulation has been to protect customer assets-but not
other creditors-from the risk of a broker/dealer's proprietary dealing and trading

17. While there is no standard definition of an "investment bank," the term is generally
understood to refer to holding companies that perform a variety of securities and derivatives
activities-such as securities brokerage, dealing, market making, underwriting, writing
derivatives contracts, and proprietary trading-that are not otherwise subject to FRB
regulation because they do not hold an affiliate operating as a depository institution. See,
e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78q(i)(5) (2006) (defining "investment bank holding company" to mean
any person that owns or controls one or more brokers or dealers and its associated persons);
LARRY HARRIS, TRADING AND EXCHANGES: MARKET MICROSTRUCTURE FOR PRACTITIONERS

140 (2003) (defining "investment banks" as "[b]rokerage firms that engage in large capital
transactions," such as block trading, underwritings, and mergers and acquisitions). The term
"financial holding company" (FHC) was defined in the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act to refer to
an FRB-regulated bank holding company that elects to be regulated as an FHC pursuant to
12 U.S.C. § 1843(l)(1) in order to engage in certain additional financial activities through its
affiliates, such as underwriting, dealing, market making, and selling insurance. 12 U.S.C.
§ 1841(p) (2006). To qualify as an FHC, among other criteria, subsidiaries that are insured
depository institutions must be "well managed" and "well capitalized." Id.§ 1843()(1)(A),
(B); see infra note 163 (discussing 12 U.S.C. § 1843(0)(1)(A)).
18. Daniel R. Fischel, Andrew M. Rosenfield & Robert S. Stillman, The Regulation of
Banks and Bank Holding Companies, 73 VA. L. REv. 301, 306-07 (1987) (arguing that
banks' unique ability to "hold illiquid assets (loans) against their liquid liabilities (deposits)"
is possible, inter alia, because banks are able to pool the risk of withdrawal demands by
holding the deposits of numerous consumers).
19. See, e.g., 3 MICHAEL P. MALLOY, BANKING LAW AND REGULATION § 11.2 (1994 &
Supp. 2007). Regardless of the depository institution's appropriate regulatory agency for
purposes of supervision and examination (e.g., the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency
for national banks or the FRB for state-chartered banks that are members of the Federal
Reserve System), the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), as federally designated
receiver, has broad authority over the supervision and ultimate resolution of any FDICinsured financial institution that is experiencing financial difficulty. Id. (noting that the
Federal Deposit Insurance Act (FDIA) contains a "more or less unified body of enforcement
provisions" applicable to all depository institutions).
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activity. From the origins of broker/dealer regulation to the voluntary regulation
of investment banks, congressional policy has thus been to let investment banks
succeed or fail on their own merits.2 '
Since the failure of Drexel Burnham Lambert Group, Inc. in 1990, if not before,
the SEC and its staff have been acutely aware of the potential for investment bank
defaults to impact the broader securities, derivatives, and credit markets.22
Nevertheless, because it has lacked the mandate to regulate financial markets for
systemic risk,23 the SEC has leveraged its regulatory authority to promote the
financial responsibility of broker/dealers to provide some degree of risk
management for the broader marketplace. 24 Through a combination of specialized
rule making for bulge-bracket firms, 25 outsourcing of prudential supervision to selfregulatory organizations, 26 and voluntary industry compliance efforts, 2 7 Congress

20. Ancillary services, such as research and analysis and investment-advisory services
in connection with mergers and acquisitions and other financial transactions, do not
generally pose threats to the financial responsibility of a firm, although they may raise
conflicts of interest or result in other practices that are deemed to be "fraudulent,"
"deceptive," or "manipulative," 15 U.S.C. §§ 78j, 78o(c) (2006), or otherwise inconsistent
with "just and equitable principles of trade." Id. §§ 78f(b)(5), 78o(b)(6).
21. Cf 2 MALLOY, supra note 19, § 7.2 (observing that, from the perspective of the
historical English model of financial services regulation, "investment banking is... a risky,
speculative venture and consequently... an inappropriate activity for an institution devoted
to the care of deposits from the public").
22. See Cynthia C. Lichtenstein, InternationalStandardsfor Consolidated Supervision
of FinancialConglomerates: ControllingSystemic Risk, 19 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 137, 138-40,
146-50 (1993) (discussing the concerns of the SEC and SEC officials about systemic risks
posed by broker/dealers and their holding companies).
23. See Troy A. Paredes, On the Decision to Regulate Hedge Funds: The SEC's
Regulatory Philosophy, Style, and Mission, 2006 U. ILL. L. REv. 975, 998-1004 (2006)
(questioning whether the SEC possesses the mandate or expertise to regulate hedge funds for
"systemic risk").
24. See, e.g., Net Capital Rule, Exchange Act Release No. 28,927, 56 Fed. Reg. 9124,
9125 (Mar. 5, 1991) ("The primary purpose of the net capital rle... is to protect customers
and creditors of registered broker-dealers from monetary losses and delays when a brokerdealer fails. In this way, the rule acts to prevent systemic risk from the failure of a financial
intermediary.").
25. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-le (2009) (noting that capital requirements for
broker/dealer subsidiaries of unregulated holding companies are subject to voluntary SEC
oversight); id. § 240.15c3-1g (capital requirements for unregulated holding companies of
broker/dealers that voluntarily undertake compliance with SEC supervision).
26. See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. § 240.17d-1 (2009) (describing the process by which the SEC
designates the responsibility to a self-regulatory organization for examining its members for
compliance with applicable financial responsibility rules); Net Capital Rule, Exchange Act
Release No. 39,456, 62 Fed. Reg. 68,011, 68,013 (Dec. 30, 1997) (describing the use of The
Options Clearing Corporation's Theoretical Options Pricing Model by broker/dealers with
the permission of their designated examining authority).
27. Id. at. 68,012-13 (describing the Framework for Voluntary Oversight developed by
the Derivatives Policy Group, under which the members of the Group agreed to report
voluntarily to the Commission on their activities in the over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives
market).
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and the SEC has created a regulatory structure for investment banks that parallels
the FRB's oversight of commercial banks and bank holding companies.
A. Origins
The New Deal financial services legislation of the 1930s attempted to deal with
specific practices that were thought to have contributed to the Great Depression,
such as excessive speculation in securities fueled by credit that led to a series of
bank failures throughout the country.28 On the theory that underwriting and other
investment-banking activities posed a significant risk to the safety and soundness of
banks and their depositors, the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933 sought to bar affiliations
between commercial banks and investment banks. 29 The Act also sought to restore
depositor confidence in the banking system by creating the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation (FDIC) to guarantee customer deposits of insured
institutions. 30 The Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
meanwhile, subjected the underwriting, brokerage, and dealing activity of
broker/dealers31 to significant regulation by a new Securities and Exchange
Commission.
Financial-responsibility rules for broker/dealers were motivated by a desire not
only to dampen speculation fueled by credit 32 but also to ensure that broker/dealers
possessed enough excess capital to satisfy counterparty obligations and civil
judgments under the federal securities acts, as well as a desire to maintain
continuity of business and a serious commitment to the profession.33 The Exchange
Act federalized certain financial safeguards, including the permissible sources of

28. See, e.g., Glass-Steagall Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-66, 48 Stat. 162 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.) ("An Act to provide for the safer and more
effective use of the assets of banks, to regulate interbank control, to prevent the undue
diversion of funds into speculative operations, and for other purposes."); Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-291, 48 Stat. 881 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 78a-78oo (2006)) (determining that "transactions in securities ... are affected with a
national public interest which makes it necessary to provide for regulation and control of
such transactions and of practices and matters related thereto . . . in order to protect
interstate commerce, the national credit, the federal taxing power, to protect and make more
effective the national banking system and Federal Reserve System, and to insure the
maintenance of fair and honest markets in such transactions").
29. 12 U.S.C. §§ 78, 377, repealed by Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999, Pub. L. No.
106-102, § 101, 113 Stat. 1338, 1341.
30. Glass-Steagall Act § 8, 48 Stat. at 168; see 2 MALLOY, supra note 19, § 7.2
(providing the history of the Glass-Steagall Act).
31. Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (2006); Securities Exchange Act of
1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78oo (2006).
32. See Molinari & Kibler, supra note 11, at 4-5.
33.

REPORT OF SPECIAL STUDY OF SECURITIES MARKETS OF THE SECURITIES AND

H.R. Doc. No. 88-95, pt. 1, at 82 (1963) [hereinafter SPECIAL
Some commentators have criticized financial regulators' excessive reliance on
minimum capital requirements in lieu of other prophylactic measures. See, e.g., Bruce S.
Darringer, Swaps, Banks, and Capital:An Analysis of Swap Risks and a CriticalAssessment
of the Basle Accord's Treatment of Swaps, 16 U. PA. J. INT'L Bus. L. 259, 327-36 (1995).
EXCHANGE COMMIssION,
STUDY].
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securities credit for brokers and dealers, 34 a 20:1 aggregate indebtedness-to-netcapital ratio for firms engaged in brokerage activity, 35 and certain limitations on
rehypothecation of customer securities. 36 The Exchange Act, moreover, delegated
extended against securities
uniform authority to the FRB to regulate credit 37
collateral for all bank, broker, and unregulated lenders.
The Commission's initial rule making focused on the risks posed to customer
accounts. The Commission's net capital rule (Exchange Act Rule 15c3-1), for
example, exempted broker/dealers who did not extend credit to customers in
connection with the purchase or sale of securities and who did not carry money or
securities for, or owe money or securities to, their customers. Nevertheless, the
availability of liquid assets was considered of paramount importance to the sound
operation of the brokerage industry; 39 as a result, the Commission rejected, after
public notice and comment, a proposal to segregate customer free credit balances
and unmargined securities from proprietary positions, because broker/dealers relied
on the ability to finance their brokerage and dealing activities with customer funds
and securities. 4°

34. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 8(a), 48 Stat. at 888, repealed by National
Securities Markets Improvement Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-290, § 104(b), 110 Stat. 3416,
3423.
35. Id. § 8(b), 48 Stat. at 888-89, repealed by Securities Acts Amendments of 1975,
Pub. L. No. 94-29, § 5, 89 Stat. 97, 109.
36. Id. § 8(c)-(d), 48 Stat. at 889 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78h(c), (d)
(2006)).
37. 15 U.S.C. § 78g(c) (2006); 12 C.F.R. pt. 220 (2009) (regulating credit extended by
brokers and dealers; entitled Regulation T). The FRB rules primarily distinguished "cash"
transactions (in which the customer is to pay the full purchase price of a security) from
"margin" transactions (for which the customer seeks to borrow a specified percentage of the
purchase price of a security). A broker/dealer could itself borrow funds against a customer's
margined securities (subject to the Act's limitations on rehypothecation) essentially on the
same terms as the broker/dealer's own securities portfolio. To ensure uniform understanding
of the terms of such transactions, margin agreements were standardized by the exchanges.
SPECIAL STUDY, supra note 33, at 390.
38. Ratio of Aggregate Indebtedness to Net Capital, Exchange Act Release No. 3323, 7
Fed. Reg. 8844 (Nov. 3, 1942) (adopting the net capital rule, codified at 17 C.F.R. §
240.15c3-1). The Commission also chose to limit the application of its first net capital rule to
broker/dealers operating in the OTC market, on the grounds that exchange members were

subject to more rigorous requirements under New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) rules. 17
C.F.R. § 240.15c3-1 (1942); see supra note 47 (eliminating this exception).
39. Molinari & Kibler, supra note 11, at 5-6.
40. SPECIAL STUDY, supra note 33, at 399-400. National Association of Securities
Dealers (NASD) rules and NYSE rules required segregation of customer securities, although
such securities could be held in "bulk" on behalf of all customers. Id. at 402-04. SelfRegulatory Organization (SRO) rules also recommended segregation of free credit balances,

although most firms could use customer funds to finance their proprietary trading activities
without restriction. Id. at 402. The Commission had also considered more broadly whether to
require segregation of all brokerage and dealing activities to eliminate conflicts of interest in
the over-the-counter market, but it ultimately settled for the authority to regulate
broker/dealers for recordkeeping and financial responsibility and to prohibit fraudulent
activity in the over-the-counter market. See generally Securities Exchange Act § 15, 15
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B. FederalizationofFinancial-ResponsibilityRegulation
In the late 1960s, Congress and the Commission became increasingly concerned
with the increasing use of leverage by the securities industry.4 Firms were able to
support a relatively significant amount of securities and assets with thin capital by
financing proprietary positions with customer free-credit balances or loans secured
by customer securities; devices such as securities loans or repurchase agreements
and letters of credit, moreover, allowed brokerage firms to borrow greater amounts
than prudential restrictions on secured bank loans would permit. 42 Impermanent
forms of capital-such as subordinated loan agreements-could also result in a
sudden violation of the net capital rule if withdrawn.43 Meanwhile, the failure of a
significant number of brokerage firms from the back-office crisis of the 1960s to
the market decline of 1969 ultimately resulted in Commission recommendations
for
44
legislation to improve the financial responsibility of broker/dealers.
The Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970 created the Securities Investor
Protection Corporation (SIPC) to protect customers' funds and securities when a
broker/dealer encounters financial difficulty. 45 The Act, moreover, required the

Commission to implement a number of additional measures, including safeguards
for the "acceptance of custody and use of customers' securities, and the carrying
U.S.C. § 78o (2006); U.S.

SEC.

& EXCH. COMM'N,

REPORT ON THE FEASIBILITY AND

ADVISABILITY OF T14E COMPLETE SEGREGATION OF THE FUNCTIONS OF DEALER AND BROKER

(1936) [hereinafter SEGREGATION REPORT].
41. JOEL SELIGMAN, TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET 450-66 (3d ed. 2003)
(describing the SEC's reaction to the "back-office" crisis from 1967-1970 and the perceived
inefficacy of exchange capital requirements in ensuring that firms maintained sufficient
liquid assets to meet their obligations).
42. See Molinari & Kibler, supranote 11, at 26-32.

43. See, e.g., SELIGMAN, supra note 41, at 458 (noting that "subordinated loans or
secured demand notes from customers or partners... as of 1970, made up 40 percent of the
capital of all [New York Stock] Exchange member partnerships and 34 percent of the capital
of all Exchange member corporations"); Nicholas Wolfson & Egon Guttman, The Net
Capital Rules for Brokers and Dealers, 24 STAN. L. REv. 603, 624-26, 636 (1972)
(describing subordinated loan agreements and the theoretical concerns with treating them as
capital for purposes of net capital computation).
44. See U.S. SEC. & ExCH. COMM'N, STUDY OF UNSAFE AND UNSOUND PRACTICES OF

BROKERS AND DEALERS, H.R. Doc. No. 92-231, at 13-30 (1971) (summarizing findings
regarding unsafe and unsound practices by broker/dealers that contributed to the demise of
several brokerage firms in 1969-70 and the SEC's recommendations for legislative action in
response thereto).
45. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78aaa-781l (2006). SIPC is empowered to file an application for a
protective decree and to seek appointment of a trustee for the liquidation of a failing
broker/dealer's business and distribution of customer property pursuant to the special
provisions of the Act. Id.§§ 78eee(b), 78fff, 78fff-2. SLPC may also advance funds to the
trustee for the prompt payment and satisfaction of net equity claims of customers (not to
exceed $500,000 per customer, and for cash claims, $100,000 per customer). Id. § 78fff-3.
As part of its risk-management function, SIPC consults with broker/dealer SROs to ensure
that SIPC members are in compliance with applicable financial responsibility rules and
develop procedures reasonably designed to detect firms approaching financial difficulty. Id.
§ 78iii(e). The SIPC fund is maintained through periodic assessments upon its members. Id.
§ 78ddd(c).
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and use of customers' deposits or credit balances. ' ' 6 The SEC's customerprotection and net capital rules implemented the specific statutory mandate to
require "the maintenance of reserves with respect to customers' deposits or credit
balances" and "minimum financial responsibility requirements for all brokers and
dealers. ' 47 The Securities Acts Amendments of 1975 advanced48 this trend by
requiring the creation of a national clearance and settlement system.
Ironically, the 1970 amendments and the customer protection rule weakened the
case for minimum-liquidity and net capital requirements for broker/dealers.
Because the reserve and custody requirements of the customer-protection rule were
designed to protect customer assets against a broker's insolvency, the need for a
separate net capital requirement was considerably lessened. a9 While some
Commission staff members maintained that the net capital rule had a more systemic
role to play in the "highly cyclical nature" of the securities industry,50 the
Commission nevertheless acknowledged that its rules should "avoid[] the
inefficient and costly commitment of capital within the securities industry where
such a commitment is not necessary for customer protection." 5' The amended net
capital rule thus incorporated an "alternative" formula, which permitted firms to
compute net capital
based on customer indebtedness instead of the firm's aggregate
52
indebtedness.
C. The Move to ConsolidatedRegulation
In the 1970s, facing the need to raise additional capital to computerize their
outmoded back-office operations, several major investment banks sought access to
public equity markets. 53 The New York Stock Exchange liberalized its rules to
permit broker/dealers to become publicly traded companies. 4 Most of the major

46. Id. § 78o(c)(3)(A).
47. Id.The Commission's uniform net capital rule thus dispensed with the exemption
for exchange member broker/dealers. Adoption of Uniform Net Capital Rule and an
Alternative Net Capital Requirement for Certain Brokers and Dealers, Exchange Act Release
No. 11,497, 40 Fed. Reg. 29,795 (July 16, 1975).
48. See 15 U.S.C. § 78q-1 (2006).
49. See Exchange Act Release No. 11,497, 40 Fed. Reg. at 29,797 ("Ultimately, it may
be possible for [the customer protection rule] in some form to replace the liquidity
requirements of the net capital rule ....
");
Molinari & Kibler, supra note 11, at 26 n. 154.
50. Molinari & Kibler, supra note 11, at 22-33.
51. Exchange Act Release No. 11,497,40 Fed. Reg. at 29,798.
52. The alternative formula "presupposes that the debits in the Reserve Formula are
collectible, that they will be applied to pay off customer claims in a liquidation, and that the
cushion of two percent of customer-related receivables .. . will be applied against
administrative costs in the event of a liquidation." Molinari & Kibler, supra note 11, at 1617. Because the firm was required to segregate excess credit balances and fully paid
customer securities, all of the firm's customer claims would have been satisfied by the
combination of segregated funds, securities, and collection of customer receivables, plus the
regulatory cushion under the rule. 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-1(a)(ii) (2009).
53. See SEUGMAN, supra note 41, at 466-86.
54. Donaldson, Lufkrin & Jenrette (DLJ) filed a registration statement with the SEC for a
public issue of common stock in May 1969; the NYSE voted later that year to "support the
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investment banks continued to operate as partnerships or closely held enterprises,
since their reputation relied on "tacit" transmission of skills and connections among
partners or voting members and they viewed other activities as potentially diluting
their franchise. 55 The emergence of computer-driven trading and arbitrage activity,
however, reinforced the dramatic increase in the balance sheets of the most highly
capitalized financial institutions and the corresponding leverage necessary to mine
financial activities with increasingly thin margins.5 6 By the 1990s, the major
7
investment banks had gradually shifted to a public-holding-company structure.5
The gradual deregulation of core commercial5 8 and investment-banking
activity59 over this period contributed to this trend. 60 The willingness of regulators
concept of public ownership of equity securities issued by member corporations," and it
eventually voted to amend its constitution to permit public ownership of member firms in
March 1970. SELIGMAN, supra note 41, at 466-67.
55. Professors Morrison and Wilhelm suggest that retail-oriented firms specializing in
brokerage activity (such as DLJ, Merrill Lynch, EF Hutton, Bache, Paine Webber, and Dean
Witter), were among the earliest firms to seek access to public capital in order to finance the
cost of computerizing their back-office operations; firms known for their advisory services,
such as Goldman Sachs and Lazard Frires, were among the last to convert into public
corporations (in 1999 and 2005, respectively) because of the reputational benefits of the
partnership structure. See

ALAN

D.

MORRISON & WILLIAM J. WILHELM, JR., INVESTMENT

236-38, 276-80 (2007).
56. Commentators observe, for example, that profits may be increasingly mined from
derivatives and other banking activity through the application of technical financial skills,
rather than reputational skills or private information culled over years of experience. See id.
at 225-64 (describing the impact of computerization and modem financial economics on the
BANKING: INSTITUTIONS, POLITICS, AND LAw

profitability of investment banks); Henry T.C. Hu, Swaps, the Modern Process of Financial
Innovation and the Vulnerability of a Regulatory Paradigm, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 333, 338

(1989) (describing the shift from "craft" to "theory"). Because of significant competition,
however, only the most highly capitalized firms can profitably deploy such techniques to
generate consistent returns. See MORRISON & WILHELM, supra note 55, at 278-80
(describing the "wave of investment flotations" by wholesale-oriented investment banks,
which was motivated by their need for capital to support the expansion of computerized
trading activity). The result is an increasing divergence between the most highly capitalized
banks and the smaller commercial banks, brokerage firms, and investment advisors
providing more traditional financial services. Id. at 293-310.
57. Public capitalization is a mixed blessing for investment banks. As reporting
companies, such holding companies are required to disclose a greater amount of information
about the business risks of their proprietary activities to the public. Steven L. Schwarcz,
Rethinking the DisclosureParadigm in a World of Complexity, 2004 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 10
(discussing Item 305 of Regulation S-K). Reliance on public capitalization also means that
financial institutions are acutely sensitive to their public share price, particularly if
compensation of traders and their supervisors is tied to short-term stock performance rather
than the risk horizon for their product markets. INST. OF INT'L FIN., FINAL REPORT OF THE IIF
COMMITTEE ON MARKET BEST PRACTICES: PRINCIPLES OF CONDUCT AND BEST PRACTICE
RECOMMENDATIONS 58-61 (2008) [hereinafter IIF REPORT].
58. Commercial banks have long relied on the ability to finance long-term loans with
short-term deposits; crucial to the success of this "carry trade" is the ability to guarantee a
profitable spread between the rates charged to borrowers and the rates paid to depositors. See
Karl S. Okamoto, After the Bailout: Regulating Systemic Moral Hazard, 57 UCLA L. REv.
183, 192-93 (2009). The elimination of restrictions on the interest rate payable in savings
accounts, as well as the development of strategies to circumvent restrictions on the payment
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to permit regulated entities and their affiliates to branch into the jurisdiction of
other regulators, often without judicial resistance, accelerated the deregulatory
process; 61 indeed, commercial banks and broker/dealers clashed over the proper
of interest in checking accounts under § 19i of the Federal Reserve Act, 12 U.S.C. § 371a
(2006), and Regulation Q thereunder, 12 C.F.R. § 225.3 (2009), through money market
funds and negotiated orders of withdrawal, has created greater pressure on banks to tighten
this spread. See, e.g., Timothy A. Canova, The Transformationof U.S. Banking and Finance:
From Regulated Competition to Free-MarketReceivership, 60 BROOK. L. REv. 1295, 1327-

30 (1995) (arguing that competition among banks to offer higher interest rates "spurred highrisk loans" and the savings and loan crisis of the late 1980s); Charles R.P. Pouncy,
Contemporary FinancialInnovation: Orthodoxy and Alternatives, 51 S.M.U. L. REv. 505,
569 (1998) (observing competition from mutual funds and other investment vehicles

providing traditional check-cashing and retail banking services). Specialized electronic
trading platforms enable corporations with a high credit rating seeking short-term financing
to bypass financial institutions in favor of direct access to commercial paper markets. SEC.
INDuS. & FIN. MKTS. Ass'N, ECOMMERCE IN THE FIXED-INCOME MARKETS: THE 2006 REVIEW

OF ELECTRONIC TRANSACTION SYSTEMS 4-16 (2006) (surveying electronic platforms for
various sectors--including commercial paper-by trading method, participants, and
availability
of pretrade prices
and posttrade
information),
available at

http://www.sifma.org/research/pdf/2006eCommerceSurveyFinal120606.pdf.
59. The profitability of the traditional brokerage, dealing, and underwriting activities of
investment banks has also come under pressure from deregulation and advances in
technology. See MORRISON & WILHELM, supra note 55, at 231-38, 240-42, 245-49. The
abolition of fixed-commission schedules for brokerage transactions, as well as the entry of
commercial banks into "discount" brokerage, spurred competition in brokerage
compensation. SELIGMAN, supra note 41, at 473-86. Competition from electronic trading
platforms, together with pressure from antitrust regulators and the SEC to abandon
anticompetitive market-making practices, has reduced profit margins for exchange
specialists and market makers. Roberta S. Karmel, Turning Seats Into Shares: Causes and
Implications of Demutualization of Stock and Futures Exchanges, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 367,
386-87 (2002); Jerry W. Markham & Daniel J. Harty, For Whom the Bell Tolls: The Demise
of Exchange Trading Floors and the Growth of ECNs, 33 J. CORP. L. 865, 887-911 (2008).
The availability of shelf registration for offerings of equity and debt securities under the
Securities Act may have reduced the underwriters' spread on securities offerings by eligible
issuers. David S. Kidwell, M. Wayne Marr & G. Rodney Thompson, Shelf Registration:
Competition and Market Flexibility, 30 J.L. & ECON. 181, 205-06 (1987); Pouncy, supra
note 58, at 570-71.
60. Jon Hilsenrath, Markets Police Themselves Poorly, but Regulation Has Its Flaws,
WALL ST. J., July 21, 2008, at A2. At least one commentator has suggested that it is no
longer justifiable to bundle routine account services for bank depositors with the high-risk
activities of commercial banks, particularly in light of the broad range of mutual funds and
other financial institutions that can perform this risk-taking function for investors. Oz Shy &
Rune Stenbacka, Rethinking the Roles of Banks: A Callfor Narrow Banking, ECONOMIST'S
VOICE, June 2008, at 4, available at http://www.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?
article=1271 &context=ev.
61. See, e.g., Bd. of Trade of Chi. v. SEC, 187 F.3d 713 (7th Cir. 1999) (concluding,
over the SEC's objection, that futures contracts could be listed on the Dow Jones Utilities
and Transportation Averages, because they reflected the market performance of industries
that themselves represented a substantial segment of the market); Bd. of Trade of Chi. v.
SEC, 923 F.2d 1270 (7th Cir. 1991) (upholding SEC's order to permit a proprietary trading
system for options on government securities operated by Delta Government Options

Corporation not to register as an "exchange" under § 6 of the Exchange Act, over the
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scope of activities permitted under their respective statutory regimes.62 Moreover,
64
63
unregulated entities, such as hedge funds and structured investment vehicles,
objections of rival CFTC-registered commodity exchanges trading Treasury futures); Chi.
Mercantile Exch. v. SEC, 883 F.2d 537 (7th Cir. 1989) (holding that "index participations"
were both securities and futures contracts, but that the CFTC's exclusive jurisdiction over
futures contracts precluded SEC action with respect to such instruments).
62. For example, the Commission attempted to check the incremental expansion of
securities activities by national- and state-chartered banks-in the face of judicial
acquiescence to such activities within the Glass-Steagall framework-in its Rule 3b-9. 17
C.F.R. § 240.3b-9 (2007), repealedby Definitions of Terms and Exemptions Relating to the
"Broker" Exceptions for Banks, Exchange Act Release No. 56,501, 72 Fed. Reg. 56,514,
56,566 (2007). See, e.g., Sec. Indus. Ass'n v. Bd. of Governors, 468 U.S. 207 (1984)
(upholding FRB order permitting nonbanking subsidiaries of a bank holding company to
operate a discount brokerage business for bank customers); Sec. Indus. Ass'n v. Bd. of
Governors, 807 F.2d 1052 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (upholding FRB order permitting state-chartered
commercial bank to place commercial paper issued by third party); Sec. Indus. Ass'n v.
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, 577 F. Supp. 252 (D.D.C. 1983), aft'd, 758 F.2d
739 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (per curiam), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, Clarke v. Sec. Indus.
Ass'n, 479 U.S. 388 (1986).
Rule 3b-9 subjected to Commission regulation any bank that earned "transaction-related
compensation" from brokerage services, whether as an accommodation for existing banking
customers or resulting from public solicitation. 17 C.F.R. § 240.3b-9 (2007). The
Commission deemed banks (or bank subsidiaries) providing such services to be excluded
from the definition of "bank" under the Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(6), and thus subject to
regulation as brokers and dealers. The Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit vacated Rule
3b-9 in American Bankers Ass'n v. Securities and Exchange Commission, 804 F.2d 739
(D.C. Cir. 1986). Noting that Congress was aware of the various securities-related activities
in which banks had traditionally engaged, id. at 746, the court observed that the regulatory
structure established by Congress was designed to avoid duplicative regulation of financial
institutions. Id. at 747 (noting the exemption for banks from the definitions of "broker,"
"dealer," "investment company," and "investment adviser"). The Court particularly noted
that the term "bank" was defined "in terms of the government agencies that regulated them,"
rather than the specific functions they performed (i.e., deposit-taking). Id. The exclusion of
banks from registration as brokers and dealers was thus "but one part of a consistent
congressional policy of keeping oversight of the banking system separate from the SEC's
oversight of the securities trading and investment industries." Id.
63. The nature of securities and derivatives trading, to a degree, limits the competitive
impact of such entities. To obtain access to trading markets without revealing their trading
strategies, for example, hedge funds and other entities typically must employ the services of
a prime broker. Danforth Townley, Davis Polk & Wardwell Memorandum Re: Negotiations
of Prime Brokerage Arrangements, in HEDGE FUNDS 2008, at 165, 167 (PLI Corp. Law &
Practice, Course Handbook Series No. 14,014, 2008) (setting forth the basic terms of a prime
brokerage agreement, including description of margin and collateial requirements); Letter
from Brandon Becker, Director, Division of Market Regulation, Securities and Exchange
Commission, to Jeffrey C. Bernstein, Prime Broker Committee (Jan. 25, 1994), reprintedin
Townley, supra at 172-73 (setting forth interpretation of Commission and FRB rules for
collection of margin and valuation of collateral from hedge fund customers pursuant to
Regulation T). As a result, such funds remain subject to each investment bank's prudential
limitations on customer borrowing or leverage.
Moreover, the individually tailored terms of swap agreements and the need for opacity
ensures that most over-the-counter derivatives will be written through "swap dealers" rather
than in principal-to-principal transactions. Hu, supra note 56, at 354-56.
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profited from trading and arbitrage activities that commercial and investment banks
performed; 65 these activities also raised concerns about systemic risk."6 In an effort
to compete with such entities, financial institutions began to sponsor their own67offbalance-sheet investment vehicles through their investment advisory affiliates.
Unlike bank holding companies, which became subject to significant restrictions
on their activities and affirmative obligations with respect to their subsidiaries
much earlier, 68 investment banks were not generally subject to prudential or other
regulatory restrictions on financial activities performed through affiliates. 69 The
64. See, e.g., Edward J. Janger, The Death of Secured Lending, 25 CARDOzo L. REV.
1759, 1777-78 (2004) (arguing that "[s]ecured lending runs the risk of becoming the poor
cousin of securitization, not because securitization offers greater efficiency, but because it
facilitates regulatory evasions and creates economic distortions").
65. Such vehicles do not perform traditional deposit-taking or broker/dealer services and
rely on private capital raising, although some have sought to compete with financial
companies and investment banking groups in the provision of certain financial services to
third parties, such as writing commercial loans. Paredes, supra note 23, at 1001 n.101.
66. Because the books and records of such entities are not subject to regulatory
oversight, regulators can only piece together the concentration risk to such hedge funds from
any reports or compliance inspections of the financial intermediaries with whom they deal.
STAFF OF THE SEC. & ExCH. COMM'N, IMPLICATIONS OF THE GROWTH OF HEDGE FUNDS 79
(2003) [hereinafter 2003 HEDGE FUND REPORT] ("The Commission may indirectly view
certain limited aspects of hedge fund trading activities through its supervision of other
market participants, i.e., broker-dealers, SROs, etc. These avenues, however, present a
fragmented view of the overall trading activity of hedge funds.").
67. Of course, to the extent that the proprietary funds are backed by the reputation of the
sponsoring firm, an expectation may be created that the firm will guarantee obligations of
the sponsored fund if it defaults. See, e.g., David Enrich, Inside Citi, a Hedge-FundPush
Blows Up; Brokers' Pitch to Investors Was One of Low Risk; Now, a Suit and a Move to
Compensate for Big Losses, WALL ST. J., Apr. 29, 2008, at CI (reporting Citigroup's
consideration whether to cover some losses in its Falcon and ASTA/MAT hedge funds); see
also infra note 143.
68. The Bank Holding Company Act of 1956 gives the FRB the authority to regulate
holding companies that have one or more operating subsidiaries that are depository
institutions. See, e.g., 3 MALLOY, supra note 19, § 8.2.1 (reciting history of the Bank
Holding Company Act). The Act gave the Board the authority to permit bank holding
companies (BHCs) to engage in certain activities "closely related to banking," 12 U.S.C.
§ 1843(c)(8) (2006); 12 C.F.R. § 225.28(b) (2009) (Regulation Y), to examine such
affiliates, § 1844(c); § 225.5, and to require the BHC to terminate the activity or to terminate
control of the subsidiary if the Board reasonably believed that such activity or control, inter
alia, "constitute[d] a serious risk to the financial safety, soundness, or stability of a bank
holding company subsidiary bank," § 1843(e); § 225.4. See 1 EDWARD F. GREENE, ALAN L.
BELLER, EDWARD J. ROSEN, LESLIE N. SILVERMAN, DANIEL A. BRAVERMAN & SEBASTIAN R.

SPERBER, U.S. REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITIES AND DERIVATIVES MARKETS

§ 13.04[3] (9th ed. 2009). A series of legislative and regulatory initiatives steadily increased
the obligations of BHCs vis-A-vis their bank subsidiaries. See, e.g., John C. Deal, Bob F.
Thompson & Bennett L. Ross, Capital Punishment: The Death of Limited Liability for
Shareholders of Federally Regulated Financial Institutions, 24 CAP. U. L. REV. 67, 75
(1995); Howell E. Jackson, The Expanding Obligations of FinancialHolding Companies,
107 HARV. L. REV. 507, 510-11 (1994).
69. Both NYSE and NASD rules, however, required approval of all control affiliates of
a broker/dealer as well as subsequent changes in control. See, e.g., NYSE Rule 304(e), 2
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failure of Drexel Burnham Lambert and other firms in the high-yield securities
market, however, reinforced SEC concerns that creditors of a broker/dealer affiliate
might come to rely on the creditworthiness of the broker/dealer, in the expectation
that the parent would shift capital from the broker/dealer as necessary to meet an
affiliate's obligations. 70 Legislation thus authorized the Commission to request
information regarding the activities of "material associated persons" of
broker/dealers in order to obtain a better picture of the holding company's total
exposure.7'
Holding company structures also permitted a degree of regulatory arbitrage.
Major investment banks, for example, moved their over-the-counter (OTC)
derivatives dealing businesses into unregulated affiliates, often offshore,72 to avoid
the application of U.S. broker/dealer law and financial responsibility
requirements; 73 in the process, holding companies diverted capital to such affiliates
N.Y.S.E. Guide (CCH) 2304 (Mar. 8, 2006) (requiring Exchange approval of"[a]ny person
who controls a member or member organization, ... but is not a member or allied member
or employee of a member organization"); NASD Rule 1017(a), FINRA Manual (FINRA), at
16,131 (June 26, 2008) (requiring members to file an application for approval of certain
changes to its "ownership, control, or business operations").
70. S. REP. No. 101-300, at 50-58 (1990); see also Jackson, supra note 68, at 564-68
(citing empirical evidence opposing this "hungry wolf' hypothesis); Peter P. Swire, Bank
Insolvency Law Now That It Matters Again, 42 DUKE L.J. 469, 481 (1992) (contrasting
FIRREA cross-guarantees and other FDIC insolvency powers with traditional powers of
trustee in bankruptcy); cf 12 U.S.C. § 1815(e) (2006) (FIRREA cross-guarantee provision).
71. Market Reform Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-432, § 4, 104 Stat. 963, 966-73
(codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78q(h) (2006)); see also 15 U.S.C. § 78o-5(b)(2) (2006) (authorizing
the Secretary of the Treasury to promulgate recordkeeping and reporting requirements for
risk assessment for holding companies of government securities brokers and dealers). Prior
to such authority, the Commission had adopted rules imposing a deduction from net worth
when computing net capital for intercompany transactions with affiliates whose books and
records were not available for examination, ostensibly to detect embezzlement or fraudulent
transactions. Financial Responsibility Rules, Exchange Act Release No. 24,553, 52 Fed.
Reg. 22,295 (June 11, 1987). The Commission also amended the net capital rule to impose
restrictions on the withdrawal of capital, Net Capital Rule, Exchange Act Release No.
28,927, 56 Fed. Reg. 9124 (Mar. 5, 1991), and promulgated additional early warning rules to
provide the Commission staff with earlier notice of such withdrawals, 17 C.F.R. § 240.17a11(2009).
72. See, e.g., Ben S. Bemanke, Chairman, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys.,
Keynote Address at the FDIC's Forum on Mortgage Lending for Low and Moderate Income
Households: Financial Regulation and Financial Stability (July 8, 2008) (noting the difficulty
of adopting liquidation rules for holding companies of investment banks, inter alia, because
they book a large share of their assets at offshore affiliates subject to foreign bankruptcy
laws).
73. See, e.g., PRESIDENT'S WORKING GROUP ON FIN. MKTS., OVER-THE-COUNTER
DERIVATIVES MARKETS AND THE COMMODITY ExCHANGE ACT 34-35 (1999), available at
http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/docs/otcact.pdf (noting the use of unregulated
investment bank holding company affiliates to house OTC derivatives dealing); Darringer,
supra note 33, at 330-31 (asserting that "setting inappropriate capital requirements" for
swaps, among other consequences, "will drive certain business from the regulated sector to
the unregulated sector"). The lack of legal certainty afforded to OTC derivatives is also
alleged to have played a role in the expatriation of the OTC derivatives business.
PRESIDENT'S WORKING GROUP ON FIN. MKTS., supra at 1. Congress eventually
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(and away from the broker/dealer) to provide derivatives affiliates with greater
credit support. 74 Following a concept release to solicit advice on reforming its
financial responsibility rules, the Commission took gradual steps to modernize net
capital computation75 and repatriate derivatives business conducted through such
affiliates. 76 As discussed below, these efforts culminated in its 2004 rule making
designed to permit broker/dealers that are part of consolidated
supervised entities
77
(CSEs) to calculate net capital on a consolidated basis.

D. The Aftermath of the Repeal of Glass-Steagall

In 1999, the enactment of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act permitted bank holding
companies to engage in a broader variety of financial activities 78 through affiliates,
subject to the functional regulation of each affiliate by its designated regulator.79
accommodated such contracts in the Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000. Pub.
L. No. 106-554 app. E, § 105, 114 Stat. 2763A-365, 2763A-379 (codified as amended at 7
U.S.C. § 2(g) (2006)) (excluding from the Commodity Exchange Act's prohibition on offboard trading of futures contracts any swap transaction on a nonagricultural commodity
entered into by "eligible contract participants" that are "subject to individual negotiation by
the parties" and "not executed or traded on a trading facility").
74. See, e.g., OTC Derivatives Dealers, Exchange Act Release No. 40,594, 63 Fed. Reg.
59,362, 59,363 nn.7-9 (Nov. 3, 1998) (describing, for example, the desirability of uniform
treatment with respect to OTC derivatives that are securities-such as options on
securities-and OTC derivatives that are not securities); Michael P. Jamroz, The Net Capital
Rule, 47 Bus. LAw. 863, 898 (1992); Roberta Romano, A Thumbnail Sketch of Derivative
Securities and Their Regulation, 55 MD. L. REV. 1, 63 (1996); Adam R. Waldman, OTC
Derivatives & Systemic Risk: Innovative Financeor the Dance into the Abyss?, 43 Am. U. L.

REV. 1023, 1050 (1994) (describing the development of derivative product companies by
major investment banks whose debt had recently been downgraded in order to obtain AAA
status). By contrast, U.S. banks engaged in swaps activity pursuant to guidance from and
prudential oversight of bank regulators. Exchange Act Release No. 40,594, 63 Fed. Reg. at
59,363 nn.7-9 (describing differential regulation of swaps and derivatives by federal
securities and banking regulators).
75. Net Capital Rule, Exchange Act Release No. 38,248, 62 Fed. Reg. 6474 (Feb. 12,
1997) (permitting use of theoretical option pricing models for listed options and related
hedges).
76. Exchange Act Release No. 40,594, 63 Fed. Reg. at 59,362 (adopting final rules that
created a separate regulatory regime to entice repatriation of broker/dealer affiliates dealing
in derivatives). The Commission's rules exempted such "OTC derivatives dealers" in certain
"eligible OTC derivatives instruments" under Rule 3b-13 from many aspects of
broker/dealer regulation and permitted OTC derivatives dealers to use Value at Risk models
(VaR) to compute net capital, subject to appropriate internal controls and Commission
supervision. 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-1f (2009).
77. Alternative Net Capital Requirements for Broker-Dealers That Are Part of
Consolidated Supervised Entities, Exchange Act Release No. 49,830, 69 Fed. Reg. 34,428
(June 21, 2004).
78. Compare 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(I)(A)-(B) (2006) (permitting FHC activities
"financial in nature or incidental to such financial activity," or "complementary to a financial
activity and [which do] not pose a substantial risk to the safety or soundness of depository
institutions or the financial system generally"), with id. § 1843(c)(8) (permitting BHC
activities "so closely related to banking as to be a proper incident thereto").
79. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Pub. L. No. 106-102, § 101, 113 Stat. 1338, 1341 (1999).
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Such "financial holding companies" were to be subject to the "umbrella" authority
of the FRB.80 To ensure that U.S. investment banks received "equivalent" treatment
with U.S. bank holding companies and universal banks under non-U.S. law,
Congress simultaneously mandated that the Commission establish a program of
voluntary supervision of investment bank holding companies, along the lines of the
Basel Accords. 81 The Commission's 2004 rule making for supervised investment
bank holding companies (SIBHCs),8 2 taken together with its rule making for CSEs
promulgated the same day,8 3 created a regulatory system for investment banks that,
for most purposes, effectively mirrored Gramm-Leach-Bliley's system of oversight
for financial holding companies.
The Commission, in supervising CSEs, simplified its task by permitting
consolidated regulation by the FRB of the broker/dealer affiliates of commercial
banks, while focusing its own resources on ultimate holding companies of financial
services conglomerates that are. not financial holding companies (FHCs) or
similarly supervised entities. First, the use of internal modeling was limited to
highly capitalized firms84 that were subject to regulation on a firm-wide basis.
Second, firms wishing to escape the onerous, strategy-based computations of the
historic net capital rule were required either to demonstrate that their ultimate
holding company was regulated by the FRB or to submit to consolidated regulation
by the SEC.85 Because only a handful of firms ever qualified as CSEs that were not
The Act repealed former sections 20 and 32 of the Glass-Steagall Act, which barred national
banks and state member banks from being affiliated with, or having certain personnel
relationships with, entities in certain securities activities. Id. BHCs that elect not to be
regulated as FHCs remain subject to essentially the same requirements applicable under
former section 20. See 1 GREENE ET AL., supra note 68, § 13.03[1], at 13-14 & n.36.
80. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 1844(c)(2)(B)-(E), (3), (4) (2006) (limiting the Board's power
to examine, regulate, and set capital adequacy requirements for certain regulated affiliates of
an FHC).
81. 15 U.S.C. § 78q(i) (2006); Supervised Investment Bank Holding Companies,
Exchange Act Release No. 49,831, 69 Fed. Reg. 34,472 (June 21, 2004); see also Regulation
of investment Banks: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Securities, Insurance, and Investment
of the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 110th Cong. (2008) (LexisNexis

Congressional) (statement of Erik Sirri, Director, Division of Trading and Markets, SEC)
(describing impetus for the CSE program).

82. Supervised Investment Bank Holding Companies, Exchange Act Release No.
49,831, 69 Fed. Reg. 34,472 (June 21, 2004) (adopting release).

83. Alternative Net Capital Requirements for Broker-Dealers That Are Part of
Consolidated Supervised Entities, Exchange Act Release No. 49,830, 69 Fed. Reg. 34,428
(June 21, 2004) (adopting release).
84. Eligibility for supervision on a consolidated basis is conditioned, inter alia, upon the
broker/dealer maintaining $1 billion in "tentative net capital" (i.e., net capital before certain
adjustments for market and credit risk) and $500 million in "net capital" at all times and
notifying the Commission if its "tentative net capital" falls below $5 billion. 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.15c3-(a)(7) (2009).
85. As discussed below, for the largest "bulge-bracket" firms, the formal computations
of the SEC's net capital requirement have been supplanted by more principles-based holding
company regulation. Cf 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-le (2009) (capital requirements for
broker/dealer subsidiaries of unregulated holding companies subject to voluntary SEC
oversight); id. § 240.15c3-1g (capital requirements for unregulated holding companies of

broker/dealers that voluntarily undertake compliance with SEC supervision).
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regulated by the FRB at the holding company level-namely, Goldman Sachs,
Morgan Stanley, Lehman Brothers, Merrill Lynch, and Bear Steams 86 -the SEC
believed it could use its limited staff resources to conduct reviews with
87 a
respectable level of periodicity, even if it was unable to supervise continuously.
The SEC's efforts at regulating CSEs were hobbled, however, by the lack of a
credible deterrent threat-even if the program were more than voluntary. First, the
SEC does not enjoy the same level of political independence as the FRB, which
renders it unduly susceptible to political pressure from Wall Street. ss Second,
prudential supervision, which requires iterative application of principles and
standards to a firm's internal controls, entails substantial ex post compliance
efforts, 89 which in turn require a dedicated stream of revenue-something the SEC
does not have.90 As a result, the SEC has an incentive to focus precious resources
on those areas most likely to generate immediate reputational or psychic benefits
for the agency and its staff,9 1 rather than litigation or administrative action against
large investment banks. Third, the SEC may be hesitant to trigger a financial crisis
by suspending the activities of a major investment bank without the power to
facilitate an orderly resolution of the claims of the broker/dealer's affiliates.92

86. OFFICE OF AUDITS, OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, SEC's
OVERSIGHT OF BEAR STEARNS AND RELATED ENTITIES: THE CONSOLIDATED SUPERVISED

ENTITY PROGRAM 1 n.16 (2008), available at http://finance.senate.gov/press/Gpress/2008/
prg092608i.pdf [hereinafter OIG REPORT].
87. See id. at 37-38. See generally id. (detailing the Commission's oversight
deficiencies with regard to the collapse of Bear Steams).
88. The five-year terms of service of SEC commissioners, the relative concentration of
power in the chairman to set the agency's agenda, the perceived revolving door between the
industry and the Commission's senior staff, and the agency's dependence on Congressional
funding that varies from year to year all contribute to a risk of extreme political sensitivityif not regulatory capture-by Wall Street firms wielding influence on Capitol Hill. 15 U.S.C.
§ 78d (2006); see, e.g., Donald C. Langevoort, The SEC as a Lawmaker: Choices About
Investor Protection in the Face of Uncertainty, 84 WASH. U. L.R. 1591, 1597-98 (2006)
(chairman, senior officers rotate out); Joel Seligman, Self-Funding for the Securities and
Exchange Commission, 28 NOVA L. REv. 233, 253-58 (2004) (describing the appropriations
process for the SEC and the desirability of self-funding). The FRB, by contrast, consists of
governors who enjoy longer terms and funds itself through assessments on member banks
and profits from its proprietary trading activities. 12 U.S.C. §§ 243, 244 (2006); see also
Steven A. Ramirez, DepoliticizingFinancialRegulation, 41 WM. & MARY L. REV. 503, 525
(2000).
89. Cf Howell E. Jackson, Variation in the Intensity of Financial Regulation:
Preliminary Evidence and Potential Implications, 24 YALE J. ON REG. 253, 267 (2007)
(discussing regulatory budget for depository institutions).
90. See Seligman, supra note 88, at 253-58 (advocating self-funding for the SEC).
91. See Langevoort, supra note 88, at 1619-23 (describing the SEC enforcement
process and the incentives of agency litigators as distinct from rule makers); see, e.g., U.S.
SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, 2007 PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT 27 (2007),
(reporting, among other
available at http://www.sec.gov/about/secpar2007.shtml
performance measures, "distribution of cases across core enforcement areas," "enforcement
cases successfully resolved," and "percentage of first enforcement cases filed within two
years").
92. In particular, the inability to oversee the liquidation of foreign affiliates would

INDIANA LA WJOURNAL

[Vol. 85:777

These structural infirmities may, at least in part, have been responsible for the
SEC's inability to manage the collapse of Bear Steams and Lehman Brothers.
Officially, the SEC Chairman maintained that the collapse of Bear Steams was due
to a "crisis of confidence" that denied the firm the short-term liquidity it needed
despite the fact that it was well capitalized and possessed liquid collateral.93 The
SEC's Office of the Inspector General, in its report on the CSE program in the
wake of the collapse of Bear Steams, 94 noted, among other factors, that the
Commission's Division of Trading and Markets was aware that Bear Steams had
significant concentrations of market risk in mortgage-backed securities; 95 that the
firm's risk-management personnel lacked the necessary expertise, staffing, and
independence from traders; 96 and that Bear Steams was not "compliant with the
spirit of certain Basel II standards" and failed to update its internal models to reflect
the risks posed by its business.97
The Inspector General attributed the inability of the Division staff to address
these "red flags" in part to a lack of staffing, 98 a lack of an effective process for
tracking material issues to ensure that they were resolved, 99 and a lack of
coordination with other divisions and other regulators.1l° It is not clear, however,
what steps the Division staff or other personnel at the Commission could have
taken to address these deficiencies, at least after the Commission had permitted
Bear Steams to participate in the CSE program o1 Moreover, given the rash of near
failures by bank holding companies not subject to consolidated regulation by the
SEC, the Inspector General's additional findings about the SEC's failure to impose
specific leverage limitations on CSEs (as with non-CSE broker/dealers) 0 2 or the
inadequacy of its capital or liquidity metrics point to a larger failure of meaningful
tools for regulatory oversight, as discussed in the next section.

complicate resolution of an investment bank. See supra note 72. As a means to overcome
such difficulties, the Geithner Bill would require certain financial holding companies to
report periodically to the FRB on a plan for "rapid and orderly resolution in the event of
severe financial distress." U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREAS., PROPOSED LEGISLATION: TITLE II:
CONSOLIDATED SUPERVISION AND REGULATION OF LARGE, INTERCONNECTED

FINANCIAL

FiRMs, § 204(d), at 11-14 (2009), available at http://www.financialstability.gov/
docs/regulatoryreform/07222009/titlelI.pdf [hereinafter GEITHNER BILL, TITLE II] (proposing
an amendment to the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956 § 6(d), 12 U.S.C. § 1845(d)
(2006)).
93. Turmoil in the U.S. Credit Markets, supra note 1 (testimony of Christopher Cox,
Chairman, SEC).
94. OIG REPORT, supra note 86.
95. Id. at 17-18.
96. Id. at 20-23.
97. Id. at 24-33.
98. Id. at 49-50.
99. Id. at 37-38.
100. Id. at 41-44.
101. The Commission may rightly be faulted, of course, for approving Bear Steams'
participation before it had completed its inspection process. See id. at 40-41.
102. Id. at 10-20.
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II. THE ENDS AND MEANS OF INVEsTMENT BANK REGULATION

Systemic risk, 10 3 as described in the context of bank regulation, invokes a parade
of horribles that disrupt the operation of the U.S. banking system. The failure of
one or more banks may trigger "runs" on other (solvent) banks, and the cascading
chain of failures would result in the collapse of the payments system, a dearth of
credit for individuals and businesses (as surviving banks scale back their lending
activity), and the potential loss of deposits (absent deposit insurance). 1° 4 These
risks have long been used to justify both the rigorous supervision and examination
of banks and the extensive powers of the FDIC and FRB to manage the affairs of
troubled banks
and bank holding companies to avoid the prospect of a bankruptcy
05
proceeding.1
In the context of investment banking, the systemic risks are of a slightly
different nature. The failure of an investment bank should not disrupt the securities
accounts of retail brokerage customers, so long as the firm has otherwise
segregated sufficient funds and securities in accordance with the SEC's customer
protection rule. I'6 Nor would it necessarily unduly impact counterparties to

103. The term "systemic risk" is frequently used to refer to a risk of a series of sudden,
adverse consequences buried within the legal or economic structure of the financial market
that may be precipitated by one or more events. Professor Schwarcz defines the term as:
[T]he risk that (i) an economic shock such as market or institutional failure
triggers (through a panic or otherwise) either (X) the failure of a chain of
markets or institutions or (Y) a chain of significant losses to financial
institutions, (ii) resulting in increases in the cost of capital or decreases in its

availability, often evidenced by substantial financial-market price volatility.
Steven L. Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, 97 GEo. L.J. 193, 204 (2008); see also Jonathan R.
Macey, Derivative Instruments: Lessons for the Regulatory State, 21 J. CORP. L. 69, 82

(1995) (distinguishing systemic risk from the "localized" risk of an individual firm's
default). "Systemic risk" is also increasingly invoked as a goal of federal banking or
derivatives legislation, without precise definition. See 7 U.S.C. § 5(b) (2006) (stating, among
the purposes of the Commodity Exchange Act, "to ensure the financial integrity of all
transactions subject [to the Act] and the avoidance of systemic risk"); 12 U.S.C. § 4401
(2006) (finding that procedures for netting obligations among financial institutions "would
reduce the systemic risk within the banking system and financial markets"); id.
§ 1823(c)(4)(G) (subparagraph entitled "Systemic Risk," permitting FDIC, upon
determination of the Treasury Secretary and the concurrence of the FDIC Board and the
FRB, to take "other action or provide assistance . .. as necessary to avoid or mitigate
[adverse effects on economic conditions or financial stability]"); see also Commodity
Futures Modernization Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-554, § l(a)(5), 114 Stat. 2763, 2763A366 (enumerating among the purposes of the act, "(6) .. . to reduce systemic risk by
enhancing legal certainty in the markets for certain futures and derivatives transactions" and
"(7) to reduce systemic risk and provide greater stability to markets during times of market
disorder by allowing the clearing of transactions in over-the-counter derivatives through
appropriately regulated clearing organizations").
104. Fischel et al., supra note 18, at 307-13 (summarizing economic theory concerning
the reason for bank runs and their macroeconomic consequences).
105. See I MALLOY, supra note 19, § 1.3.3, 1.69-1.116 (describing the evolution of the
FDIC).
106. 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-3 (2009) (requiring broker/dealers to "maintain the physical
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derivatives transactions or other credit exposure to the extent that such
counterparties have obtained an adequate quantity (and quality) of collateral. 10 7
Rather, systemic risk in this context refers to the chain of consequences for other
participants in securities and derivatives markets in the event that a major firm was
8
forced into bankruptcy. 10
Some of the consequences of excessive "interconnectedness" might include:
*
*

*

*

*
*

Devaluation of publicly traded securities resulting from the "fire sale"
liquidation of a bankrupt firm's portfolio of securities assets;
Devaluation of publicly traded securities resulting from the simultaneous
"closeout" and liquidation of collateral used to support outstanding
derivative transactions;
Exposure to unsecured claims against the bankrupt firm, such as shortterm commercial paper and undercollateralized securities or derivatives
transactions;
The loss of hedging transactions (e.g., swaps, forwards, options) with the
bankrupt firm to offset market and credit risks, which might be difficult or
extremely costly to replace as a result of changed market conditions;
Exposure on credit insurance (e.g., credit default swaps) written on the
debt securities of the bankrupt firm;
Reduced lending, underwriting, and dealing activity as commercial and
investment banks retrench to conserve capital."

The simultaneity of such events might have consequences similar to those of
traditional bank failures. For example, institutional investors may seek to unwind
transactions with and restrict short-term lending to financial firms that might appear
troubled;'10 this in turn could cause money market funds and other short-term funds
on which individual investors rely for immediate liquidity to lose value.1"
possession or control of all fully-paid securities and excess margin securities" and "[e]xcess
of total credits ...over total debits" in customer accounts as computed under 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.15c3-3(a)). As described above, SIPC may advance funds for the prompt payment and
satisfaction of net equity claims of customers (not to exceed $500,000 per customer, and for
cash claims, $100,000 per customer). 15 U.S.C. § 78fff-3 (2006); see supra note 45.
107. For some transactions, the quantity and quality of permitted collateral is established
by regulation. See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-3(b)(3) (2009) (collateral required for loans of
securities from customers of a broker/dealer); Class Exemption to Permit Certain Loans of
Securities by Employee Benefit Plans, Prohibited Transaction Exemption 81-6, 46 Fed. Reg.
7527 (Jan. 23, 1981) (collateral required for loans of securities from an ERISA plan).
108. See, e.g., Okamoto, supra note 58, at 194-203 (describing how the meltdowns of
Long-Term Capital Management, Bear Steams, Lehman Brothers, and AIG parallel bank
runs).
109. See, e.g., Turmoil in the US. Credit Markets, supra note 1 (testimony of Ben S.
Bernanke, Chairman, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System).
110. Cf BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. REsERVE Sys., MONErARY POLICY REPORT TO
THE CONGRESS 23-25 (2008) (describing pressure on short-term and long-term funding

markets and the increased collateralization requirements for loans secured by securities
collateral other than Treasury securities, which precipitated the FRB's unprecedented
decision to open its discount window to primary dealers).
111. See BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYs., NI=rY-Furm ANNUAL REPORT
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Moreover, the significant interconnectedness of commercial banks and other
financial services conglomerates in securities and derivatives markets could lead to
contagion in the commercial banking sector.
A. Regulatory Ends
The appropriate level of financial responsibility regulation turns, to some
degree, on how the problem is framed. Efficiency-that is, the reduction of
transaction costs and agency costs in the provision of financial services-is often
held out to be the paramount goal of financial services regulation." 2 Access to
short- and long-term capital and opportunities to fine-tune business risks are
important drivers of economic growth, and an inefficient financial sector indirectly
affects the performance of all other industries." 3 Regulation of financial
responsibility, like other activities, should thus be assessed, at least in part, by the
appropriate balancing of the ex ante costs imposed by regulation against the ex post
consequences of a failure to regulate.
If we view investment bank regulation as the "localized" problem of protecting
customers, creditors, and counterparties of firms approaching financial difficulty, a
cost-benefit analysis might suggest that the current level of SEC regulation of
investment banks is sufficient (if not itself excessively onerous).' l 4 SEC regulation
already provides a measure of protection for customers, directly (under the
customer protection rule) and indirectly (under the net capital rule). Major creditors
5-13 (2008), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/rptcongress/annualO8/

pdf/AR08.pdf (describing impact of the failure of Lehman Brothers on the commercial paper
market).
112. See Frank Partnoy, Why Markets Crash and What Law Can Do About It, 61 U. Prrr.

L. REv. 741, 752-53 (2000) (arguing that regulation of markets is appropriate because
market crashes are "allocatively inefficient" and that financial instability affects "real
economic performance"); Hu, supra note 56, at 367 (arguing that regulation of systemic risk
is important because the "'externalities' from failure are higher than those arising from the
failure of a typical industrial enterprise"); Macey, supra note 103, at 82 (arguing that
"regulation of derivatives activity is more likely to have the unintended consequence of
forcing trading activity into less efficient (but economically equivalent) channels, rather than
curbing or preventing such activity"); Schwarcz, supra note 103, at 205-07 (asserting that
"efficiency should be a central goal in regulating systemic risk," but that it "should not be
the only goal" because "[flailure of the financial system can generate social costs in the form
of widespread poverty and unemployment, which in turn can destroy lives and foster
crime").
113. Moreover, even those cynical of regulators' commitment to maximizing efficiency
should agree that it is in regulators' self-interest to ensure that financial markets function
somewhat efficiently, if only to preserve the expectation of steady increases in staff, budgets,
and eventual employment opportunities after government service. See Langevoort, supra
note 88, at 1603-06 (noting propensity of senior SEC officials to use superior expertise
accumulated while at the Commission to seek comparative advantage upon reentry into
private sector).
114. Cf. Darringer, supra note 33, at 330 (discussing the adverse effects of excessive
capital requirements, including "misallocation of capital resources," "distortions in bank
pricing and business decisions," causation of a "global credit crunch," "increase [in]
portfolio risk [or acquisition of] the riskiest assets within each asset classification," and
migration of business "from the regulated sector to the unregulated sector").
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of investment banks, much like other public companies, are able to set the terms of
credit at arm's length, based on their appraisal of the firm's assets and
management. 115 Counterparties to various securities and derivatives transactions,
moreover, may bargain for a degree of protection against counterparty credit
exposure through a variety of devices."16 Counterparty credit exposures, thus, may
well be a risk endemic to the investment banking business that can be internalized
like any other risk if adequate information is disclosed. Firms dealing with
investment banks as counterparties must either adopt reasonable internal controls
against such risk or bear the consequences." 7 Occasional market crises, while
painful, may serve to rearrange financial relationships-rewarding perspicacious
firms and well-designed products and dismantling8 poorly managed firms and illconceived products-in a socially beneficial way."
Other approaches to the problem of systemic risk take a macroeconomic
perspective, justifying intervention to promote the additional social goals of
maintaining stability and fairness." 9 Under this view, the broader consequences of
instability for the marketplace-unemployment, financial insecurity, political
unrest-require regulatory intervention, even if long-term social welfare is
marginally reduced. 20 A procrustean limitation on leverage may be deemed
inefficient, from an economic perspective, 121 but it nevertheless provides some
assurance that incidents of marketplace instability resulting from the failure of
major financial intermediaries will be less frequent. 122 Fairness and investor

115. See, e.g., BASEL II FRAMEWORK, supra note 13, 809, at 175 (setting forth the aim
of Pillar III to "encourage market discipline by developing a set of disclosure requirements
which will allow market participants to assess key pieces of information on the scope of
application, capital, risk exposures, risk assessment processes, and hence the capital
adequacy of the institution"). But see infra note 213 (critiquing the free-market perspective).
116. Cf 7 U.S.C. § la(12) (2006) (defining "eligible contract participants" who may
enter into exempt swap agreements under the Commodity Exchange Act); 15 U.S.C. § 80a3(c)(7) (2006) (defining "qualified purchasers"); 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-3(c)(3) (2009)

(establishing minimum collateral requirements for securities loans).
117. See Macey, supra note 103, at 84-89 (arguing that many of the risks associated with
derivative trading that have been identified as "systematic risks" posing negative
"externalities" by academics who favor regulation may in fact be internalized).
118. See id.
119. See Pouncy, supra note 58, at 590 (arguing that, from a "heterodox" perspective,
"welfare enhancements resulting from productive financial innovation [should] be
distributed between wages and profits not only to promote efficiency," by "correcting
perceived market imperfections that, for example, raise cost, lower transacting freedom, or
otherwise produce socially undesirable results," but that they should seek to promote "equity
as well"); see also MARK CASSELL, How GOVERNMENTS PRIVATIZE 35-42 (2002) (discussing
the Resolution Trust Corporation's mandate, in liquidating the assets of failed savings and
loan associations, to ensure participation by minority- and women-owned businesses, to
promote affordable housing, and to protect local financial and real estate markets).
120. See Schwarcz, supra note 103, at 207.
121. See Erik F. Gerding, Laws Against Bubbles: An Experimental-Asset-Market
Approach to Analyzing Financial Regulation, 2007 Wis. L. REv. 977, 1007 (providing
typology of antibubble laws).

122. Cf Schwarcz, supra note 103, at 211-13.
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services-are both
protection-both in the availability and suitability of financial
23
additional goals that might be deemed to improve efficiency.'
An intermediate approach might view systemic risk primarily as a collective
action problem. To assert that certain firms are "too big" or "too interconnected" to
fail implies that the constituents of the firm are collectively likely to prefer an
outcome that preserves existing contractual and other relationships over the belated
and uncertain rearrangement of those relationships in bankruptcy. The difficulty
lies in developing a mechanism to share the cost of preserving those relationships,
if any, so that no individual creditor or counterparty finds it advantageous to force
the firm into insolvency. At one end of the spectrum, a major derivatives
counterparty might prefer to buy a defaulting firm's entire portfolio rather than
incur the costs of recovering its claims in bankruptcy. At the other end, individual
customers or depositors may find it difficult to orchestrate or finance a bailout,
merger, or prompt liquidation without regulatory intervention.
Under this approach, the goal of regulation should be to determine whether, on
the basis of available information, the impact of insolvency on a firm's major
counterparties would have a sufficiently significant impact that it is in their
collective interest to entertain a negotiated alternative. In such situations, federal
authorities can effectively address or compensate for the lack of traditional
financing, fear of violating capital or concentration thresholds, lack of information,
or other transaction costs that restrain counterparties and creditors from privately
negotiating a transaction. Concerted action-under the oversight of a regulator or
central banker-may be possible with the injection of additional resources.
B. Regulatory Means
While financial regulators have a wide range of administrative and enforcement
tools at their disposal, devising the correct set of rules, standards, and principles
poses several challenges. 124 First, regulators must consider what resources they
have at their disposal and how much of the cost of regulation can be shifted to
private industry or to third parties without a loss of quality.' 25 Regulators must
consider how the intensity of regulatory activity or the application of regulation
should be ramped up to deal with market conditions that may portend a crisis.

123. Because systemic risk entails consequences primarily for the counterparties eligible
to participate in the markets for exotic financial instruments, the argument for regulating
systemic risk under this rubric is somewhat attenuated. See Paredes, supra note 23, at 9981004; see also 2003 HEDGE FUND REPORT, supra note 66, at 79 (arguing that the
Commission's concern about the opacity of hedge funds is based "both on the possible loss
of customer assets held by broker-dealers, which the Commission has a mandate to protect in
conjunction with [SIPC], and the systemic risk implications for the broader financial system,
should a large broker-dealer fail due to exposure to a hedge fund"). Indeed, a regulatory
system designed to protect sophisticated contract participants from their own failure to
monitor for local and counterparty risk might exacerbate the "moral hazard." See Hu, supra
note 56, at 367-69.
124. See M. Elizabeth Magill, Agency Choice of PolicymakingForm, 71 U. Cm-. L. REv.
1383, 1396-97 (2004).
125. See Sidney A. Shapiro, Outsourcing Government Regulation, 53 DUKE L.J. 389, 390
(2003).
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Moreover, regulators must consider what measures to take in the aftermath of a
crisis, and the signal those actions send to regulated entities.
1.Prophylaxis: Balancing Rules and Principles
Regulators struggle with prophylactic regulation of the financial services
industry because of the constant development of new products and services.
Financial innovation both improves the efficiency of financial markets and
increases the potential for latent risk to individual firms and to the financial
system. 26 The evolution of financial instruments is driven by many factors. Some
allow their users to shift or diversify risks posed by other assets or transactions.
Securitization diversifies risk emanating from debt instruments with variable cash
flows, such as pools of mortgages, bonds, receivables and other assets, 127 while
swaps and over-the-counter derivative contracts allow contract participants to
exchange the market risk or credit risk in underlying instruments for the credit risk
of counterparty performance. 28 Others, such as synthetic securities, 12 9 money
market mutual funds, 130 and repurchase 32agreements,13 1 were tailored to circumvent
particular legal or regulatory obstacles. 1

126. As the processes of financial innovation have become more standardized, a literature
has developed in legal academia analyzing these processes and the manner in which
financial regulators cope with changes in the financial system. See Hu, supra note 56, at
337-38 (describing change in process of innovation); Kenneth C. Kettering, Securitization
and Its Discontents: The Dynamics ofFinancialProductDevelopment, 29 CARDozo L. REv.

1553, 1632 (2008); Pouncy, supra note 58, at 513-38 (defining financial innovation,
chronology of financial instruments). See generally Henry T.C. Hu, New FinancialProducts,
the Modern Process of FinancialInnovation, and the Law, 69 TEX. L. REv. 1273 (1991).
127. See Claire A. Hill, Securitization:A Low-Cost Sweetenerfor Lemons, 74 WASH. U.
L.Q. 1061, 1063 (1996) (noting benefits of securitization). In doing so, it reduces the risk

premium required to underwrite the underlying instruments, and thus reduces borrowing
rates for homeowners, issuers, and other borrowers.
128. See JoHN C. HULL, OPTIoNS, FUTURES, AND OTHER DERIVATIVES 132 (3d ed. 1997)
(discussing credit risk of swaps).
129. Synthetic positions in various securities were developed throughout the 1990s to
avoid regulation by the SEC and the CFTC. See Pouncy, supra note 58, at 585.
130. Money market mutual funds were developed in part to offer customers checking and
related bank services without bank regulation. See Donald C. Langevoort, Information
Technology and the Structure of Securities Regulation, 98 HARv. L. REV. 747, 748-49
(1985).

131. See, e.g., SEC v. Miller, 495 F. Supp. 465, 467 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (noting that entities
may structure loans secured by securities as a "repurchase agreement," among other reasons,
because of "a desire to circumvent the U.C.C. requirements and other legal obstacles to
using ordinary collateralized loans"). An argument may be made, for example, that securities

"sold" under a repurchase agreement, unlike securities "pledged" to a financing

counterparty, are not subject to the automatic stay in bankruptcy. See In re Bevill, Bresler &
Schulman Asset Mgmt. Corp., 67 B.R. 557, 596-98 (D.N.J. 1986). The legal uncertainty
created by such arguments ultimately led Congress to exclude repurchase agreements from
the automatic stay under the so-called "closeout" provisions of the Bankruptcy Code. 1 I
U.S.C. § 546(f) (2006) (limiting bankruptcy trustee's ability to avoid transfers in connection

with "repurchase agreements"); id. § 559 (providing that "exercise of a contractual right of a
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Financial products require their sponsors-be they investment banks,
commercial bank holding companies, or other regulated or unregulated entities-to
consider a variety of risks. Among the "known" risks that the regulatory system for
financial products today requires firms to quantify for purposes of computing
capital requirements are market risk from changes 34in the value of underlying
135
instruments,

33

credit risk of issuers of securities,'

and operational risks,

including both legal risks and agency costs arising from inadequate controls or
complex legal structures. 36 As important, if less quantifiable, are the liquidity risks
resulting from the depth and breadth of the market (if any) in which the instrument

repo participant... to cause the liquidation.., of a repurchase agreement" in the event of
insolvency or bankruptcy "shall not be stayed, avoided, or otherwise limited by operation of
any provision of this title or by order of a court or administrative agency in any proceeding
under this title"); see Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L.
No. 98-353, tit. III, sec. 391, § 101, 98 Stat. 333, 364 (adding provisions governing
"repurchase agreements").
132. See Pouncy, supranote 58, at 548.
133. See BASEL II FRAMEWORK, supra note 13, IM 683-718, at 157-203. Historical
information may provide some basis for modeling market risks. See Hu, supra note 56, at
345; see also IIF REPORT, supra note 57, at 47-50.
50-643, at 19-143.
134. See BASEL II FRAMEWORK, supra note 13,
644-83, at 144-57 (described as "the risk of loss resulting from
135. See id.
inadequate or failed internal processes, people and systems or from external events").
136. See id. at 144 n.97 (described as "exposure to fines, penalties, or punitive damages
resulting from supervisory actions, as well as private settlements"). Agency costs are also a
vital consideration in assessing a regulatory program. New instruments continuously strain
the legal and regulatory framework for risk management. See Henry T.C. Hu, Misunderstood
Derivatives: The Causes of Informational Failure and the Promise of Regulatory
Incrementalism, 102 YALE L.J. 1457, 1492 (1993); Frank Partnoy & David A. Skeel, Jr., The
Promise and Perils of Credit Derivatives, 75 U. CiN. L. REv. 1019, 1031 (2007). Complex
legal and accounting structures exacerbate the cost of monitoring or insuring against the
failure of intermediaries in the production chain. See IIF REPORT, supra note 57, at 49-50
(describing the agency cost problems inherent in the "originate-to-distribute" model of
mortgage underwriting); Robert C. Pozen, How to Revive SecuritizationMarkets, WALL ST.
J., Apr. 29, 2008, at Al 1 (arguing for better disclosure of sponsor obligations and greater
independent governance power with respect to securitization trusts).
Complex instruments, moreover, may result in increased agency costs if senior managers
and directors are unable to supervise or implement a supervisory structure over the conduct
of traders and product designers. Cf.Hugo Dixon, Give Bank Boards a Spine: Directors Who
Can Weigh Risk Would Also Maintaina Better Grip on CEOs, WALL ST. J., May 27, 2008, at
C12; Henry Kaufman, Who's Watching the Big Banks?, WALL ST. J., Nov. 13, 2007, at A25;
Alistair MacDonald, UK.PanelWarns of Tighter Banking Regulation, WALL ST.J., Mar. 3,
2008, at A2. Senior executives and directors may also be unfamiliar with the vast array of
financial products under development, Hu, supra note 56, at 369-70 (quoting Michael
Hiltzik, Banks Enter New World of High Risk, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 27, 1985, at Al), while
younger traders and managers may possess technical expertise without practical experience,
see, e.g., Andrew Ross Sorkin, A Wish List for Fixing Wall Street, N.Y. TIMES, May 13,
2008, at Cl (interview with Kenneth C. Griffin, Founder of Citadel Investment Group). The
rush of competitors to offer a product generating above-average returns may blind them to
the need to obtain appropriate expertise or establish internal controls. See Pouncy, supra note
58, at 579; Schwarcz, supra note 57, at 14-15.
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trades,137 as well as risks posed by excessive concentration of positions in
correlated assets or the counterparty credit risk of excessive concentration of
transactions directly or indirectly with certain counterparties.' 38 Indeed, to the
extent that correlations among asset prices become apparent only in hindsight, it is
difficult for regulators to marshal the consensus necessary to require such
correlations to be taken 39
into account in computing regulatory capital or taking other
prophylactic measures. 1
When supervising the risk-management functions of investment banks and other
financial institutions, for example, policy makers must determine whether to
prescribe an ex ante rule, a standard applied ex post in administrative or judicial
proceedings, or a more abstract principle or objective to be elaborated by formal
interpretation and informal consultation with the relevant regulators.140 In some

137. See JEAN DESROCHERS & JACQUES PRtFONTAINE, BASEL COMMITTEE ON BANKING
SUPERVISION, PRINCIPLES FOR SOUND LIQUIDITY RISK MANAGEMENT AND SUPERVISION 15-16

(2008).
138. See BASEL II FRAMEWORK, supra note 13,
770-78, at 214-17; see also Jamroz,
supra note 74, at n.219 (describing the dual impact of the implosion of several firms
specializing in the high-yield securities market in the late 1980s: a decline in the market for
high yield debt and illiquidity in the secondary market); Partnoy & Skeel, supra note 136
(anticipating underestimation of correlation risk with respect to instruments held in CDOs
and other structured instruments).
139. See Rachel McTague, Sirri Explains Lessons Learned So Far from Sub-Prime
Securities Market Crisis, BNA SEC. L. DAILY, Mar. 21, 2008 (summarizing remarks of Erik
Sirri, Director, Division of Trading & Markets, SEC before the Investment Advisers
Association to the effect that firm valuation models misestimated the correlation risk among
mortgages and overestimated the liquidity of CDOs in determining concentration levels); see
also Erik F. Gerding, Code, Crash, and Open Source: The Outsourcing of Financial
Regulation to Risk Models and the Global FinancialCrisis,84 WASH. L. REV. 127, 172-75
(2009).
140. See Colin S. Diver, The Optimal PrecisionofAdministrative Rules, 93 YALE L.J. 65,
73 (1983) (framing the question of optimal precision of rules in terms of the cost of ensuring
compliance, over- and under-inclusiveness, and the cost of rule making); Louis Kaplow,
Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557, 621-24 (1992)
(contrasting the ex ante costs of developing rules with the ex post costs of applying and
enforcing standards); Cass R. Sunstein, Problems with Rules, 83 CAL. L. REV. 953, 961-68
(1995) (contrasting, inter alia, the strengths and weaknesses of rules, standards, and
principles as sources of law). For example, banks that use the "standardised measurement
method" for market risk developed under the original rule-based framework of the Basel
Accords are generally subject to an 8% charge to net capital for the "specific risk" of holding
a position in an individual equity security, and an 8%charge for the "general market risk" of
holding a long or short position in the market as a whole. BASEL II FRAMEWORK, supra note
13, 718(xix)(i), at 176-77. Regulatory approval for the use of internal models to measure
market risk under the standard-based approached envisioned by the Basel II Framework, for
example, depends upon an assessment that, inter alia, "[t]he bank's models have in the
supervisory authority's judgement a proven track record of reasonable accuracy in
measuring risk[.]" Id. 718(lxxi), at 191 (emphasis added). An example of an even more
abstract principle for risk-based regulation might be 12 U.S.C. § 1844(e)(1) (2006), which
authorizes the FRB to require an FHC to terminate a subsidiary's activity (or its ownership
or control of the subsidiary) "whenever it has reasonable cause to believe that the.., activity
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circumstances, simple disclosure of risks might be sufficient, as long as
counterparties or customers possess the expertise or have access to the information
necessary to assess performance independently.' 4 1 Because of the substantial
"public" business commercial and investment banks perform, they have become
subject to significant substantive regulation of their risk-management and
operational functions. 142 Implementing such objectives in the context of regulating
financial responsibility poses significant challenges.
The broad objectives of regulation include assuring that firms use reliable
internal controls for assessing business risks, maintain adequate capital and liquid
assets available to weather foreseeable risks, and maintain adequate documentation
of the foregoing for purposes of regulatory oversight. 43 Detailed recordkeeping
and reporting rules, for example, are almost universally used for financial firms in
order to simplify regulatory oversight.'"4 Inducing firms to improve internal
controls for greater compliance, however, is a more delicate task, particularly once
the initial hurdle of registration or licensure has passed; while operational standards
are preferable, because they can be tailored to individual firms' internal
organization, the "iterative" process of improving compliance with standards could
become futile unless the regulatory agency5 routinely (if not continuously) exercises
its supervisory and examination powers.14
..constitutes a serious risk to the financial safety, soundness, or stability of a... subsidiary
bank and is inconsistent with sound banking principles or with the purposes of this chapter."
Id.
141. See Hu, supranote 136, at 1496 (advocating incremental disclosure requirements, in
light of regulators' limited understanding); Schwarcz, supra note 57, at 4-7 (arguing that the
mix of bankruptcy, tax, securities law, commercial law, accounting, and finance
considerations entailed in designing financial products make disclosing the proper amount of
information difficult). The recent subprime lending crisis revealed, for example, both a lack
of accountability in underwriting standards for assets underlying structured instruments and
the failure to anticipate the impact of concentrated defaults on valuation of such instruments.
Because of the assumptions upon which these instruments were designed, originators of the
special purpose vehicles failed to ensure that someone in the creation and distribution chain
internalized the latent risks of uncreditworthiness and illiquidity these instruments posed. See
Kettering, supra note 126, at 1632.
142. Cf Jackson, supra note 68, at 564.
143. See Hu, supra note 56, at 380, 385 (noting that depository institutions rely primarily,
if not exclusively, on capital requirements to deal with the risks posed by swap instruments
and other financial derivatives); Schwarcz, supra note 103, at 210-13 (discussing "historical
approaches" to regulating systemic risks of banks, hedge funds, and other entities whose
activity may affect financial markets); see also Stephen Joyce, N.Y FedPresident Outlines
Reform of Nation's FinancialRegulatory System, BNA BANKING DAILY, June 10, 2008.
144. See, e.g., 31 C.F.R. § 103.120 (2009) (requiring financial institutions regulated by a
Federal functional regulator or a self-regulatory organization-including banking
institutions, securities broker-dealers, FCMs and introducing brokers-to comply with antimoney laundering program requirements);

BASEL COMMITTEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION,

35-37 & n.2 (1997) (describing
informational requirements of banks and non-bank financial institutions that provide services
similar to those of banks), availableat http:// www.bis.org/publ/bcbs30a.pdf.
145. Cf Jackson, supra note 89, at 267 (noting that regulation of depository institutions
constituted an estimated 45.1% of the total budget and required an estimated 42.7% of the
total staff for U.S. financial regulation in 2004).
CORE PRINCIPLES FOR EFFECTIVE BANKING SUPERVISION
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The choice of prophylactic measures also turns significantly on how the
regulator perceives its mission. Depositors lend banks the use of their money in
exchange for a fee (or banking services), whereas securities accountholders
typically view broker/dealers as custodians absent express permission to use their
securities. 146 The former lends itself to a system of standards for assessing the
quality of lending and underwriting practices (since deposits are the source of funds
for such activity), while the latter47 might thus lend itself to a system of rules
designed to prohibit commingling. 1
The size of modem commercial and investment banks and their highly
automated trading activity makes it difficult to rely on antiquated calculations to
determine the risk exposure of a firm. Hardwired rules are difficult to change,
particularly if an agency's ability for rapid market intervention is limited by its
statutory authority. 148 Statistical models based on analyses of scenarios
representative of historical movements have thus been developed to gradually
replace rule-based "haircuts" on market and credit risks.149 New risk-management

146. Willa E. Gibson, Banks Reign Supreme Under Revised Article 9 Deposit Account

Rules, 30 DEL. J. CoRe. L. 819, 852-53 (2005) (describing the differences between deposit
accounts and securities accounts); see supra text accompanying notes 45-48 (discussing
broker/dealer's use of customer credit balances).
147. Regulators may engage in discrimination based on size, even if regulatory
philosophies may differ; those with quantitatively greater or unusual risks may be subject to
more prudential supervision, while smaller firms may be subject to hard-wired rules and
liquidated or sold off once they approach financial difficulty. Conversely, a regulator
strapped for enforcement resources might prefer to focus on small firms-against whom they
are likely to rack up more sanctions-rather than devote significant resources to large firms
with a strong reputational interest in setting and abiding by industry best practice.
148. See, e.g., Net Capital Rule, Exchange Act Release No. 28,927, 56 Fed. Reg. 9124,
9130-31 (Mar. 5, 1991) (Fleischman, Comm'r, dissenting) (challenging the SEC's authority
to promulgate a rule empowering it to issue orders preventing the withdrawal of capital
absent express statutory authority to proceed by order).
149. See Darringer, supra note 33, at 261-65 (critiquing the Basel I product-based
approach to capital computation). The Basel II Framework, for example, allows banks to
"use risk measures derived from their own internal risk management models" for
determining market risk in lieu of the standardized "building-block" approach of the original
Basel Accords, subject to:
"
certain general criteria concerning the adequacy of the risk
management system;
*
qualitative standards for internal oversight of the use of models,
notably by management;
"
guidelines for specifying an appropriate set of market risk factors
(i.e., the market rates and prices that affect the value of banks'
positions);
o
quantitative standards setting out the use of common minimum
statistical parameters for measuring risk,
•
guidelines for stress testing;
•
validation procedures for external oversight of the use of models;
and
*
rules for banks which use a mixture of models and the
standardised approach.
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technologies employ backtesting of risk-management systems in order to detect and
address emerging risks, rather than requiring regulatory review and approval of
higher haircuts or margins.1 50 Such measures, of course, are handicapped by firms'
and regulators' inability to foresee the particular risks for which firms must
establish internal controls. Without proper understanding of the limitations of riskmanagement systems, moreover, senior executives and managers may well abdicate
authority to subordinates to make risk assessments for the firm.'5 '
2. Manipulating Regulatory Levers as Market Conditions Change
Unlike commercial banks, investment banks do not rely on customer deposits to
finance their day-to-day activities. Investment banking is, nevertheless, a business
that can come to rely significantly on sources of short-term liquidity. 152 Investment
banks may finance operations with a variety of short-term instruments, including
commercial paper, repurchase agreements, and letters of credit. 153 As pressures
mount to extract higher profits from underwriting, market making, derivatives
dealing, and other business lines requiring cash or cash equivalents, relatively
cheaper short-term financing may become significantly more attractive than longBASEL II FRAMEWORK, supra note 13, 701(ii), at 162-63. The Basel II Framework also
permits regulated entities to use an "internal risk based approach" for assessing credit risk,
id. 211, at 52, and an "advanced measurement approach" for operational risk, id. 655, at
147, but only if they have received supervisory approval from their respective national bank
supervisory authorities. After much debate, U.S. federal bank regulators agreed to require
only certain large, internationally active banking organizations (with at least $250 billion in
total assets or at least $10 billion in foreign exposure) to transition to such "advanced
approaches" for credit and operational risk. Risk-Based Capital Standards: Advanced Capital
Adequacy Framework-Basel II, 79 Fed. Reg. 69,288 (Dec. 7, 2007) (joint rule making by
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Treasury; Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System; Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation; and Office of Thrift Supervision,
Treasury).
150. See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-le(d)(l)(iii) (2009) (requiring backtesting and
reconfiguration of VaR models to reflect the number of incidents in which net capital losses
exceeded the VaR calculation of one-day market risk during a specified time period).
Regulators must nevertheless choose (by necessity) time periods or confidence levels for the
calibration of internal risk models, as well as formulae for converting projected negative
movements under those models into adjustments to net capital. See, e.g., id. § 240.15c3le(b)(1), (3) (2009); see also id. § 240.15c3-le(c) (requiring computation of "counterparty
exposure charge[s]" and "concentration charge by counterparty" using formulae applying
multipliers determined by the counterparty's credit rating). Such regulatory decisions may
appear "overprotective" to firms that are willing to tolerate greater market or credit risk. See,
e.g., Darringer, supra note 33, at 325-26.
151. Cf Henry T.C. Hu, Faith and Magic: Investor Beliefs and Government Neutrality,
78 TEX. L. REv. 777, 821-23 (2000).
152. See Molinari & Kibler, supra note 11, at 22 (describing broker/dealers' need for
liquid assets).
153. See John C. Coffee, Jr. & Hillary A. Sale, Redesigning the SEC: Does the Treasury
Have a Better Idea?, 95 VA. L. REV. 707, 747-48 & n. 109 (2009) (describing Drexel
Burnham Lambert Group's reliance on commercial paper financing); Molinari & Kibler,
supra note 11, 25-33 (describing broker/dealer's special liquidity needs and the use of
repurchase agreements and letters of credit).
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term liabilities or capital. 154 These sources of liquidity, like any other, can dry up
rather quickly in the event of credit concerns or a market panic.
Because the creditors in such short-term financing arrangements are typically
financial intermediaries and institutional investors,155 a capped deposit insurance
scheme like the FDIC or an investor protection scheme like the SIPC may not be
enough to assure investors that their financial position is secured. Riskmanagement protocols thus typically require firms to monitor a variety of "early
warning indicators," such as:
•
*
*
*
*
*
*

rapid asset growth;
growing concentrations in certain asset classes or liabilities;
repeated incidents of approaching or breaching internal limits;
widening credit-default-swap spreads;
requests for additional collateral, decrease in credit lines;
difficulty in arranging short-term financing; or56
otherpotential signs of reputational concern.1

While market crises might be staved off through ex post regulatory intervention,
there is considerably less agreement as to how regulators know when intervention
is warranted, and how to intervene. In circumstances where one or more institutions
approach financial difficulty, regulators may have the power to put such firms
under more intense scrutiny or require them to limit their activities until they are
healthier or can be sold or liquidated.157 In the context of systemic risk, however, it
is generally nonlocalized, market-wide activity that threatens market stability.158 In
an ideal world, regulators would identify overhyped or misunderstood products or
contracts and curtail their use until the market has a chance to develop appropriate
protocols for managing their risks.
Unfortunately, regulators do not possess such prescience, and they may well be
loath to check the growth of new products through regulatory intervention simply
because the rate of growth in a particular product line accelerates.' 5 9 In the absence

154. Cf ROBERT J. BARBERA, THE COST OF CAPITALISM: UNDERSTANDING MARKET
MAYHEM AND STABILIZING OUR ECONOMIC FUTURE 40-43 (2009) (summarizing Hyman

Minsky's "Financial Instability Hypothesis"-which describes, inter alia, how periods of
economic expansion can induce businesses and individuals to become perilously reliant on
short-term financing-and its application in the recent financial crisis).
155. According to the Federal Reserve Board, money market funds and financial
institutions are among the largest holders of commercial paper and counterparties to
repurchase agreements. See FEDERAL RESERVE BOARD, FLOW OF FUNDS AccoUNTS OF THE
UNITED STATES, tbls.L.207 & L.208, at 88 (Dec. 10, 2009) (identifying holdings of "federal
funds and security repurchase agreements" and "open market paper"--consisting of
commercial paper and bankers' acceptances-by sector).
156.

BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, BANK FOR INT'L SETTLEMENTS, PRINCIPLES

FOR SouND LIQUIDITY RISK MANAGEMENT AND SUPERVISION

15-16 (2008).

157. See supra note 71 (SEC early warning requirements); infra note 163 (FDIC powers
to take "prompt corrective action").
158. See PAULSON BLUEPRINT, supranote 10, at 143-46.
159. See Kettering, supra note 126, at 1645-55 (suggesting that regulators' "natural

inclination to avoid market shocks is apt to lead them to support market expectations with
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of independent knowledge of market practice, regulators are likely to adopt
standards for new products based on the information selectively provided by the
firm or industry trade associations; while these standards may reflect best practices
at any given time, further refinement of standards will lag behind because of the
information gap.160 In some cases, market pressure causes legislators or regulators
to remove prophylactic regulation that may be deemed to call into question the
legality or regulatory treatment of the new product. 16' Even within individual firms,
moreover, the innovative use of financial products by traders may exceed the
ability of in-house
compliance counsel to assess risks and develop appropriate
62
internal controls.1

Keeping capital ratios low and margin levels high may provide greater assurance
that firms will be solvent in a crisis, but they stifle growth. 163 Some academic
commentators have suggested that agencies or self-regulatory organizations with
margin-setting authority, such as securities and commodity exchanges, could raise
margins as a means to curb trading. 164 Exchanges, however, may be loath to use
respect to the legal characteristics of a sufficiently well-established product").
160. See Hu, supranote 56, at 405-06.
161. See Kettering, supra note 126, at 1632-55 (describing the manner in which
repurchase agreements achieved legal certainty in judicial proceedings and with the blessing
of regulators and legislators as a result of being "too big to fail").
162. Private incentives to prevent risks from erupting into crises may not suffice either.
Financial institutions with a strong, long-term reputational interest, for example, might seek
to reduce leverage and amass liquidity in ebullient markets, in order to invest more cheaply
in failing firms during a market downturn. This long-term incentive, however, may be
undercut by short-term interests driven by compensation structures or pressure from
shareholders to maximize earnings.
163. A self-regulatory organization such as a stock exchange may, of course, require that
a firm that is nearing its maximum capital ratio scale back its activity to a more reasonable
level as a condition of maintaining or expanding its current level of business. See, e.g.,
NYSE Rule 325(a), (b), 2 N.Y.S.E. Guide (CCH) 2325 (Dec. 10, 2008) (requiring firms
carrying customer accounts to refrain from expanding or to reduce business if net capital
falls below certain levels). But see 15 U.S.C. § 78iii(e) (2006) (requiring SIPC to "consult
and cooperate" with SROs to "develop[] and carr[y] into effect procedures reasonably
designed to detect approaching financial difficulty").
By contrast, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991
significantly expanded the FDIC's authority to take "prompt corrective action" in the event
an insured depository institution encounters difficulty, subject to a least cost analysis. 12
U.S.C. § 18310 (2006) (specifying corrective action to be taken by FDIC or appropriate
banking agency if an insured depository institution is "undercapitalized," "significantly
undercapitalized," or "critically undercapitalized"); id.§ 1843(/)(1)(A) (requiring as a
condition of eligibility to be regulated as a "financial holding company" that "all of the
depository institution subsidiaries of the bank holding company [be] well capitalized").
Some commentators have questioned whether the FDIC's special powers with respect to
insolvent banks are warranted. See Swire, supra note 70, at 488, discussed infra text
accompanying note 231.
164. See Roberta S. Karmel, Mutual Funds, Pension Funds, Hedge Funds and Stock
Market Volatility-What Regulation by the Securities and Exchange Commission Is
Appropriate?, 80 NoTRE DAME L. REv. 909, 947-48 (2005) (criticizing SEC and FRB for

failure to use regulatory tools); Gerding, supra note 121, at 1030 (discussing the limited
effectiveness of margin rules).
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that authority in a manner that might decrease liquidity during periods of price
volatility; 165 indeed, increased competition may signal greater liquidity, which in
turn may prompt further deregulation." 6 Imposing credit limits or heightened
margin or capital requirements on one class of assets in the midst of a rising
market, moreover, could well trigger a collapse in asset prices while speculative
activity migrates to another asset class to compensate.1 67 Likewise, in lieu of
closing down insolvent firms immediately, regulators (either because they lack
on
such power or fear repercussions for other firms) may attempt to keep the firm
8
life support by attempting to prevent market forces from taking their course.16
3. Allocating the Cost of Failures
Law and regulation dictate how and to what extent the cost of failures are
allocated to individual market participants (counterparties and creditors), industry
peers, and the public (whether in the form of a taxpayer-funded bailout or a
recovery fueled by quantitative easing). At the level of individual market
participants, law makers and policy makers may create or support ex ante
incentives for such entities to protect themselves against the domino effect of
multiple failures caused by a single irresponsible firm. At the level of the industry,
law makers and regulators might seek to apportion responsibility based on the
ability to pay (for example, a tax, fee, or insurance premium based the size of one's
balance sheet), rather than individual culpability. When such measures are

165. Jerry W. Markham, Federal Regulation of Margin in the Commodity Futures

Industry-History and Theory, 64 TEMP. L. REv. 59, 83-84, 142 (1991) (discussing and
critiquing exchanges' arguments for not raising margins).
166. See, e.g., Securities Credit Transactions, 61 Fed. Reg. 20,399, 20,400 (May 6, 1996)
(proposed FRB rule making to deregulate extensions of credit against debt and other "nonequity securities" held by a U.S. broker/dealer for the account of a customer, on the grounds
that banks, foreign broker/dealers and other foreign lenders, "with whom U.S. broker dealers
increasingly compete worldwide," are "generally ... unconstrained" in extending credit
against such securities).
167. Cf Hu, supra note 151, at 797-98 (stating that the Fed has limited tools, and that
market pressure makes it difficult to use them in times of crisis). One of the great
innovations of the late twentieth century was the credit default swap (CDS). In theory, CDSs
could be highly useful tools in managing risk; the problem with CDSs, however, is that they
substitute the credit risk of the insurer for the credit risk of the reference entity. If insurers
are not diligent in controlling risk, and insureds fail to protect themselves against the
possibility of the insurers' default, their utility as risk-management tools is illusory. See, e.g.,
TETT, supra note 3, at 125-28; Brian J.M. Quinn, The Failureof Private Orderingand the

FinancialCrisisof 2008, 5 N.Y.U. J. L. &Bus. 549, 592-93 (2009).
168. For example, the SEC may allege manipulation if firms participate in the unwinding
or transfer of client contracts from a failed entity or share information with their own clients
who may have dealings with the failing entity. See Kate Kelly & Susanne Craig, Goldman Is
Queried About Bear's Fall-Manipulation Talk Worried Schwartz; Lehman Also Calls,
WALL ST. J., July 16, 2008, at CI (describing the SEC investigation of Citadel's and

Goldman Sachs' trading activity in the credit-swap market-in which Citadel and Goldman
allegedly unwound swaps with Bear, and Goldman may have taken on swap positions that
clients unwound at Bear-on the heels of rumors about Bear Steams' solvency).
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insufficient, use of fiscal or monetary policy, together with statutory or regulatory
authority to resolve firms, might be appropriate.
Individual firms can best protect themselves against counterparty credit risk, 69
be it with respect to a derivative contract or credit extended against financial assets,
by requiring adequate collateral to meet daily (or more frequent) variations in credit
exposure, which may then be liquidated by the firm in the event its counterparty is
unable to meet calls for additional collateral or otherwise triggers an event of
default. 170 Moreover, firms may seek to net all of their contracts with a
counterparty under one or more master agreements. The U.S. Bankruptcy Code
strongly supports these approaches by granting counterparties the ability to
terminate, net, and "closeout" such transactions outside of any bankruptcy
proceeding. 17 1 While such measures may serve the interests of individual firms in
"localized" failures, the preferential treatment of closeout rights to other secured
weaken a
and unsecured claims of an insolvent financial institution may 1further
72
destabilized firm and leave less on the table for its other creditors.

169. Firms may also seek to insure against credit or counterparty risks or obtain a "put"
option on financially innovative products. See Hu, supra note 56, at 418 (suggesting
requirement that firms purchase swap insurance for "non-designated" swaps that can't be
addressed by rules); see also In re Citigroup Inc. S'holder Derivative Litig., 964 A.2d 106,
113 (Del. Ch. 2009) (describing "liquidity put" that "allowed the purchasers of [Citigroup's
collateralized debt obligations] to sell them back to Citigroup at original value" and the
contribution of such options for Citigroup's exposure to subprime mortgage risk). But see

supra note 167 (discussing insurance risk).
170. See, e.g., HULL, supra note 128, at 534.
171. The Code permits, inter alia, enforcement of ipso facto clauses providing for
termination of qualified transactions upon bankruptcy, 11 U.S.C. §§ 555, 556, 559, 560
(2006), netting of exposures resulting from such transactions and the liquidation of collateral
supporting such transactions outside the automatic stay ("closeout"), id. § 362(b)(6), (7),
(17), and restricts avoidance of transfers constituting margin or settlement payments, id
§§ 546(e), (f), (g). See Shmuel Vasser, Derivatives in Bankruptcy, 60 Bus. LAW. 1507,
1525-32, 1534-37 (2005) (discussing the Code provisions).
172. Kettering, supra note 126, at 1651 (discussing, in the context of the LTCM bailout,
the consequences of exercising closeout rights); Schwarcz, supra note 103, at 201
(describing impact of simultaneous closeout of open derivatives contracts); see also Robert
R. Bliss & George G. Kaufman, Derivatives and Systemic Risk: Netting, Collateral,and
Closeout 20 (Fed. Reserve Bank of Chi. Working Paper Series, Paper No. 2005-03, 2005),
available at http://ssm.com/abstract=-730648 (asserting that, while netting and closeout
provisions are routinely justified because of their role in reducing systemic risk, closeout
rights potentially contribute to systemic risk "by making it more difficult to manage the
distress or insolvency of a major dealer" and netting and collateral protections "do little to
ameliorate the disruptions to markets that would ensue from abrupt termination of a large
number of contracts with attendant fire-sale losses from liquidating collateral and the need to
reestablish hedges with new counterparties"); Franklin R. Edwards & Edward R. Morrison,
Derivatives and the Bankruptcy Code: Why the Special Treatment?, 22 YALE J. ON REG. 91,
114-16 (2005) (arguing that differential treatment of derivatives contracts in bankruptcy
may be justified on the grounds that the automatic stay does little to enhance their value,
unlike firm-specific assets whose value might be impaired if the firm ceased to be a going
concern).
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More comprehensive mechanisms entail a combination of industry initiative and
regulatory effort to overcome collective action problems.' 73 Clearinghouses and
guarantee funds, much like insurance companies, mutualize the risk of localized
defaults among all members or contributors.' 7 4 Clearinghouses may additionally
facilitate multilateral netting of exposures among their brokers and dealer members
to reduce each member's net exposure to the financial system.' 75 Often the
obligations of defaulting members of such clearinghouses will also be backed by a
guarantee fund into which members must contribute. To the extent that a firm's
contribution to a guarantee fund, or pro rata share of loss in a clearinghouse, is not
linked to the extent or riskiness of its dealings with a defaulting firm, however,
clearinghouses may lessen76the incentive for firms to make the ex ante expenditure
necessary to monitor risk.
Some regulators have taken steps to enhance the responsibility of the financial
industry in containing systemic risk through better clearance and settlement
systems for derivatives and other new financial products. 177 Like traditional

173. For example, the clearance and settlement of securities was consolidated by the
Securities Acts Amendments of 1975. 15 U.S.C. § 78q-1 (2006). Through the SEC's
persistence in fulfilling this mandate, clearance and settlement of transactions in most
publicly-traded securities is now effected through various subsidiaries of the Depository
Trust & Clearing Corporation (DTCC). PAULSON BLUEPRINT, supra note 10, at 211. All
options listed on U.S. stock and options exchanges are cleared and traded through the
Options Clearing Corporation. HARRIs, supra note 17, at 50. By contrast, clearinghouses for
futures and related transactions remain unlinked. PAULSON BLUEPRINT, supra note 10, at 51.
174. See HARRIS, supra note 17, at 46; supra note 153.
175. See, e.g., Temporary Exemptions for Eligible Credit Default Swaps to Facilitate
Operation of Central Counterparties to Clear and Settle Credit Default Swaps, Securities Act
Release No. 8999, Exchange Act Release No. 59,246, 74 Fed. Reg. 3967 (Jan. 22, 2009) (to
be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 230, 240, 260) (adopting interim final temporary rules providing
exemptions under federal securities law to facilitate the operation of one or more central
counterparties for those credit default swaps); DTCC and the Clearing Corporation
Announce CreditDefault Swap ClearingFacility,DTCC CORP. NEWSL. (Depository Trust &
Clearing Corp.), June 2008, at 6, available at http://www.dtcc.com/news/newsletters/

dtcc/2008/jun/june@dtcc.pdf (describing arrangements to facilitate central clearing for OTC
derivatives dealers through a central clearing counterparty).
176. Cf Romano, supra note 74, at 8 1.
177. For example, Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner has delivered proposed
legislation for "financial regulatory reform" to Congress, which includes a proposal to
require clearing of all over-the-counter derivatives through a registered derivatives clearing
organization. See U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREAS., PROPOSED LEGISLATION: TITLE VII:
IMPROVEMENTS TO REGULATION OF OVER-THE-COUNTER DERIVATIVES MARKETS, § 713, at
15-30 (2009), available at http://www.financialstability.gov/docs/regulatoryreform/
titleVII.pdf [hereinafter GEITHNER BILL, TITLE VII]; see also Press Release, Fed. Reserve
Bank of New York, Statement Regarding June 9 Meeting on Over-the-Counter Derivatives
(June 9, 2008), available at http://www.newyorkfed.org/newsevents/news/markets/

2008/ma080609.html (describing meeting of "17 major financial institutions" to discuss
ways to improve processing, centralization, and infrastructure of over-the-counter
derivatives); Michael M. Grynbaum, Derivatives Trading Is Scrutinized, N.Y. TIMES, June
10, 2008, at C1; Regulators Agree Central Counterpartyfor Derivatives Market Would
Lower Risks, BNA SEC. L. DAILY, July 10, 2008 (discussing the support of Pat Parkinson,
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clearinghouses for transactions in equity and debt securities and exchange-traded
derivatives, a central clearinghouse for over-the-counter derivatives would reduce
each individual member's exposure to a defaulting counterparty to a financial
contract in two ways: first, by netting transactions so as to reduce the total number
and size of outstanding transactions with a defaulting counterparty, and second, by
178
guaranteeing each defaulting member's net obligation through a guarantee fund.
The key obstacle here is that any guarantee fund designed to satisfy member
obligations in full might entail a significantly increased commitment of liquid
capital beyond current levels.1 79 As a result, central clearing and settlement might
help reduce net exposures and provide some guarantee for specific products but
should not be expected to contain a major crisis.
The last resort in any crisis of systemic proportions is a federally orchestrated
bailout or liquidation. 180 In the context of commercial banks and other insured
depository institutions, routine liquidation transactions have historically taken a
deputy director in the Federal Reserve's Division of Research and Statistics, for proposed
CCP for credit derivatives).
178. Ancillary to such a system is the need for mechanisms to capture trade information
electronically and contemporaneously with the execution of such transactions, as well as
procedures to ensure that the common terms of such transactions are adequately documented
in master agreements. Both regulators and industry participants have become increasingly
concerned, in recent years, about the lack of adequate documentation underlying their
derivatives activity. COUNTERPARTY RISK MGMT. POLICY GROUP II, TOWARD GREATER
FINANCIAL STABILITY: A PRIVATE SECTOR PERSPECTIVE 11 (2005) [hereinafter TOwARD
GREATER FINANCIAL STABILITY] (presenting recommendations and guiding principles,
classified as (i) "actions that individual institutions can and should take at their own
initiative," (ii) "actions which can be taken only by institutions collectively in collaboration
with industry trade groups," and (iii) "actions which require complementary and/or
cooperative actions by the official sector"); Lawmakers Seek GAO Report on Tech Woes in
Derivatives Market, 38 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 24, at 1008 (June 9, 2006)
(requesting that GAO determine the adequacy of the legal, technological, and paperworkhandling infrastructure of credit derivatives markets).
179. See, e.g., DEPOSITORY TRUST & CLEARING CORP., ANNUAL REPORT 54 (2008),
(reporting
available at http://www.dtcc.com/downloads/annuals/2008/2008_report.pdf
participant deposits of approximately $47 billion as of December 31, 2008); OPTIONS
CLEARING CORP., ANNUAL REPORT 19 (2008), availableat http://www.optionsclearing.com/

about/ann rep/annrep_pdf/annual rep_08.pdf (reporting a $5.5 billion clearing fund as of
December 31, 2008); SEC. INVESTOR PROT. CORP., ANNUAL REPORT 16 (2008), available at
http://www.sipc.org/pdf/SIPC Annual Report 2008 FINAL.pdf (reporting net assets of
approximately $1.7 billion as of December 31, 2008, prior to the satisfaction of $1.4 billion
in "estimated costs to complete customer protection proceedings" relating to the Madoff
scheme and others).
180. While nationalization of banks is not openly mentioned as an option in the United
States, the FDIC and other bank regulators have maintained dominant interests in or operated
banks while in receivership for significant periods of time. See, e.g., Timothy A. Canova,
The Transformation of U.S. Banking and Finance: From Regulated Competition to FreeMarket Receivership, 60 BROOK. L. REV. 1295, 1296, 1327-36 (1995) ("By the end of

President Reagan's second term in office, the advocates of free-market capitalism were
quietly relying on massive government interventions and a policy of financial bailout to
safeguard the entire monetary payment system."); cf End of Illusions, ECONOMIST, July 19,
2008, at 81 (dubbing potential "conservatorship" of government sponsored enterprises a
"fancy word for nationalization").
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variety of forms, including open monetary assistance to keep troubled banks afloat,
negotiated "purchase-and-assumption" transactions, auctioning of the bank's assets,
and outright payments to insured depositors. 181 For more systemic crises, the use of
fiscal or monetary policy may be appropriate to provide liquidity to the
marketplace on a temporary basis. 182 To avoid undue "moral hazard," central
bankers and other federal interveners must of course maintain a degree of
"constructive ambiguity" as to whether a given entity or crisis will warrant
intervention.' 83 Beyond mere moral hazard, however, government intervention may
well dole out benefits and costs unfairly among market participants if federal
officials are motivated
by political pressure, rather than the obligation to seek out
4
the best outcome.'1

III. ALTERNATIVE STRATEGIES TO REGULATING INVESTMENT BANKS
While the SEC's program for supervision of CSEs and SIBHCs has been
suspended, 185 it is far from settled as to how federal regulators will regulate holding
companies of financial service providers other than bank holding companies.
Federal policy makers have proposed broad oversight of all financial service
providers, as discussed in greater detail in Part IV below, but differ substantially as
to the regulatory responsibilities and appropriate regulatory authorities for holding
companies of regulated broker/dealers and other categories of financial
intermediaries. Critical to resolving this issue is a determination as to (i) which
additional categories of financial services conglomerate must be subject to federal
oversight for financial responsibility and (ii) which categories of financial services
conglomerate will be eligible for voluntary federal oversight (for example, as a

181. See, e.g., Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Bank Failures,Risk Monitoring,
and the Market for Bank Control, 88 CoLuM. L. REv. 1153, 1172-1193 (1988). The

Resolution Trust Corporation (RTC), a federally chartered corporation, handled nearly $460
billion in assets owned by approximately 750 ailing thrift institutions over a six-year period
(1989-1995): as conservator of ailing thrifts, RTC either sold off them or their insured
deposits to private buyers (making up the difference) or shut them down and paid insured
deposits directly; RTC also acted as receiver of unsold assets. See CASSELL, supra note 119,
at 28-32. To avoid openly impacting the federal budget (by law, any new expenditures had
to be offset by tax increases or cuts in existing expenditures), RTC's operations were funded
in substantial part by the Resolution Funding Corporation (REFCORP), a quasigovernmental corporation that raised approximately $30 billion by issuing long-term bonds
underwritten by private investment bankers (at a premium to Treasury securities). Id. at 14849.
182. See infra Part IV.C.
183. Partnoy, supra note 112, at 757, 783 (suggesting that central bank should maintain
"constructive ambiguity" as to whether it will bail out failing financial firms); cf Hu, supra
note 151, at 875 (arguing that the Federal Reserve and Treasury's power to clean-up should
be curtailed as a signal to the market that there is no safety net).
184. See, e.g., Hu, supra note 151, at 870 (suggesting that Warren Buffett was willing to
bail out LTCM).
185. Press Release, SEC, Chairman Cox Announces End of Consolidated Supervised
Entities Program (Sept. 26, 2008), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2008/2008230.htm.
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condition for exemption from regulation in other jurisdictions where they do
business).
Among the new categories of financial service provider that are likely to
become subject to some enhanced federal oversight regime are holding companies
of insurance companies. Several proposals contemplate a federal regulatory scheme
for some systemically significant insurance companies, 8 6 in light of the near failure
of AIG due to the derivatives activity of its unregulated affiliates.' 8 7 Investigations
into the conduct of AIG have already identified that the regulation of AIG's
insurance companies by the New York State Insurance Department did not ensure
adequate oversight of AIG's affiliated financial-products divisions, even though
such affiliates handled a significant volume of exchange-traded and over-thecounter derivatives.188 With federal regulation of insurance
companies, regulation
89
of insurance holding companies is a likely further step.'
In addition to insurance companies, there is a growing consensus that hedge
funds and other private funds are likely to come under increased regulatory
scrutiny. The Obama administration has resurrected proposals to subject hedge
fund advisers to registration under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940.19'
Meanwhile, European Union regulators have publicly discussed subjecting such
private funds to a degree of regulatory oversight, 191 in which case U.S. funds
participating in European or international markets may seek a domestic regulatory
regime-much like the SIBHC and CSE regulatory regimes-to take advantage of
any available exemptions based on reciprocity or home country regulation.

186. See U.S.

DEP'T OF THE TREAS.,

NATIONAL INSURANCE,

PROPOSED LEGISLATION: TITLE V: OFFICE OF

§ 313, at 1-2 (2009), available at http://www.financialstability.gov/

docs/regulatoryreform/title V ofc Natl Ins 7-22-2009 fnl.pdf (proposing to create an Office
of Insurance within the Treasury Department that would have the authority, among other
functions, "to monitor all aspects of the insurance industry, including identifying issues or
gaps in the regulation of insurers that could contribute to a systemic crisis in the insurance
industry or the United States financial system"); GROUP OF THmRTY, FINANCIAL REFORM: A
FRAMEWORK FOR FINANCIAL STABILITY 8 (2009), available at http://www.group30.org/
pubs/reformreport.pdf [hereinafter G30 REPORT].
187. See, e.g., William K. Sjostrom, Jr., The AIG Bailout, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 943
(2009) (describing how AIG exploited the CFMA to engage in derivatives activity at the
holding company level).
188. But cf American InternationalGroup: Examining What Went Wrong, Government
Intervention, and Implications for Future Regulation: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on
Banking, Housing & Urban Affairs, 11lth Cong. 6-8 (2009) (testimony of Eric Dinallo,
Superintendent, New York State Insurance Department) (defending the New York State
Insurance Department).
189. See PAULSON BLUEPRINT, supra note 10, at 126-36.
190. See U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREAS., PROPOSED LEGISLATION: TITLE IV: REGISTRATION OF
ADVISERS TO PRIVATE FUNDS (2009), available at http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/
reports/title iv reg advisers priv funds 7 15 09 fiil.pdf (requiring registration of advisers to
private funds) [hereinafter GEITHNER BILL, TITLE IV].
191. See Commission Proposalfor a Directive of the European Parliament and of the
Council on Alternative Investment Fund Managers, at 2-4, COM (2009) 207 final (Apr. 30,
2009) (proposing to require hedge funds and private equity funds that meet certain
thresholds for assets under management to obtain authorization from their home country

regulators and to meet certain requirements, including minimum capital requirements).

INDIANA LA WJOURNAL

(Vol. 85:777

Moreover, the FDIC has unveiled rules that would require heightened capital
cushions, continuity of ownership, and regulatory scrutiny for private equity firms
that seek to acquire depositary institutions, but without designating them as a
"source of strength" for their depositors like traditional bank holding companies. 192
For such private funds, regulators might well consider regulation as an investment
bank holding company as a means of discouraging creeping regulation by banking
regulators.
A third possibility is that existing bank and nonbank holding companies may
wish to spin off financial services businesses, either to remove troubled assets or to
93
qualify for access to federal assistance in the event of a systemic failure.'
Separating the "good bank" from the "bad bank" would allow the good bank to
seek private infusions of capital based upon its stronger portfolio of assets. 194 The
holding company and its nonbank subsidiaries would thus continue to operate as a
going concern or wind down in an orderly manner.195 Regulation of such entities as
a broker/dealer holding company or similar nonbank holding company might
entitle them to the benefits of exemptive relief for financial institutions engaged in
derivative transactions under federal securities, commodities, and bankruptcy law.
The common theme is that financial services conglomerates that are not bank
holding companies should be subject to some regulation for systemic risk, but not
to the same degree as federally insured depository institutions or their holding
companies. Regulators would therefore be responsible for monitoring such firms
for liquidity and capital adequacy-and possibly for intervening to resolve a failing
institution in the event of financial stress-but without the same commitment to
rescue such firms as depository institutions. To the extent that the allocation of
authority to or among regulators sets the tone for any subsequent regulatory

192. Final Statement of Policy on Qualifications for Failed Bank Acquisitions, 74 Fed.
Reg. 45,440, 45,448 (Sept. 2, 2009).
193. Among nonbank companies, for example, General Motors spun off its financial
services arm, GMAC, in 2006 as part of an internal reorganization. See GMAC Financial
Services, Who We Are, http://www.gmacfs.com/us/en/about/who/index.html. GMAC
subsequently sought and obtained approval from the FRB as a bank holding company in
2008. Id. General Electric, meanwhile, has lobbied Congress to avoid becoming subject to
regulation as a bank holding company, despite calls from the Treasury to regulate its
financial services arm, GE Capital, as a bank holding company. See, e.g., Peter Eavis,
Defining Road Rules for GE Capital,WALL ST. J., Aug. 10, 2009, at C10.
194. See Editorial, Making Failure an Option, WALL ST. J., June 9, 2009, at A18
(advocating breakup and resolution of Citigroup); Katharina Bart, UBS Banks on Low-Risk
Future, WALL ST. J., Feb. 11, 2009, at C3 (describing UBS's decision to require investment
banking units to fund themselves at market rates instead of relying on cheaper central
funding).
195. See, e.g., John Coates & David Scharfstein, Lowering the Cost of Bank
Recapitalization, 26 YALE J. ON REG. 373, 381-82 (2009) (describing the process by which
the assets of a BHC bank subisidiary might be removed to a bridge bank, owned and
guaranteed by the FDIC, without attempting to recapitalize the BHC and its nonbank
subsidiaries); Rob Cox, Citibank in 2011-Hypothetically, N.Y. TIMES.COM, Jan 24, 2010,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/25/business/25views.html
(satirically
describing the possible "creation of Toxia, America's biggest nonbank financial institution,"
to contain the most underperforming assets of GE Money and Citi Financial).
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framework, the alternatives frequently discussed are (i) consolidation of authority
in the FRB, (ii) functional regulation of investment banks and other nonbank
financial services conglomerates by a regulator such as the SEC, FDIC, or newly
formed regulator, and (iii) industry initiatives.
A. ConsolidateAuthority in the FRB
Perhaps the most forcefully advocated alternative to the current system of
financial regulation is to consolidate oversight of all holding companies of all
financial services providers in the Federal Reserve Board. The premise of this
argument is that ex post central bank relief must be tied to ex ante central bank
regulation, for only the prospect of access to central bank liquidity in times of crisis
can induce market participants to comply with ex ante efforts to monitor and
counteract systemic risk. 196 Accordingly, all entities that might seek an entitlement
to, or face the prospect of, an intervention by the FRB by virtue of their extended
network of counterparty relationships would become subject to central bank
oversight. 97 At a minimum, such regulation would consist of additional
information gathering by the FRB from individual firms subject to regulation, as
well as the authority to alert firms of potential risks to their business resulting from
their own or their counterparties' activities.198 It would also seek to grant broad
discretionary powers to the FRB to limit the activities of, or liquidate, firms that
threaten market stability.199
Centralization of regulatory authority over financial services, whether in a
central bank or other financial services agency, has many adherents. 00 First,
centralization would eliminate gaps and coordinate regulation of all financial
intermediaries. While holding companies for banks and brokerage firms are
ostensibly subject to the same regulatory capital requirements, the potential for

196. See Timothy Geithner, Op-Ed, We Can Reduce Risk in the FinancialSystem, FIN.
TIMES, June 8, 2008, at 9.

197. See PAULSON BLUEPRINT, supra note 10, at 146-48.
198. See id. at 148-51.
199. See id. at 151-52.
200. See Elizabeth F. Brown, E Pluribus Unum-Out of Many, One: Why the United
States Needs a Single Financial Services Agency, 14 U. MIAMI Bus. L. REv. 1 (2005)
(arguing for consolidation of banking regulators); John C. Coffee, Jr., Competition Versus
Consolidation: The Significance of OrganizationalStructure in Financial and Securities
Regulation, 50 Bus. LAw. 447, 473-81 (1995) (arguing for consolidation of SEC and
CFTC); Pouncy, supra note 58, at 587. Smaller countries may prefer a single financial
regulator because of the significant benefits from economies of scale. For larger countries,
policy makers must consider both pros and cons of consolidated regulation: A single
regulator may improve the consistency and comparability of regulation of different financial
products, avoid "regulatory gaps" when regulating new products, and be reputationally
responsible for success of the system. Martin (Cihtk & Richard Podpiera, Are More
Integrated Prudential Supervision Agencies Characterized by Better Regulation and
Supervision? 8-9 (July 5, 2007) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://ssm.com/abstract=998624. On the other hand, a single regulator that is too large,
whose objectives are ill defined, or that performs multiple roles (such as a central bank) may
not be as effective. Id. at 9-10.
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inconsistent interpretive guidance across regulators can create opportunities for
preferential treatment. Disparities in the regulation of sales practices and margins
taken by bank, securities, and commodity regulators-even when such disparities
are created by express statutory mandate-have long been the subject of industry
complaints. 20 1 Regulators loath to resolve such debates may often be tempted to
yield to the lowest common denominator, rather than risk alienating one
constituency.
Centralization of regulatory authority in the FRB would also carry with it the
benefits of depoliticization and ease of global coordination. A centralized
regulatory authority, such as the FRB, is typically constituted as a central bank
insulated from political pressure and thus able to focus its regulatory efforts on
long-term market stability. 202 To the extent that, in many non-U.S. markets,
commercial and investment banking is conducted in "universal" banking
enterprises under a single financial regulator, 2 3 centralizing authority in the FRB
would allow U.S. financial regulation to speak with one voice in international or
global fora
and to coordinate regulatory responses with other central bankers more
24
rapidly. 0
Critics note that conferring exclusive authority on a single panoptic regulator to
regulate financial markets has significant drawbacks as well. A central bank with
broad discretionary authority may be inclined to favor depository institutions over
other regulated entities-or bank holding companies over investment banking
groups, in a systemic crisis-either by relying on nonbanks as a "source of
strength" for depository institutions within a holding company or favoring relief to
depository institutions over other market participants. 20 5 It is also not clear that a

201. See PAULSON BLUEPRINT, supra note 10, at 106-09; Coffee, supranote 200, at 47381 (arguing for consolidation of SEC and CFTC).
202. Cf Ramirez, supra note 88, at 503--04.
203. See Eilis Ferran, Do FinancialSupermarkets Need Super Regulators? Examining
the United Kingdom's Experience in Adopting the Single FinancialRegulator Model, 28
BROOK. J. INT'L L. 257 (2003); Joseph Silvia, Efficiency and Effectiveness in Securities
Regulation: ComparativeAnalysis of the United States's Competitive Regulatory Structure
and the United Kingdom's Single-RegulatorModel, 6 DEPAUL BUS. & COM. L.J. 247 (2008).
204. Cf 11F REPORT, supra note 57, at 126-41 (recommending that central banks

institutionalize mechanisms for injecting liquidity).
205. Bank regulators have long sought to reach the assets of affiliates of a troubled
institution in order to avoid commitment of public funds. For example, the FDIC has sought
to require commonly controlled banks and trusts to cross-guarantee losses of an insured
depository institution. Jackson, supra note 68, at 533-35; see also 12 U.S.C. § 1815(e)
(2006) (granting the FDIC power to assess any loss it incurs due to the failure of one insured
depository institution against commonly controlled banks and trusts, but not nonbanking
affiliates).
The FRB has taken the position that BHCs must similarly serve as a "source of strength"
to their subsidiary institutions, 12 C.F.R. § 225.4 (2009), and has asserted the policy view
that "a bank holding company should stand ready to use available resources to provide
adequate capital funds to its subsidiary banks during periods of financial stress or adversity."
Policy Statement, Responsibility of Bank Holding Companies to Act as Sources of Strength
to Their Subsidiary Banks, 52 Fed. Reg. 15,707, 15,708 (Apr. 30, 1987) (noting further that
"[a] bank holding company's failure to meet its obligation to serve as a source of strength to
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regulator with plenary authority over systemic risk will seek to use its authority to
countermand heightened business conduct or prudential
2 6 regulation-in the name of
market stability-during the run-up to a market crisis. 0
Unified regulation may also undermine the ability of a central regulator to
distinguish the degree of federal oversight or remedial intervention accorded to
different products or services. To the extent that it may be highly undesirable that
investment banking and securities trading generally receive the same level of
federal protection as the banking system, the identity of the regulator charged with
oversight of specific affiliates or product lines is an important signal to the publicfor example, SIPC versus FDIC protection-to make such divisions clear. 20 7 A
single regulator would reinforce the implicit expectation that all regulated financial

its subsidiary bank(s), including an unwillingness to provide appropriate assistance to a
troubled or failing bank, will generally be considered an unsafe and unsound banking
practice [subject to a cease-and-desist order under § 1818(b)] or a violation of Regulation Y,
or both"); Jackson, supra note 68, at 528-39. The Fifth Circuit rejected this view in MCorp
Financial,Inc. v. Board of Governors FederalReserve System, 900 F.2d 852, 863 (5th Cir.

1990) (concluding that "the Board's determination that the holding company's failure to
transfer its assets to a troubled subsidiary was an 'unsafe or unsound practice' . . . is an
unreasonable and impermissible interpretation of that term"), aff'd in part and rev "din part
on other grounds, 502 U.S. 32 (1991).

The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999 subsequently limited the FRB's ability to seek
funds or assets from a regulated securities or insurance affiliate of a troubled depository
institution without the consent of such affiliate's regulator. 12 U.S.C. § 1844(g) (2006). But
see Supervisory Letter SR 00-13 from the Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. to the
Officer in Charge of Supervision and Appropriate Supervisory Staff at Each Fed. Reserve
Bank and to Financial Holding Companies (Aug. 15, 2000), available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/SRLETrERS/2000/SR0013.HTM (noting that the
Board "is responsible for assessing consolidated capital adequacy for FHCs with the ultimate
objective of protecting the insured depository subsidiaries from the effects of disruptions in
the nonbank portions of the organization").
206. See 12 U.S.C. § 1639(l)(2) (2006) (providing the FRB with discretionary regulatory
authority to "prohibit acts or practices in connection with... (A) mortgage loans that the
Board finds to be unfair, deceptive, or designed to evade the provisions of [statutory
disclosure requirements for certain mortgages]; and (B) refinancing of mortgage loans that
the Board finds to be associated with abusive lending practices, or that are otherwise not in
the interest of the borrower"); Alan S. Blinder, Two Bubbles, Two Paths, N.Y. TIMES, June

15, 2008, at BU6 (distinguishing central bank's role in bubbles caused by unsafe or unsound
banking practices from those caused by exogenous factors); Allan H. Meltzer, Keep the Fed
Away From Investment Banks, WALL ST. J., July 16, 2008, at A17; see, e.g., Editorial, A
CrisisLong Foretold, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 19, 2007, at A36 (asserting that the Fed neglected its
obligation to regulate "unfair" and "deceptive" mortgage lending under Home Ownership
Equity and Protection Act of 1994).
207. One study has suggested, for example, that investors are generally unable to
distinguish the type of services provided by, or appreciate the conflicts of interest that
permeate, a web of interconnected financial intermediaries. ANGELA A. HUNG, NOREEN
CLANCY, JEFF DoMINITZ,

ERIC

TALLEY, CLAUDE BERREBI

& FARRluKH

SuvANKuLov,

INVESTOR AND INDUSTRY PERSPECTIVES ON INVESTMENT ADVISERS AND BROKER-DEALERS,

at

xix (2008), available at http://www.rand.org/pubs/technicalreports/2008/RAND_
TR556.pdf (finding that "[i]nvestors had difficulty distinguishing among industry
professionals and perceiving the web of relationships among service providers").

INDIANA LA WJOURNAL

[Vol. 85:777

institutions would benefit from the federal government's largesse, thus
exacerbating moral hazard.
Most importantly, however, commentators have described the pressure on the
FRB to avoid intervening during periods of market exuberance (when its efforts
"take away the punchbowl") 208 if it has the power to remediate ex post. 2°9 Indeed,
the FRB has rolled out a number of financing facilities in recent months to create
some semblance of stability in financial markets, 210 while doing little as yet to
exercise the enormous economic leverage it possesses over the financial industry to
increase its prophylactic authority. 211 This may be partly a result of its twin role in
the U.S. financial system, as both a regulator and market participant.212 As a

208. "The job of the Federal Reserve is to take away the punchbowl just when the party
gets going." GEORGE COOPER, THE ORIGIN OF FINANCIAL CRISES: CENTRAL BANKS, CREDIT
BUBBLES AND THE EFFICIENT MARKET FALLACY 138 (2008) (attributing quotation to William
McChesney Martin, Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve between
1951 and 1970).
209. See, e.g., COOPER, supra note 208, at 24 ("[T]he Fed's monetary policy can be
characterised as one in which policy is used aggressively to prevent or reverse credit
contraction or asset price deflation, but is not used to prevent-credit expansion or asset
inflation."); Amitai Aviram, Counter-CyclicalEnforcement of CorporateLaw, 25 YALE J.
ON REG. 1, 26-27 (2008) (describing pressures on FRB monetary policy); Ramirez, supra
note 88, 538-554 (chronicling the FRB's ability to exercise political independence in
exercising monetary policy); see also ALAN GREENSPAN, THE AGE OF TURBULENCE 178
(2007) ("If we raised rates and gave as a reason that we wanted to rein in the stock market, it
would have provoked a political firestorm. We'd have been accused of hurting the little
investor, sabotaging people's retirements. I could imagine the grilling I'd get in the next
congressional oversight hearing.").
210. In addition to direct lending to financial institutions via its discount window, the
FRB has created (i) a Term Auction Facility, through which depository institutions may bid
for use of funds of 28-day or 84-day maturity, (ii) a Primary Dealer Credit Facility, which
lends funds to the FRB's primary dealers overnight at fixed rate and secured using variety of
collateral, and (iii) a Term Securities Lending Facility, which permits firms to borrow U.S.
Treasury securities against riskier forms of collateral for a one-month period. Bd. of
Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Credit and Liquidity Programs and the Balance Sheet:
Lending to Depository Institutions (Jan. 13, 2010), http://www.federalreserve.gov/
monetarypolicy/bst lendingdepository.htm; Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys.,
Credit and Liquidity Programs and the Balance Sheet: Lending to Primary Dealers (Jan. 13,
2010), http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/bst-lendingprimary.htm.
Notably,
each of these tools is designed to provide short-term financing as a means to address
concerns about scarcity of liquidity.
211. See Stephen Joyce & Aaron Lorenzo, Borrowing Facilities Achieve Success but
Market Stubbornness FrustratesFed, BNA BANKING DAILY, May 13, 2008.
212. Cf Alfred C. Aman Jr., Bargainingfor Justice: An Examination of the Use and
Limits of Conditions by the Federal Reserve Board, 74 IOwA L. REv. 837, 892-98 (1989)
(raising concerns about the FRB's use of conditions and voluntary commitments from bank
holding companies under the Bank Holding Company Act in lieu of administrative rule
making). In a related context, the Federal Reserve Board has encountered similar issues with
designing its program for "primary dealers," the commercial and investment banks that assist
the FRBNY in implementing monetary policy through participation in periodic Treasury
auctions and the FRBNY's Open Market Operations, as well as supplying information about
market conditions. HARRIS, supra note 17, at 58. Critical to the success of the primary dealer
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regulator, the FRB has in recent years expressed a commitment to regulation by
market forces, rather than altering (or stating an intention to alter) margin
requirements or monetary policy or increasing regulation in the face of market
practices. 213 As a market participant, however, it has a mixed record in exploiting
its leverage as lender of last resort to extract either commitments to improve risk
management or concessions from ailing firms to deter other supplicants for
relief.214 Other bank regulators, who do not enjoy the luxury of the FRB's

unlimited balance sheet, have taken a firmer stand.215
program, as with any underwriting or selling syndicate, is some assurance about (and
corresponding due diligence into) the reputational integrity and creditworthiness of
participating firms. Acknowledging the "public impression" that primary dealers were
regulated by or held special status with the Federal Reserve System, however, the FRBNY
amended its procedures to replace its discretionary selection procedures with more
standardized criteria regarding capital adequacy and creditworthiness and a focus on
"market," rather than "dealer," surveillance. Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., Administration of
Relationships with Primary Dealers (Jan 22, 1992), http://www.ny.frb.org/markets/
pridealers_policies.html.
213. COOPER, supra note 208, at 34-36 (criticizing the FRB's "internally inconsistent"
philosophy of deferring to the doctrine of market efficiency while asset prices rise and credit

expands, while adopting the "Keynes/Minsky perspective" of government intervention
through fiscal and monetary policy when the economy contracts); MARTIN MAYER, THE FED:
THE INSIDE STORY OF

How

THE WORLD'S MOST POWERFUL FINANCIAL INSTITUTION DRIVES

that "Greenspan's fear of ordering participants in a
private market to follow imposed standards has limited the Fed's role in risk reduction" and
THE MARKETS 282-83 (2001) (noting

arguing that the FRBNY should have taken a more aggressive approach to "stress test[ing]"
bank's financial models); Peter S. Goodman, Taking Hard New Look at a Greenspan
Legacy, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 9, 2008, at Al (describing the FRB's deregulatory policy under
Chairman Greenspan and its role in thwarting efforts to regulate derivatives in accordance

with free market principles); see also The Financial Crisis and the Role of Federal
Regulators:Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Oversight and Gov. Reform, 110th Cong. (Oct.

23, 2008) (testimony of Alan Greenspan), available at http://oversight.house.gov/
images/stories/documents/20081023100438.pdf ("[T]hose of us who have looked to the selfinterest of lending institutions to protect shareholder's equity (myself especially) are in a
state of shocked disbelief.").
214. Compare PRESIDENT'S WORKING GROUP ON FIN. MKTS., HEDGE FUNDS, LEVERAGE,
AND THE LESSONS OF LONG-TERM CAPITAL MANAGEMENT, at 12-14 (1999), available at

http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/reports/hedgfund.pdf
[hereinafter LTCM REPORT]
(describing the FRBNY's role in creating a consortium of LTCM's trading partners to take
on the "responsibility and burden of resolving LTCM's difficulties" by investing $3.6 billion
in new equity), and Davidoff & Zaring, supra note 16, at 479-80 (describing Treasury
Secretary Paulson's effort to push "JPMorgan to offer as low a price as possible" to Bear

Stearns' shareholders as part of its FRB-backed acquisition of Bear Steams "in order to
again prevent future moral hazard by financial institutions"), with Louise Story & Gretchen
Morgenson, A Rift at the Fed over the Bailout of A.LG., N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 22, 2010 at B1
(describing internal divisions at the FRB over the decision "to pay A.I.G.'s trading partners
in full on tens of billions of dollars in contracts" in lieu of negotiating for a fraction of that
amount).
215. The FDIC may not exercise its authority "to make loans to, to make deposits in, to
purchase the assets or securities of, to assume the liabilities of, or to make contributions to,
any insured depository institution" or to take certain other remedial measures unless (i)
"necessary" to provide insurance coverage for the insured deposits and (ii) the total amount
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B. CoordinatedOversight of Investment Bank Holding Companies

Another set of initiatives to improve regulation of the investment-banking sector
would entail greater cooperation among existing regulators, such as the SEC, while
preserving multiple regulators with different portfolios. Proposals have been made
to give the SEC increased oversight authority over holding company affiliates of
broker/dealers, in lieu of the now-defunct voluntary supervisory program.21 6 At
least one commentator has suggested greater collaboration among risk-management
specialists at each agency to assess the health of the financial system and make
appropriate recommendations.2t 7 Others have suggested giving the SEC the power
to take corrective action or force resolution of investment banks,21 s or giving the
FDIC itself the power to resolve investment banks.2 19 As capital requirements and
of the expenditures and obligations incurred is the "least costly to the Deposit Insurance

Fund of all possible methods for meeting the Corporation's obligation." 12 U.S.C. § 1823(c)
(2006). An exception exists when the Treasury Secretary, upon the written recommendation

of the FDIC Board and the Federal Reserve Board, after a supermajority vote of each,
determines that failure to do so, inter alia, "would have serious adverse effects on economic
conditions or financial stability." Id.; see also Thecla Fabian, FDICPreparesfor Failureof
Larger Banks; Bear Stearns Continues to Raise Questions, 40 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA)
No. 23, at 895 (June 9, 2008). Commentators have already suggested, for example, that the
FRB (or any other prudential regulator of investment banking activities) should follow a
"least cost" approach to assessing alternatives in the face of distress and to create an audit
trail for subsequent review by another branch of government. Robert C. Pozen, Op-Ed, Think
First,Bail Out Later, N.Y. TIMES, June 15, 2008, at WK13 (criticizing the Fed's bailout of
Bear Steams). But see Ben S. Bemanke, Chairman, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve
Sys., Remarks at the FDIC's Forum on Mortgage Lending for Low and Moderate Income
Households (July 8, 2008), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/
speech/bemanke2008O7O8a.htm ("Designing analogous rules for the prompt and orderly
resolution of securities firms is not straightforward, as these firms differ significantly from
most commercial banks in their financing, business models, and in other ways," such as
"book[ing] a large share of their assets at [offshore] affiliates . .. subject to foreign
bankruptcy laws.").
216. Malini Manickavasagam, SEC's Sirri Asks Congressfor Legislation to Strengthen
Investment Bank Regulation, 40 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 19, at 737 (May 12, 2008).
217. See, e.g., Harvey L. Pitt, "For Want of a Nail": ERM for the Regulators,
COMPLIANCE WK., Apr. 29, 2008, http://www.complianceweek.com/article/4100 (calling for
creation of a Risk Management Committee on the PWG for the purpose of "making an
annual, top-down, risk-based assessment of the U.S. financial system"). Since the market
crash of 1987, the executive branch has convened a Working Group on Financial Markets,
composed of the four principal federal financial regulators, to give recommendations with a
view to "enhancing the integrity, efficiency, orderliness, and competitiveness of our Nation's
financial markets and maintaining investor confidence." Exec. Order No. 12,631, 53 Fed.
Reg. 9421 (Mar. 18, 1988).
218. See Meltzer, supra note 206 (arguing that the SEC should have the same authority
with respect to investment banks as federal bank regulators have with commercial banks, in
lieu of granting the FRB discretionary oversight); see also infra text accompanying notes
274-279 (describing the resolution authority for investment bank holding companies in the
Geithner Bill, Title Xl). Of course, national securities exchanges and self-regulatory
organizations already possess this power. See supra note 163.
219. Regulating and Resolving Institutions Considered "Too Big to Fail": Hearing
Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, I1 th Cong. 7-10 (2009)
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business practices are standardized across retail financial services, regulatory
conflicts or gaps may be reduced 22
or0 addressed through joint rule-making exercises
or formal interagency agreements.
There is an argument that legislators should consider fragmenting regulation of
investment banks by regulatory objective. The Paulson Blueprint, for example,
refers to the distinction between regulation of the "localized" risk of individual firm
failures versus "systemic" risk to the financial market. 221 Under such a scheme, a
prudential regulator would be responsible for handling firm-specific events, while a
systemic regulator would handle marketwide events. 222 The difficulty here is that
much of the information gathering and analysis by a systemic risk regulator and
prudential regulator would be duplicative. Moreover, to the extent that a systemic
risk regulator must assume the functions of a prudential regulator when investment
bank failures might signal instability, 223 the prudential regulator's power would be
effectively neutralized over entities considered too big to fail.
For such fragmented regulation to have a significant impact, the prudential
regulator for investment banks would have to have the power to take corrective
action, including the power to require the investment bank to scale down its
operations, sell off key assets, and, in extreme circumstances, to liquidate. The
FDIC, for example, has sought to exercise such authority with respect to the
holding companies of FDIC-insured commercial banks. 224 It is questionable
whether regulators could exercise such powers effectively with respect to a holding
company for investment banks or other nondepositary institutions if its principal
creditors are institutions and sophisticated counterparties, rather than depositors. A
regulator who seeks to take such action runs the risk of impairing claims on the
firm, particularly if it intervenes too late or cannot realize the full value of the
firm's assets in liquidation,2 25 and its statutory mandate is designed to limit creditor
claims to the value of the insolvent firm.226
[hereinafter Regulating andResolving] (testimony of Sheila M. Bair, Chairman, FDIC).
220. See, e.g., Memorandum of Understanding Between the U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n
and the Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. Regarding Coordination and Information
Sharing in Areas of Common Regulatory and Supervisory Interest (July 7, 2008), available
at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2008/2008-134_mou.pdf.
221. PAULSON BLUEPRINT, supra note 10, at 143-46.
222. Id
223. See, e.g., id. at 152 (noting that a broad grant of authority to the FRB to impose
corrective actions "clearly could impact and potentially undercut PFRA's authority and to
some extent CBRA's authority" and suggesting checks on the ability of the FRB to initiate
such actions without seeking approval from the Secretary of the Treasury and, in the case of
PFRA-regulated entities such as depository institutions, the head of the PFRA).
224. See Resolution Reform Act of 2009, S. 1540, 111th Cong. §2 (2009) (granting the
FDIC the authority "to resolve the holding companies, affiliates, and subsidiaries of failed or
failing insured depository institutions"); Regulating andResolving, supra note 219, at 7-10
(testimony of Sheila M. Bair, Chairman, FDIC); infra text accompanying notes 274-279
(describing the resolution authority for investment bank holding companies in the Geithner
Bill, Title X]).
225. Cf Robert R. Bliss & George G. Kaufman, US. Corporate and Bank Insolvency
Regimes: A Comparisonand Evaluation, 2 VA. L. & Bus. REv. 143, 155 (2007) (noting that
"banking law places an emphasis on minimizing immediate losses to the FDIC and
depositors through prompt initiation of legal closure and resolution primarily through
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Moreover, legislators would have to decide which agency would be responsible
for exercising such authority. To the extent that authority would be conferred upon
the SEC, the critical question is how to justify the allocation of SEC staff resources
to maintain a rigorous enforcement program for the handful of investment banks
that qualify for it, when economies of scale would suggest that the Federal Reserve
Board is better suited to incorporate such oversight into its supervisory activities.
Even if second-tier broker/dealers or affiliates of existing FHCs were to seek CSE
status, further mergers among investment banks, acquisitions by FHCs, or failures
could rapidly thin the ranks.227 Moreover, even with dedicated funding for the
program, 228 turnover among the handful of economists or other staff persons
assigned to CSE oversight could drastically affect the quality of the program and
the consistency of the supervision required by Basel II for the successful
implementation of the Framework.229
The argument for giving the FDIC the power to take corrective action with
respect to faltering investment banks is simply that it is the federal agency with the
most experience in handling the resolution of financial institutions.230 It is not clear
whether there is an adequate policy basis for granting the FDIC the powers
associated with regulation of insured institutions without any corresponding federal
obligation (as opposed to discretion) to insure their customers and counterparties
against default. SIPC already insures securities accounts against default. None of
the other rationales for granting the FDIC special insolvency powers-such as the
fear of insider abuse or mismanagement of monies deposited by public customers
and the federal policy of restricting ownership in and heavily regulating the
acquisition of depository institutions-appears compelling in the case of the purely
proprietary trading and dealing activities of investment banks. 23 '

liquidation; while corporate bankruptcy is more likely to weigh perceived long-term goingconcem value").
226. See infra text accompanying notes 289-90.
227. See MORRISON & WILHELM, supra note 55, at 298 (illustrating through a timeline the
formation of FHCs and SIBHCs through the processes of merger and acquisition).
228. See Fiscal 2009 Appropriations: Financial Services and General Government:
Before the FinancialServs. and General Government Subcomm. of the H. Appropriations

Comm., 111th Cong. (2008) (testimony of Christopher Cox, Chairman, SEC) (observing that
"[w]hile the CSE program is at present voluntary, and receives no dedicated funding from
Congress.... Congress may be acting to fill this gap").
229. By contrast, the Commission is ideally suited to ensure compliance by both FHCs
and SIBHCs with the Third Pillar of the Basel II Framework to the extent that there is a
compelling need to ensure that the disclosure framework contemplated thereunder dovetails
with mandatory disclosure requirements applicable to FHCs and SIBHCs under federal
securities law. BASEL II FRAMEWORK, supranote 13, 813-16, at 227.
230. Regulating and Resolving, supra note 219, at 20 (testimony of Sheila M. Bair,
Chairman, FDIC) (noting that "[w]hile no existing government agency, including the FDIC,
has experience with resolving systemically important entities, probably no agency other than
the FDIC currently has the kinds of skill sets necessary to perform resolution activities of
this nature").
231. Cf. Macey & Miller, supra note 181, at 1215-23 (discussing impediments to
changes in control of depository institutions); Swire, supra note 70, at 506 (discussing
"insider abuse").
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C. PromoteIndustry Initiatives

Because competitors of failing enterprises bear the primary brunt of systemic
risk, they have some incentive both to prevent systemic risk from arising and to
mitigate the consequences of a systemic event. The calibration of such models to
compute capital requirements or other internal restrictions on transactions or
products is a matter of discretion, however, and regulators (rightly or wrongly)
have reason to fear that banks will not fully internalize the potential risks they bring
to the financial system.232 Furthermore, the ex ante probability of a systemic crisis
is sufficiently insubstantial that even the most trivial prophylactic efforts to reduce
operational risk-such as ensuring adequate documentation of derivative
contracts-may be left unaddressed or uncompleted until markets reach crisis
unless failure to comply carries the possibility of regulatory sanction, or worse,
inability to document one's claims in an insolvency proceeding.
Many efforts have been made to adopt standards or "best practices" for risk
management. Firms routinely suggest the development of more "robust and
pervasive" risk cultures, including formalization of the role of risk-management
officers, internal controls for risk, and greater board awareness of firm risks.233 A
number of discrete working groups have also been created to address specific
components of the regulatory framework, such as reducing the operational risks
entailed in OTC derivative transactions or improving the monitoring of
counterparty credit risk.234 As discussed above, however, procedures developed in
the wake of a crisis may be sacrificed or modified if viewed as an impediment to
competition. 235 Moreover, participation of the entities most vulnerable in a crisis
(such as unregulated funds) cannot be assured.
Enhanced disclosure is also routinely suggested by both regulators and industry
in the wake of a crisis. 236 Voluntary information-sharing agreements among firms
would in theory allow individual intermediaries to make better formed assessments
about latent concentration or indirect counterparty credit risks.237 Determining who
should have access to what information presents the regulatory challenge.
Disclosing proprietary information to a regulator, particularly on a voluntary basis,
runs the risk of freedom-of-information requests or misappropriation by regulatory
officials.238 Disclosing proprietary information to counterparties risks revealing

232. See supranotes 76, 150 (discussing VaR models).
233. IIF REPORT, supra note 57, at 31-38.
234. See, e.g., LTCM REPORT, supranote 214, at F-I to -6.
235. See, e.g., Confessions of a Risk Manager,ECONOMIST, Aug. 9, 2008, at 73 (giving a
first-person account by an anonymous risk manager) ("At the root of it all, however, was--and still is-a deeply ingrained flaw in the [risk management] decision-making process. In
contrast to the law, where two sides make an equal-and-opposite argument that is fairly
judged, in banks there is always a bias towards one side of the argument.").
236. See G30 REPORT, supra note 186, at 12; Christopher Cox, Chairman, U.S. Sec. &
Exch. Comm'n, Address to the Security Traders 12th Annual Washington Conference (May
7, 2008), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2008/spch050708cc.htm (pressuring
greater disclosure of liquidity risk by major investment banks).
237. See IIF REPORT, supra note 57, at 107-09 (suggesting the formation of a Market
Monitoring Group).
238. Hu, supra note 56, at 410 (discussing Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) issues
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trading strategies, or worse, could prompt a "run" if its financial situation is
perceived as deteriorating; 239 because these entail the disclosure of proprietary
information, third-party verification (usually in the form of a regulator) is necessary
to ensure completeness. Client information is even more sensitive, since clients
have the ability to break up activity across firms to avoid revealing their strategy to
any single firm, thus complicating risk management.
Ex post initiatives, moreover, may tend toward self-preservation or cherrypicking of failed firms' assets.2 40 Healthy firms in a position to acquire ailing firms,
for example, may delay in order to avoid straining their own balance sheets with
additional debt or to profit from further reductions in public share prices. 24' The
time and effort to undertake due diligence during a market crisis, moreover, poses
an additional impediment to self-correction. Government involvement may, to a
degree, address collective-action problems in order to arrive at an expeditious
solution, as long as such efforts focus on those firms that have the most incentive to
bail out a troubled firm. 242

related to seeking information from industry).
239. OCC, FRB, FDIC, and OTS regulations provide that:
[E]xcept in very limited circumstances, banks, savings associations, and other
financial institutions may not disclose a report of examination or any portion of
the report, nor make any representations concerning the report or the report's
findings without the prior written permission of the appropriate federal banking
agency. The circumstances for release of nonpublic supervisory information
may include disclosure to a parent holding company, director, officer, attorney,
auditor, or other specified third party, as indicated in the regulations of the
appropriate federal banking agency. Any person who discloses or uses
nonpublic information except as expressly permitted by one of the appropriate
federal banking agencies or as provided by the agency's regulations may be
subject to the criminal penalties provided in 18 USC 641.
Press Release, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., FDIC, Office of the Comptroller
of the Currency, Office of Thrift Supervision, Interagency Advisory on the Confidentiality of
the Supervisory Rating and Other Nonpublic Supervisory Information (Feb. 28, 2005),
availableat http://www.fdic.gov/news/news/press/2005/pr1805a.html.
240. For example, the Master Liquidity Enhancement Conduit-which was to have been
created by several major banks to purchase assets from structured investment vehicles
invested in subprime mortgages-failed to materialize. Karen Krebsbach, Street Still Cool to
Super SIV Fund, U.S. BANKER, Jan. 2008, at 16; see also Floyd Norris, 3 Major Banks Offer

Plan to Calm Debts in Housing, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 16, 2007, at Al (describing the Master
Liquidity Enhancement Conduit concept); Gillian Tett, Krishna Guha & David Wighton,
Banks Agree $75bn MortgageDebt Fund,FT.coM, Oct. 14, 2007.
241. See, e.g., Under the Hammer, EcONOMIST, July 12, 2008, at 81-82 (reporting

rumors of long-anticipated, but as yet unconsummated, acquisitions of certain investment
banks and commercial banks).
242. For example, the FRBNY organized a $3.6 billion bailout of Long-Term Capital
Management (LTCM) by its major creditors, including Bankers Trust, Barclays, Chase,
Credit Suisse First Boston, Deutsche Bank, Goldman Sachs, Merrill Lynch, J.P. Morgan,
Morgan Stanley, Salomon Smith Barney, UBS, Socidtd Gdn6rale, Lehman Brothers, and
Paribas. LTCM REPORT, supra note 214, at 12-14; Anita Raghavan & Mitchell Pacelle, To
the Rescue? A Hedge Fund Falters,So the Fed PersuadesBig Banks to Ante Up, WALL ST.

J., Sept. 24, 1998, at Al. Bear Steams, however, notably declined to participate despite its
significant exposure to LTCM. LTCM REPORT, supra note 214, at 17-20 (describing Bear
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IV. THE DIFFICULTIES OF ACHIEVING POLITICAL CONSENSUS
While the basic tools and institutional structures for regulating financial services
conglomerates are fairly well established, regulatory reform has stalled even as
policy makers have resisted calls to contemplate more sweeping changes to the
structure of financial regulation.243 Some radical approaches may have little chance
of being implemented in practice-such as a complete ban on intervention by the
FRB or the Treasury 244 or using antitrust law or similar concepts to bar firms from

becoming too large or interconnected to fail. 245 Other approaches may require a
reconfiguration of congressional oversight, and a corresponding augmentation or
diminution in the power of the committee chairs and ranking members, whose
regulatory agencies are eliminated, merged, or diminished. 246 Finally, the
considerable wealth and influence of the financial services industry all but ensures
that changes in the regulatory landscape will be incremental.247 As a result, the
proposals 8 that have been put forward tend to coalesce around "two to five"
models.

24

Steams' exposure to LTCM as its prime broker).
An industry bailout may also take the form of participation in a "firm commitment"
underwriting. See, e.g., Patrick Hosking & Christine Seib, FSA Puts Pressure on Top Five
Banks to Support Bradford & Bingley Rights Issue, TIMES (London), June 10, 2008, at 43

(discussing Financial Services Authority's "unprecedented step" of pressuring U.K. banks to
sub-underwrite £20M of a proposed £258M rights offering by a U.K. financial services
firm).
243. See, e.g., Why Wall Street Reforms Have Stalled, N.Y. TIMES.COM, Sept. 11, 2009,
http://roomfordebate.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/09/ 1/why-wall-street-reforms-have-stalled
(presenting the views of several academic, industry, and government commentators on the
reasons why efforts to change the culture of, and risks in, the financial industry have not
been successful in the wake of the current crisis).
244. Cf Curtis J. Milhaupt, Japan's Experience with Deposit Insurance and Failing
Banks: Implicationsfor FinancialRegulatory Design?, 77 WASH. U. L.Q. 399, 406-07,430-

31 (1999) (arguing that "[e]mpirical observation ... discredits the view that a world without
deposit insurance is a world of market discipline for banks" because market participants will
assume the existence of implicit deposit protection and that, based on the Japanese
experience, well-designed explicit government guarantees "may be the starting point for the
development of effective private mechanisms to control bank risk and promote bank
stability").
245. Cf David Cho, Banks 'Too Big to Fail' Have Grown Even Bigger, WASH. POST,

Aug. 29, 2009, at Al (noting that a "series of federally arranged mergers safely landed
troubled banks on the decks of more stable firms" but created even bigger banks likely to
have government backing in the event of a crisis).
246. For example, the bifurcation of regulatory authority over securities and derivatives
between the SEC and CFTC has survived in part because the two agencies are overseen by
different House committees. See Coffee, supra note 200, at 450-51 (describing role of the

House Agriculture Committee in protecting CFTC's jurisdiction).
247. See, e.g., Gretchen Morgenson & Don van Natta Jr., In Crisis, Banks Dig in for

Fight Against Rules, N.Y. TIMES, June 1, 2009, at Al (describing Wall Street's lobbying
effort against efforts to regulate derivatives).
248. See Lawrence A. Cunningham & David Zaring, The Three or Four Approaches to
Financial Regulation: A CautionaryAnalysis Against Exuberance in Crisis Response, 78
GEO. WASH. L. REv. 39 (2009).
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In this Part, I compare the recommendations with respect to the problem of
regulating financial services conglomerates of a set of five representative views in
the political process:
"
*
"

"

"

The Paulson Blueprint, which represents the policy recommendations of
the Treasury Department under Henry Paulson;
The legislation recently proposed by the Treasury Department under
Timothy Geithner (the Geithner Bill);2
The report of the Thirty (the G30 Report), a "private, nonprofit,
international body composed of very senior representatives2 of
the private
°
and public sectors and academia," chaired by Paul Volcker;
The Report of the Committee on Capital Markets Regulation (the CCMR
Report), a committee composed of "twenty-five leaders from the investor
community, business, finance, law, accounting, and academia"; 25' and
The plan proposed by the Republican members of the U.S. House
25 2
Financial Services Committee (the "House Republican Bill").

I have structured this Part based on their approaches as to (i) how to define
"systemic risk" or "systemically significant" institutions, (ii) who has the power to
take "corrective action," and in what form, to counter concerns about excessive
risk, and (iii) how broadly the FRB or another regulator can take remedial action in
the wake of a crisis.
A. Defining Systemic Risk
One key question that most of the proposals address is whether to identify
certain financial services conglomerates as "systemically significant," and if so,
whether the appropriate process is to identify them as such through legislation, rule
making, or a discretionary process. With respect to the first question, for example,
the House Republican Bill appears to reject the idea of identifying systemically
significant institutions. 255 Designating institutions as such constitutes, in the view
of the bill's sponsors, an express government guarantee of a bailout in the case of
financial stress and creates undue moral hazard. 2 Moreover, special designation
puts such firms at a significant advantage when raising funds in capital markets or
attracting depositors or clients; this could result in a cartelization of the financial

249. See supranote 177.
250. G30 REPORT, supranote 186.
251.

COMM. ON CAPITAL MKTS. REGULATION, THE GLOBAL FiNANcIAL CRisis: A PLAN

(2009), available at http://www.capmktsreg.org/pdfs/TGFCCCMRReport_(5-26-09).pdf [hereinafter CCMR REPORT].
252. Consumer Protection and Regulatory Enhancement Act, H.R. 3310, 111 th Cong.
(2009).
253, See Press Release, House Comm. on Fin. Servs. Republicans, Republicans Introduce
Comprehensive Financial Regulatory Reform Legislation (July 23, 2009), available at
http://republicans.financialservices.house.gov/index.php?option=com - content&task=view&i
d=692&Itemid=43 (describing philosophy of House Republican Bill).
254. See id.
FOR REGULATORY REFORM
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services industry as larger, government-backed market participants crowd out
smaller firms that do not enjoy such a guarantee. 255 The CCMR Report likewise
concedes that higher capital requirements may be appropriate for "large"
institutions, but it cautions against a special designation or a special resolution
regime for systemically significant institutions because of the moral hazards
entailed.256
By contrast, the GeithnerBill and the G30 Report attempt to define more clearly
which firms pose a systemic risk to financial markets. The apparent purpose of
such identification would be to ensure that regulators subject such firms to
heightened regulation ex ante and some sort of orderly resolution ex post. The G30
Report, for example, recommends appropriate prudential regulation not only for
BHCs, but also for "large, internationally active insurance companies" and "large
investment banks and broker/dealers" not otherwise organized as bank holding
companies; it further suggests that prudential regulation might be appropriate for
private pools of capital for "funds above a size judged to be potentially
systemically significant." 257 The Geithner Bill would expressly define as Tier 1
FHCs those financial firms whose combination of size, leverage, and
interconnectedness could "pose a threat to global or United States financial
stability" if it failed.258 The FRB would be responsible, pursuant to statutory criteria
and in consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury and a newly formed
Financial Services Oversight Council (consisting of all federal financial regulators),
for developing
rules to define those firms that pose such risks to the financial
259
system.

255. See Peter J. Wallison, Congress is the Real Systemic Risk, WALL ST. J., Mar. 17,
2009, at A15 ("Financial institutions that not are large enough to be designated as
systemically significant will gradually lose out in the marketplace to the larger companies
that are perceived to have government backing .. ");William Poole, Former St. Louis Fed.
Reserve President, Remarks to the CFA Society of San Francisco (May 6, 2009), available
at
http://www.sustainablewealth.org/bailouts-an-afront-to-the-market-and-to-democracy
(arguing that "market[s] will allocate too much capital to firms" in the top ten to twenty
positions if government guarantees are expected).
256. CCMR REPORT, supra note 251, at 69-71 (offering, as "a starting point," the idea of
a progressive capital surcharge for "core" U.S. banks with more than $250 billion in assets);
id.at 113 (supporting an ad hoc determination of systemic risk); id.at 207-08 (noting
possible disadvantages inherent in the designation of certain institutions as "systemically
significant").
257. G30 REPORT, supra note 186, at 8-9.
258. GEITHNER BILL, TrrLE II, supranote 92, § 204, at 3-4.
259. See U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREAS., PROPOSED LEGISLATION: TITLE I: FINANCIAL
SERVICES
OVERSIGHT
COUNCIL,
§
102,
at
1-3
(2009),
available at
http://www.financialstability.gov/docs/regulatoryreform/07222009/titlel.pdf
[hereinafter
GEITHNER BILL, TrrLE I]. The bill provides that the FRB would establish rules, in
consultation with the Department of the Treasury, to guide the identification of Tier 1 FHCs,
GEITHNER BILL, TITLE II, supra note 92, § 204(a), at 3-4, but provides that the new Financial
Services Oversight Council, among other bodies, "may recommend financial firms to the
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System for designation as Tier 1 financial
holding companies," GEITHNER BILL, TITLE I, supra § 103(a), at 3-4.
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Other approaches might leave such determinations to the FRB, the Treasury, or
another market stability regulator on an ad hoc basis. The Paulson Blueprint, for
example, identifies a broad range of institutions that may pose a macro-prudential
risk-including bank holding companies and other financial services
conglomerates as well as private pools of capital-and gives its "market stability"
regulator broad authority to access or compel disclosure of information from such
institutions, to publish aggregate financial information about overall market risk,
and to consult and provide input into rule making by individual financial
regulators.260 Under this framework, the market stability regulator would appear to
have broad, unchecked power to decide whether particular institutions are
"systemically significant" and to take appropriate action.
Most of the reform proposals contemplate retaining the FRB as the market
stability regulator for all financial holding companies, but as suggested by the
discussion in Part III, the proposals differ with respect to how prudential oversight
of financial firms will be allocated. With the exception of the House Republican
Bill, each proposal contemplates broad authority for the FRB to collect information
from systemically significant financial institutions (and in some cases, private pools
of equity). Several of the proposals nevertheless contemplate granting concurrent
power to individual prudential regulators or to a council thereof.261 Only the House
Republican Bill, in an effort to focus the FRB's mission on monetary policy,
proposes to confer exclusive authority on a Market Stability and Capital Adequacy
Board (which would include outside experts as well as regulators) to monitor
interactions among various sectors of the financial system, identify risks, and report
its findings to Congress.262
To the extent that most of the proposals grant broad authority to the FRB to
define and oversee systemically significant financial services conglomerates, the
debate focuses on the degree to which it is possible to check the FRB's authority
through the individual or collective action of other federal regulators. 263 One flaw

260. PAULSON BLUEPRINT, supra note 10, at 148-51.

261. See, e.g., CCMR REPORT, supra note 251, at 206-10 (expressing ambivalence as to
how to allocate supervisory authority between the FRB and any newly created financial
services authority); G30

REPORT,

supra note 186, at 10-11; GEITHNER BILL,

TITLE II,

supra

note 92, § 204, at 13-14 (proposing an amendment to the Bank Holding Company Act of
1956 § 6(d)(3), 12 U.S.C. § 1845(d)(3) (2006)) (providing the FDIC with backstop
examination authority); PAULSON BLUEPRINT, supra note 10, at 152 (proposing a "Market
Stability Council" composed of the Secretary of the Treasury, the Chair of the FRB, and the
head of the Prudential Financial Regulatory Agency (PFRA)).
262. Consumer Protection and Regulatory Enhancement Act, H.R. 3310, 11 1th Cong. §
201 (2009) (proposing an eleven-member Market Stability and Capital Adequacy Board
comprising the chairs of six federal financial regulators and five private members appointed
by the President who are "specially qualified to serve ... by virtue of their education,
training, and experience").
263. See H.R. 3310 § 102 (proposing a ten-day period, extendible by an additional thirty
days, during which the functional regulator and Market Stability and Capital Adequacy
Board may consult with creditors of a "non-bank financial institution" prior to the filing of
an involuntary petition for bankruptcy); CCMR REPORT, supra note 251, at 206-10
(expressing ambivalence as to how to allocate supervisory authority between the FRB and
any newly created financial services authority); GEITHNER BILL, TITLE I, supra note 259, §
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in this strategy is that the FRB has historically enjoyed political independence,
whereas other financial regulators, such as the Treasury and the SEC, are
susceptible to greater political pressure. 264 Rather than combat the cyclicality of
markets, such a regulatory structure could exacerbate it, to the extent that politically
accountable regulators are likely to resist oversight during boom markets.
Moreover, the effectiveness of such a council or advisory board would be
diminished if its ranks are expanded to include assorted political appointees and
state banking and securities regulators, as some have proposed.265
B. Taking CorrectiveAction
The proposals also differ as to whether the concept of "prompt corrective
action" should be extended to nonbank financial services conglomerates and, if so,
whether such powers should be exercised by a designated prudential regulator or
the FRB. The Republican Plan, for example, expresses a preference for handling
the resolution of nonbank financial services conglomerates through the bankruptcy
process, 2 66 whereas the other proposals express a preference for some resolution
103(a), at 3-4 (empowering a new Financial Services Oversight Council to "recommend
financial firms to the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System for designation as
Tier 1 financial holding companies"); PAULSON BLUEPRINT, supra note 10, at 152 (proposing
a "Market Stability Council" comprised of the Secretary of the Treasury, the Chair of the
FRB, and the head of the Prudential Financial Regulatory Agency (PFRA) to approve FRBinitiated corrective action with respect to insured depository institutions); see also H.R. 3310
§ 403 (requiring the discontinuance of any actions taken by the FRB using emergency
powers in response to a joint resolution of the Senate and House expressing disapproval of
the action); G30 REPORT, supra note 186, at 11 (recommending that any systemic support
provided by a central bank under exigent circumstances be subsequently approved by an
appropriate governmental entity "with the consequent risk transfer to that entity"); U.S.
DEP'T OF THE TREAS., PROPOSED LEGISLATION: TITLE XIII: ADDITIONAL IMPROVEMENTS FOR

CRISIS
MANAGEMENT,
§
1301,
at
1 (2009),
available at
http://www.financialstability.gov/docs/regulatoryreform/07222009/titleXIII.pdf [hereinafter
FINANCIAL

GEITHNER BILL, TITLE XIII] (proposing an amendment to the Federal Reserve Act § 13, 12

U.S.C. § 343, to limit the FRB's power to extend credit to persons other than banks by
requiring the prior written approval of the Secretary of the Treasury).
264. See Kettering, supra note 126, at 1646-47 & n.308 (discussing the relative
independence of financial regulatory agencies such as the SEC, OCC, and FDIC); Ramirez,
supra note 88, at 532-35 (contrasting the FRB's political independence with that of the
SEC).
265. See, e.g., Letter from Timothy J. Karsky, Chairman, Conferences of State Bank
Supervisors, Roger Sevigny, President, Nat'l Ass'n of Ins. Comm'rs & Fred J. Joseph,
President, N. Am. Sec. Adm'rs Ass'n, to Sen. Christopher J. Dodd, Chairman, Senate
Comm. on Banking, Hous. & Urban Affairs, Sen. Richard Shelby, Ranking Member, Senate
Comm. on Banking, Hous. & Urban Affairs, Rep. Barney Frank, Chairman, House Comm.
on Fin. Servs. & Rep. Spencer Bachus, Ranking Member, Hous. Comm. on Fin. Servs. (May
18, 2009), available at www.nasaa.org/content/Files/JointSystemicRiskCouncilletter.pdf
(seeking representation by state financial regulators in any systemic risk council).
266. H.R. 3310 § 102 (proposing a ten-day period, extendible by an additional thirty
days, during which the functional regulator and Market Stability and Capital Adequacy
Board may consult with creditors of a "non-bank financial institution" prior to the filing of
an involuntary petition for bankruptcy).

INDIANA LA WJOURNAL

[Vol. 85:777

mechanism for nonbank financial services conglomerates. The G30 Report, for
example, would apply a resolution mechanism "only to those few organizations
whose failure might reasonably be considered to pose a threat to the financial
system," to be undertaken by a regulator with powers "comparable" to the
resolution authority for deposit-taking institutions.267 By contrast, the CCMR
Report (consistent with its preference to avoid the -systemically significant
designation) recommends a Financial Company Resolution Act, applicable to all
financial institutions, which would draw upon existing resolution rules applicable
to broker/dealers, banks, and other entities under the Bankruptcy Code.268
The Paulson Blueprint and the Geithner Bill each take a similar approach but
provide more detail as to how resolution authority would be allocated and
exercised. The PaulsonBlueprint vests authority inthe FRB to coordinate systemic
risk regulation and to initiate corrective action affecting the entire financial
landscape.269 Under the Paulson Blueprint, the FRB would have the authority to
require firms to take corrective actions-such as limiting risk exposures to certain
assets or counterparties or bolstering their liquidity or capital positions-as
necessary to eliminate threats to market stability.270 The Paulson Blueprint
recognizes that some checks on the FRB's corrective authority might be
appropriate. For example, the FRB might be required to seek the approval of a
Market Stability Council for firms regulated by the Prudential Financial Regulatory
Agency (PFRA)
and the Secretary of the Treasury for all other financial services
271
charter firms.
Under the Geithner Bill, all Tier 1 FHCs and bank holding companies would be
subject to a regime of prompt corrective action similar to that exercised by the
FDIC under the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act
(FDICIA) with respect to insured depository institutions.272 Firms would also be
subject to enhanced public disclosures about their risk profile, capital adequacy,
and risk-management capabilities, and each firm would be required to report
periodically to the FRB on its plan for "rapid and orderly resolution in the event of
severe financial distress." 273 The proposal further contemplates a special resolution
regime, in which the Treasury would be able to make a determination as to whether
corrective action should be taken with respect to a Tier 1 FHC,274 with the FDIC or
SEC generally appointed to act as conservator or receiver of investment bank

267. G30

REPORT, supranote 186, at 16.
268. CCMR REPORT, supra note 251, at 124-27.
269. See PAULSON BLUEPRINT, supranote 10, at 147.
270. PAULSON BLUEPRINT, supranote 10, at 151-52.

271. Id. The Market Stability Council, as conceived in the Paulson Report, might consist
of the Secretary of the Treasury, the Chairman of the FRB,and the head of the PFRA. Id. at
152. As a result, the FRB would need to obtain the concurrence of either the Secretary of the
Treasury or the head of the PFRA if it sought to require corrective action. Id.
272. U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREAS., PROPOSED LEGISLATION: TITLE XII: ENHANCED
RESOLUTION AUTHORITY, §§ 1201-10 (2009), available at http://www.financialstability.gov/
docs/regulatoryreform/title-XIIresolution-authority_072309.pdf
[hereinafter GEITHNER
BILL, TITLE XII].

273. GEITHNER BILL, TITLE II, supra note 92, § 204(d), at 11-14 (proposing an
amendment to the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956 § 6(d), 12 U.S.C. § 1845(d) (2006)).
274. GEITHNER BILL, TITLE XII, supra note 272, § 1203(b), at 5.
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holding companies outside of the operation of the Bankruptcy Code. 275 The
conservator or receiver would also have broad authority to control a firm's
operations, sell or transfer all or part of its assets (including a portfolio of the firm's
making,
qualified financial contracts), determine creditors' claims pursuant to rule
276
and renegotiate or repudiate contracts with employees and third parties.
The Geithner Bill's prescriptions for managing the failure of a Tier 1 FHC,
while an important step in addressing systemic failures, do not fully address the
risks posed by investment banks. First, the plan appears to fragment authority over
the resolution of investment bank holding companies among three agencies. The
Secretary of the Treasury would have the authority to invoke the special resolution
regime for a Tier 1 FHC, based on specified criteria,277 but only upon the written
recommendation of two-thirds of the members of the FRB or two-thirds of the
commissioners of the SEC.278 Such overlapping authorizations could create
significant problems without achieving the intended result. To the extent that the
Treasury and the SEC are generally regarded as susceptible to political influence,
the task would ironically fall to the FRB to act as a check on the deployment of the
U.S. government's fiscal resources.
Second, while the Geithner Bill contemplates that the FRB will have
consolidated oversight over both domestic and foreign subsidiaries of a Tier 1
FHC, it is not clear how the SEC or any other financial regulator could oversee the
orderly resolution of a Tier 1 FHC's non-U.S. subsidiaries. While SIPC would
continue to handle the disposition of the assets of the customers of a Tier 1 FHC's
broker/dealer subsidiary in accordance with the provisions of the Securities
Investor Protection Act, the SEC must rely on the FRB or the Treasury to finance
resolution of the firm's proprietary obligations. The proposal at most contemplates
that the SEC or another financial regulator responsible for liquidation should
"coordinate with the appropriate foreign financial authorities regarding the
resolution of subsidiaries of. . . covered bank holding compan[ies]" located in
foreign jurisdictions.279

275. Id. § 1202(l)(B), at 1-2 (providing that the SEC shall be the "Appropriate Federal
Regulatory Agency" of a covered holding company "if the largest subsidiary... is a broker
or dealer"); id. § 1204(b), at 7-8 (providing that the Secretary of the Treasury may appoint
"one of the Appropriate Federal Regulatory Agencies" as conservator or receiver of a
covered holding company); id. § 1207, at 9 (requiring termination and exclusion of actions
under the Bankruptcy Code and state insolvency law against covered holding companies).
276. Id. § 1209 (describing the powers and duties of the FDIC and SEC when acting as
conservator or receiver).
277. See id. § 1203(b), at 5 (requiring the Secretary of the Treasury to determine that (1)
the firm is in default or "in danger of default"; (2) the failure of the firm and its resolution
under otherwise applicable law would have "serious adverse effects" on the financial system
or the economy; and (3) use by the government of the special resolution regime would
"avoid or mitigate" these adverse effects).
278. Id. § 1203(a)(1), at 2.
279. Id. § 1209(a)(1)(M), at 77-78; see also CCMR REPORT, supra note 251, at 122, 127
(recommending consolidation or coordination of cross-border insolvency proceedings for
multi-entity financial companies).
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C. ProvidingRemedial Relief
The proposals also differ on the political accountability of the FRB when using
monetary policy to effect a bailout. While the use of fiscal policy-such as the
Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP)--is subject to ad hoc congressional
authorization and direct congressional and executive oversight, the FRB's authority
under Section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act to extend credit to nonbank entities
in "unusual and exigent circumstances" is limited only by the Act's requirement of
a supermajority vote. 280 Because of the difficulties of maintaining constructive
ambiguity in the face of a systemic crisis, the various proposals (with the exception
of the CCMR Report) seek ways publicly to limit the discretion of the FRB to use
monetary policy.
The Geithner Bill, for example, contemplates further limiting the FRB's power
to extend credit to persons other than banks by requiring the prior written approval
of the Secretary of the Treasury. 21' To the extent that political appointees are likely
to favor a bailout in a time of market distress, it is not clear how effective a check
this will be. The Geithner Report would also authorize the Treasury, as with the
current TARP program, to use fiscal tools--such as providing loans, purchasing
assets, guaranteeing liabilities, or making equity investments in the firm-in
addition to the FRB's emergency lending authority. 282 To the extent that fiscal
policy is subject to greater discipline and political risk than monetary policy, it is
unclear whether a Treasury Secretary would be willing to limit monetary policy
during periods of market stress.
More ambitious proposals create disincentives for political actors to participate
in a central-bank initiated bailout. The G30 Report argues for the preservation of
central bank emergency lending for "highly unusual and exigent circumstances,"
but seeks to ensure political cover for lending to nonbank financial institutions,
whether "by law or practice." 283 The report further recommends that fiscal policy,
rather than central bank liquidity, be used when purchasing or lending against highrisk assets or providing long-term direct or indirect capital support. 284 Any systemic
support provided by the FRB under exigent circumstances, moreover, would be
subsequently approved by an appropriate governmental entity "with the consequent
risk transfer to that entity." 285 The House Republican Bill would further constrain
the FRB's authority. For example, in addition to requiring the Treasury Department
to approve all actions taken by the FRB under section 13(3), the Plan suggests that
Congress should have the right to block any FRB action by congressional

280. 12 U.S.C. § 343 (2006) (permitting the FRB, "[i]n unusual and exigent
circumstances.... by the affirmative vote of not less than five members, [to] authorize any
Federal reserve bank... to discount for any individual, partnership, or corporation, notes,
drafts, and bills of exchange").
281. GEITHNER BILL, TITLE XIII, supra note 263, § 1301, at 1 (proposing an amendment
to the Federal Reserve Act § 13, 12 U.S.C. § 343 (2006)).
282. See GEImHNER REPORT, supra note 10, at 77-78.
283. G30 REPORT, supra note 186, at 11.
284. Id.
285. Id.
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resolution and that the FRB's discretion to bail out individual institutions (as
opposed to creating broadly available liquidity facilities) should be eliminated.286
It is unlikely that such checks on the FRB's remedial powers are more than
window dressing. There is no suggestion that the FRB has not enjoyed the full
backing of the Secretary of the Treasury during the current crisis. In addition, while
certain members of Congress have taken the Chairman of the FRB to task for the
dramatic expansion of the FRB's balance sheet during the current crisis, 287 there is
little reason to believe that Congress would not accede to a politically palatable
rescue package. By contrast, there is every reason to believe that a politically
popular president might, in defiance of a reluctant Congress, assert executive
authority to use fiscal funds to stave off a crisis until the requisite political support
could be marshaled for FRB relief, regardless of possible constitutional
challenges. 288 As a result, the consultation requirements may be helpful for
purposes of encouraging coordinated action, but are unlikely to present serious
obstacles to intervention in the face of political pressure.
The Geithner Bill further provides, along the lines of the G30 Report, that
federal regulators use fiscal policy to backstop the resolution authority of the FDIC
and the SEC. On the one hand, the bill purports to limit the resolving authority's
maximum liability to claims for the amount it would have received if no corrective
action had been taken and the firm had been liquidated under the Bankruptcy Code
or state insolvency law.289 On the other, the bill provides that the FDIC may
provide emergency assistance to a covered holding company, and that the FDIC
and SEC, when acting as conservator or receiver, may make additional payments or
credit additional amounts to claimants, to "prevent or mitigate serious adverse
effects to financial stability or the United States economy., 290 To fund such
payments, the FDIC and SEC would draw upon a "bank holding company fund"
financed by borrowing from the Treasury, which in turn would be financed through
public borrowing, the outlays of which would be recouped by risk-based
assessments on holding companies. 291 Whether Congress would authorize such an

286. Consumer Protection and Regulatory Enhancement Act, H.R. 3310, 111 th Cong.
§ 403 (2009) (requiring the discontinuance of any actions taken by the FRB using emergency
powers in response to a joint resolution of the Senate and House expressing disapproval of
the action).
287. See, e.g., Brian Blackstone & Patricia Yoest, The Financial Crisis: Bailouts Turn
Up Heat on Fed Chief-Both Sides of Hill Increase Criticism ofBernanke Moves, WALL ST.
J., Sept. 19, 2008, at A2; Neil Irwin, A Growing Chorus on the Hill Questions the Fed's
Decisions; Lawmakers Could Delay Expansion of Bank's Powers, WASH. POST, Mar. 26,
2009, at DI; Damian Paletta, Fed Documents Fuel Concerns About Expanding Central
Bank's Role, WALL ST. J.,June 27, 2009, at A4.
288. Jeffrey Rosen, TARP Heels, NEw REPUBLIC, Mar. 18, 2009, at 5, available at
http://www.tnr.com/article/tarp-heels (describing potential constitutional challenges by
libertarian organizations to the TARP program); cf ROBERT E. RUBIN, IN AN UNCERTAIN
WORLD 168-76 (2003) (describing former Treasury Secretary Rubin's use of unorthodox
measures to avert defaulting on the federal debt in the face of Republican opposition to
raising the debt ceiling).
289. GEITHNER BILL, TITLE XII, supra note 272, § 1209(d)(2).
290. Id. § 1209(d)(3).
291. Id. § 1209(n).
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open-ended commitment remains to be seen in light of the resistance that
industry
292
participants may bring to bear against the use of such levying authority.
V. A SELF-REGULATORY FRAMEWORK FOR SYSTEMIC CRISES
My proposed framework for regulating investment banks and other financial
services conglomerates would draw upon the tools for regulation outlined in Part II
and the institutions described in Part III, but would depart dramatically from the
traditional shuffling of regulatory responsibilities of the type described in Part IV.
The proposal would essentially consist of a cost-sharing mechanism organized on
the model of the modem self-regulatory organization (SRO), the membership of
which would include those financial conglomerates "too interconnected to fail."
Requiring major participants to have some "skin in the game" would not only cause
them to consider more carefully the credit and operational risks of dealing with
particular counterparties but also, by extension, to internalize at least part of the
cost of the anticipated clean-up of markets after a crash.293 Substantive regulation
might consist primarily of risk-management principles, overseen by a prudential
regulator with superior expertise in information gathering and analysis, while
industry rules, incrementally developed during ebullient times under the oversight
of a business conduct regulator, would establish a clear, ex ante baseline level of
responsibility.
A. The Proposal

The goal would be to transform the way in which the FRB and the Treasury
intervene in the wake of a financial crisis. Rather than leaving regulators to attempt
to broker deals among counterparties or cajole competitors to save an insolvent
firm from bankruptcy, the proposal would create an industry organization
committed to identifying firms in need of assistance and to participating in any
government-orchestrated assistance. Unlike a clearinghouse, however, the
participation of each firm would be determined by formulas that would serve as a
starting point for any ex post negotiation. These formulas, moreover, would create

292. See, e.g., David Streitfeld, The Bailout Bill Comes Due, Vexing Agencies, N.Y.

Sept. 18, 2009, at BI (discussing the FDIC's and FHA's concerns about tapping the
Treasury or the industry to finance their activities and banks' opposition to special fees to
replenish FDIC funds).
293. Cf Alan S. Blinder, Op-Ed, The Casefor a Newer Deal, N.Y. TIMES, May 4, 2008,
at B20 (suggesting that originators of mortgages and sponsors of securitization vehicles
should retain some interest or accountability for the creditworthiness of assets underlying
asset-backed securities). Such a proposal could easily turn into a cost-defraying measure for
the federal government, rather than a means of promoting financial stability and mitigating
systemic risk, if federal authorities routinely call upon the self-regulatory organization to
participate in bailouts. See, e.g., Jackson, supra note 68, at 561-62 (observing that defraying
federal costs is not a "regulatory justification" for imposing obligations on bank holding
companies). As a matter of policy, therefore, it is probably safer to give the self-regulatory
organization the initial obligation to make a determination whether remedial action is
appropriate, rather than give the FRB or another federal regulator the formal ability to
require the SRO to participate in a transaction.
TIMES,
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ex ante incentives and disincentives for firms when dealing with counterparties in
whose resolution the firms might be called upon to participate some day.
Legislation would establish the general purposes of the organization-for
example, to share the costs of restoring stability to the financial system-and the
organization itself would adopt rules for asset purchases, stock purchases, or
financial assistance to troubled firms in situations where the FRB (or another
systemic regulator) declares a crisis. An agency other than the FRB-be it the SEC
or any successor regulator-would be responsible for approving the rules of the
entity to ensure fair treatment of members. In the event of a crisis, the systemic
regulator-when seeking industry participation in a bailout or acquisition-could
either invoke the rules of the entity to finance the clean-up transaction or negotiate
a less burdensome arrangement consistent with the privileges and obligations of
participating members.
To avoid an open-ended commitment to bail out all financial firms, the success
of an industry buyout financed by the FRB must depend on whether industry
members have a vested interest in protecting a failing firm from bankruptcy. As a
result, the final terms of a buyout will depend, among other considerations, on (i)
the relative size and leverage of affected financial conglomerates, (ii) the degree to
which such entities managed their concentration or counterparty risk, (iii) the
degree to which products were marketed without due diligence or regard for latent
risks, (iv) the impact on capital adequacy and liquidity of the assumption of risk
with respect to the failing enterprise, and (v) the potential gain to participating
firms if assumed positions recover value after the crisis has abated.
In the following three Subparts, I describe how such an organization might be
constituted, how it would operate in advance of a systemic crisis, and how it would
participate in a rescue operation for a failing firm during a systemic crisis.
1. Membership
As discussed above, one of the obstacles that policy makers face in crafting the
contours of a "too big to fail" policy is that it is not in the regulators' interest to
define which firms merit this treatment. 294 Rules may be designed to ensure that
firms of a certain size or who are entrusted with functions vital to government
interests, such as primary dealers, would qualify;295 indeed, the FRB's enormous
commercial power relative to its primary dealers and as lender of last resort, among
other factors, has given it the clout to compel industry participation in many similar
transactions. But smaller banks or brokerage houses, or even hedge funds, pose
different issues: while reform proposals affirm that bailout authority for
systemically significant institutions must be tied to an ex ante commitment to
prudential supervision, 296 a systemic regulator would always have to decide ex post

294. Cf Partnoy & Skeel, supra note 136, at 1036 ("Fourteen Families" resolve credit
derivatives backlog); Kaufman, supranote 136 (noting combined assets).
295. See, e.g., supra note 212 (discussing criteria for selecting primary dealers), supra
note 84 (discussing criteria for consolidated supervision of CSEs), supra note 149
(discussing criteria for use of "advanced approaches" to assessing market risk by large,
internationally active banking organizations).
296. See, e.g., CCMR REPORT, supra note 251, at 70 ("Firms that are too big, too
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whether the costs of bankruptcy to the broader economy exceed the cost of a
bailout.
The proposed approach would give the FRB greater "constructive ambiguity" in
the face of a systemic crisis by replacing the binary decision of whether to bail out
a failing firm out with the decision to determine the degree to which it will
participate in an industry initiative. The proposal would link a federal commitment
to be bailed out with a commitment to participate in the bailout of other firms; if
called upon by the FRB to do so or if approved by participating firms pursuant to
ex ante rules. Membership in such an organization would thus be largely voluntary
(for firms other than the largest banks and investment firms) and subject to a form
of "credit" approval by other members. Such membership would also entail a
commitment to share-both vertically, with federal regulators, and horizontally,
with other members--certain categories of information necessary to determine
direct and indirect interfirm concentration risk.297
Firms might be induced to seek membership through a variety of incentives. The
most important incentive, of course, is the implicit credit support provided by the
organization, which would reduce the firm's transaction costs when hypothecating
assets or entering into derivative transactions involving credit exposure.
Membership in the organization might also be required, for example, for firms that
seek to compute capital or required margin in accordance with risk-based models,
such as under the SEC's net capital rule and proposed SRO portfolio margining
298
rules,298 or under
the Basel Framework. 299 Other privileges of membership might
include the right to preferential treatmeit of derivatives and financing3 contracts
currently available to financial institutions under federal bankruptcy law. 00
interconnected, or too complex to fail impose added costs to the government and, ultimately,
the taxpayer in the form of the government assistance that might be needed to rescue large,
distressed institutions. Given the concentration risks to the government, it is reasonable to
question whether 'systemically important' firms should be held to a higher solvency
standard."); G30 REPORT, supra note 186, at 27 ("[M]arkets are likely to presume that the
largest regulated financial institutions will, to some extent, be protected against the full force
of market discipline ....To compensate for this, and to keep the probability of potential
failure of such institutions to acceptably low levels, existing regulatory standards and
supervisory approaches will need to be upgraded."); PAULSON BLUEPRINT, supra note 10, at
156 (stating that "market stability discount window lending would have to be supported by
Federal Reserve authority to collect information and conduct examinations of borrowing
firms in order to protect the Federal Reserve (and thereby the taxpayer)").
297. Members and nonmembers would continue to be regulated by the SEC for
compliance with the net capital rule and the customer protection rule. If, however, a systemic
risk regulator were recognized as the "ultimate regulator" of an investment bank holding
company, the SEC would presumably defer to its consolidated regulator for capital
requirements.
298. Paredes, supra note 23, at 1027 n.18 (citing articles proposing SRO margining
rules).
299. Phyllis Diamond, Lawmakers Quiz SEC on Plans to Re-Assess CSE Liquidity
Standards, BNA SEC. L. DAILY, Apr. 4, 2008 (discussing capital and liquidity standards for
the top five CSEs: Bear Steams, Goldman Sachs, Lehman Brothers, Merrill Lynch, and
Morgan Stanley).
300. See 11 U.S.C. § 101(22) (2006) (defining "financial institution," inter alia, for
purposes of the closeout provisions applicable to securities and derivatives transactions
under the Bankruptcy Act); supra note 171 (describing preferential treatment).
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2. Operation

The FRB's role in the proposed framework would be to act as lead underwriter
for any proposed rescue transaction. Like most reform proposals, this proposal
would grant the FRB wide discretion to gather information from all regulated and
unregulated financial firms in order to detect, prevent, and remediate market events.
This proposal would also give the FRB broad discretion to fashion remedial relief,
but within the framework established by SRO rules and only upon a formal request
by the industry.3 0
The SRO would perform principally two functions: it would both define specific
categories of aggregate information to be gathered from and shared by members on
a routine basis and develop terms for sharing the costs and benefits of underwriting
clean-up efforts when requested by the FRB. To ensure that such rules are
administered fairly, the SEC would assist members of the proposed self-regulatory
body in formulating equitable rules for the allocation of responsibilities (and
privileges) in the event of a FRB-mandated bailout. While it would be unrealistic
for the SEC and the SRO to develop a comprehensive framework for all possible
market crises, adopting predictable rules would help focus negotiations in the wake
of a crisis and help quantify potential exposures to systemic risk.
The information-sharing function of the SRO would be limited to those
categories of information that can be aggregated sufficiently to avoid disclosure of
proprietary or customer trading, and that are desirable to refine cost-sharing rules.
As industry proposals have recognized, the quantity and quality of information a
financial services conglomerate provides about its activities depends on the degree
of confidentiality that counterparties are able to ensure. 30 2 Sharing of information
among member firms-which might include information about aggregate
transaction volumes in various financial products-would allow firms to identify
specific areas of potential risk across firms and to readjust their own trading
strategies to avoid undue concentration. Sharing information subject to an SRO
mandate and under regulatory supervision would ensure standardization and some
third-party verification of disclosures.
The cost sharing rules would essentially take the form of a syndication
agreement, defining the terms under which responsibility would be apportioned
among SRO members. 30 3 The rules, for example, might set maximum and
minimum thresholds for financial commitment based on each member's respective
net worth, as well as specific allocation targets based on each member's net
exposure to particular asset classes or financial instruments deemed to have
contributed to the crisis. The rules might also craft procedures for relieving
financially troubled firms of an obligation to participate in an FRB-orchestrated
transaction, as well as procedures for reallocating the shares of defaulting or
troubled members to more solvent members. The rules might even specify the

301. For a discussion of this framework, see infra Part V.A.3.
302. TOWARD GREATER FINANCIAL STABILITY, supra note 178, at 46-47.
303. See, e.g., 1 Louis Loss, JOEL SELIGMAN & TROY PAREDES, SEcuriTiEs REGULATION
500-04 (4th ed. 2006) (describing the formation and terms of the "agreement among
underwriters").
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terms under which individual members could bid for a failing firm if they are
willing to improve upon the terms set by the SRO.
Rules might also be designed to protect members against excessive
discriminatory treatment, such as by requiring a certain degree of participation
based on line of business. For instance, it would be foolish to imagine that
investment banks generally pose the same degree of moral hazard as commercial
banks, given that bank depositors are far less able to evaluate the risk or severity of
bank failures than institutional counterparties of investment banks. Nevertheless, to
the extent that the framework for commercial bank regulation is far more sensitive
to systemic risk-both in terms of the degree of supervision commercial banks
receive as well as the availability of deposit insurance-there is a possibility that
the FRB would use any industry sponsored organization as a means to prop up
commercial banks at the expense of investment banks. To a degree, the sheer size
of the largest bank holding companies relative to investment bank holding
companies allays such concerns, since any major commercial bank bailout would
far exceed the available resources of investment banks. Moreover, only bank
holding companies would be in a position to acquire a defaulting commercial bank
or its customer accounts. 3°
Legislation would grant certain protections to members participating in a FRBorchestrated bailout. For example, legislation should generally preempt any action
by shareholders to enjoin or set aside any FRB-orchestrated bailout conducted at
the FRB's request and in accordance with SRO rules. 30 5 Legislation might also
grant the SRO a right of first refusal to participate in any bailout involving the use
of FRB financing (including bailouts of hedge funds, major corporations, or other
unregulated entities), to the extent that the FRB might thereby convey
(intentionally or unintentionally) prized assets or substantial equity exclusively to
one or more commercial or investment banks. Conversely, the SRO may be entitled
to seek bids for assets or affiliates of a failed institution (other than affiliates that
are insured depository institutions) while under the conservatorship of a joint FRBSRO vehicle. Finally, legislation should guarantee SRO members the right to a

304. Cf Macey & Miller, supra note 181, at 1188 (discussion of the FDIC's auction
procedures for troubled banks). In particular, the inability of private equity investment firms
to participate effectively in the financing of troubled bank holding companies because of
restrictions on concentrated ownership under the Bank Holding Company Act, see 12 U.S.C.
§ 1841(a)(2) (2006) (defining "bank holding company" to include any company that owns
twenty-five percent or more of the voting securities of any bank or any other bank holding
company or, inter alia, "exercises a controlling influence over the management or policies of
the bank or company"), has drawn considerable media attention. See, e.g., Editorial, The
Banks andPrivate Equity, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 3, 2008, at 9.

305. Shareholders of failing firms should, of course, remain able to seek monetary
damages for any breach of a board's fiduciary duties in the context of such a transaction, to
the fullest extent permitted by state law. See In re Bear Steams Cos., Inc. S'holder Litig.,
C.A. No. 3643-VCP, 2008 WL 959992 (Del. Ch. Apr. 9, 2008) (describing shareholder

litigation in opposition to the acquisition of Bear Steams pending in both Delaware and New
York courts); see also Gretchen Morgenson, Approve This Deal, or Else, N.Y. TIMES, June
15, 2008, at BUI (discussing shareholder criticism of the "sweet package" received by the
Texas Pacific Group and other institutional investors as part of Washington Mutual's efforts
to raise additional capital in the face of subprime mortgage losses).
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supermajority vote before they are required to participate in the bailout of a
nonmember firm.30 6
3. Structuring Relief
Because of the unpredictability of market events and the variety of approaches
to effectuating remedial relief, the FRB must have broad discretion in fashioning
any remedial measures. Moreover, since many such transactions must be negotiated
within limited time windows, excessively elaborate protocols would discourage
FRB reliance on any market-wide system of relief. Nevertheless, certain procedures
would be necessary before the FRB is permitted to foist a particular transaction on
a market SRO.
i. Determining if Federal Intervention Is Warranted
The first step the FRB would be required to take is to make a determination,
based on the information at hand, whether multilateral relief is warranted in any
given circumstance. To the extent that a failing firm's insolvency would
disproportionately impact only a few firms, the appropriate recourse is to encourage
the firms most affected to induce some form of pre-bankruptcy acquisition or
settlement. In such circumstances, the FRB would communicate privately to the
affected members that it would not initiate any industry-wide relief, absent a
demonstration that such an obligation would trigger adverse consequences for the
affected firms and their counterparties. Affected firms might also appeal to the
industry SRO for a vote on whether, under the circumstances, to grant relief
without federal assistance.
The purpose of such a requirement is to discourage federally financed relief in
circumstances where the benefits would flow primarily to a handful of firms. While
FRB participation in any transaction will be the subject of extensive (if timepressured) negotiation, it would be a useful signal to the marketplace if the FRB
were able to convey its views as to whether it would take the lead in executing a
transaction, whether it would participate in a transaction led by the industry, or
whether it would be opposed outright to participation.
ii. Scope of Relief
The second step the FRB would take is to determine the appropriate structure of
the relief at issue. Much like the "least-cost" approach of the FDIC, 0 7 the FRB
would be expected to structure relief in the form that would impose the least burden
on the financial system as a whole, in terms of total obligations assumed
(contingent or otherwise) and total liquidity to be committed. In some
circumstances, this might entail underwriting the issuance of additional shares to
raise capital or temporarily guaranteeing new obligations in an effort to preserve
the entity. In others, remedial relief might consist of the purchase and orderly

306. See 12 U.S.C. § 343 (2006) (requiring a supermajority vote for the FRB to take
actions to address systemic risk).
307. See supra notes 163, 215.
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liquidation of a narrowly limited portfolio of assets or contracts, such as through a
special purpose vehicle, while allowing the remainder of the firm's assets to be
liquidated in bankruptcy. 308 In yet others, acquisition of the firm as a whole might
be desirable, with participating firms purchasing equity interests (for example,
through a cash-out
merger) in exchange for assumption of outstanding
30 9
obligations.
iii. Apportionment of Responsibility
The third step would be to allocate a share of the remedial efforts among the
FRB and industry participants. The FRB would be given broad discretion, for
example, to determine what percentage (if any) of remedial relief to assume itself.
If, for example, a significant percentage of a defaulting firm's obligations were
owed to nonmember firms (such as institutional investors or private vehicles), it
may not be appropriate to burden industry members with a significant share of
responsibility for the defaulting firm's conduct. By contrast, if a defaulting firm's
transactions were largely conducted with other members, a stronger case would
exist for limiting relief to industry members. The FRB would be authorized to
selectively reveal information about the specific exposures of member firms to the
SRO and its members in an effort to negotiate an appropriate distribution of shares.
The purpose of this step would be, essentially, to assess both the relative
culpability of individual firms and the industry as a whole, as well as the capacity
of individual firms to participate in any remedial relief For truly extraordinary
events (such as 9/11 or Hurricane Katrina), the FRB might consider financing the
lion's share of a transaction if other firms were not able and willing to do so. 31a For
crises precipitated by a chronic industry failure to monitor counterparty risks or
agency costs (such as the Enron debacle and the subprime crisis), the FRB might
scale back its role in any intervention. As a means to internalize the costs of risk
taking, firms might also be required to structure executive compensation, or
compensation for other highly remunerated employees, in such a manner as to deny
or claw back compensation from those individuals who had direct or indirect
responsibility for the products or services on the basis of which contribution is
assessed. 1

308. See supra notes 163, 230-31 & 272-76 (discussing the FDIC's power to take
"corrective action" of this type).
309. See supra notes 163, 230-31 & 272-76 (discussing the FDIC's power to take
"corrective action" of this type).
310. See, e.g., Jackson, supra note 68, at 601-02 (suggesting that, in some circumstances,
the risk of systemic failure is sufficiently "uninsurable" that the federal government must act
as insurer of last resort).
311. Some commentators have asserted that equity-based compensation, particularly in
the financial services sector, may have contributed to higher risk taking and leveraging. See
Carl R. Chen, Thomas L. Steiner & Ann Marie Whyte, Does Stock Option-BasedExecutive
CompensationInduce Risk-Taking? An Analysis of the Banking Industry, 30 J. BANKING &
FiN. 915, 943 (2006) (concluding that "the structure of executive compensation... induces
risk-taking in the banking industry" and lending support to the view that "regulators need to
consider a new paradigm that explicitly provides the appropriate incentives/disincentives for
risk-taking within the compensation structure"); Anthony J. Crawford, John R. Ezzell &
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iv. Duration of Relief
The fourth step would require the FRB to consider whether industry
participation should be immediate or phased in over a period of time. The FRB
could, for example, allocate responsibility to individual firms to purchase shares in
a portfolio of assets, but finance a significant percentage of the purchase price to
avoid imposing undue demands on marketplace liquidity. Such obligations could
then be satisfied over a period of years (or decades) as markets recover. Amortizing
industry obligations in this manner might also provide risk-management
professionals with some basis for developing estimates of the anticipated cost of
such crises over time, rather than treating them as onetime events.

James A. Miles, Bank CEO Pay-PerformanceRelations and the Effects of Deregulation,68
J. Bus. 231, 232-33, 246-55 (1995) (discussing the extent to which increased pay-

performance relations for CEOs after deregulation can be attributed to the hypothesis that
banks seek to transfer wealth from the FDIC and taxpayers to the bank's shareholders by
engaging in morally hazardous risk-taking); Kose John & Yiming Qian, Incentive Features
in CEO Compensation in the Banking Industry, FRBNY EcoN. POL'Y REv., Apr., 2003, at
109 (asserting that if top management of commercial banks is "very closely aligned with
equity interests in banks, which are highly leveraged institutions, management will have
strong incentives to undertake high-risk investments"); see also Jeffrey N. Gordon, "Say on
Pay": CautionaryNotes on the U.K. Experience and the Case for Shareholder Opt-In, 46
HARv. J. ON LEGIS. 323, 363-67 (2009) (arguing that the "the most significant policy issue"
raised by the pay-for-performance compensation at major Wall Street firms "was the
systemic risk that these particular high-powered incentives created for firms whose failure
would ramify throughout the financial system as a whole"); Frederick Tung, The Great
Bailout of 2008-09, 25 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 333, 340 (2009) (arguing that "[w]hen you
pay managers of banks with equity, you increase their risk-taking incentives by giving them

a direct equity stake in the upside payoff from taking big risks"). But see Elijah Brewer III,
William Curt Hunter & William Jackson III, Deregulation and the Relationship Between
Bank CEO Compensation and Risk-Taking 2 (Fed. Reserve Bank of Chi. Working Paper
Series, Paper No. 2003-32, 2003), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=486985 (concluding
that "more levered banks do not have higher levels of equity-based CEO compensation").

One of the challenges of regulating the relationship between risk and compensation,
however, is the difficulty of setting temporal parameters-whether through the use of

vesting requirements or claw back periods-to determine when, and what percentage of, an
employee's compensation is free and clear of any such encumbrance. See VIRAL V.
ACHARYA & MATrHEw RICHARDSON, RESTORING FINANCIAL STABILITY: How TO REPAIR A
FAILED SYSTEM 204-13 (2009). Tying such provisions to the duration of a firm's
participation in a transaction under the proposal might conveniently avoid the problems of
picking specific timeframes. See, e.g., 31 C.F.R. § 30.2 (2009) (imposing restrictions on the
compensation of employees of a recipient of assistance under TARP "during the period
during which any obligation to the Federal government arising from financial assistance
provided under the TARP remains outstanding"); id. § 30.8 (requiring, inter alia, that bonus

payments for senior executive officers and the next 20 most highly compensated employees
of a TARP Recipient be subject to clawbacks for "materially inaccurate financial statements
... or any other materially inaccurate performance metric criteria").
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B. DiscussionandAnalysis
In this section, I discuss some of the advantages of the proposed framework and
the concerns it might raise for financial regulators and financial services
conglomerates.
1. Advantages of the Proposed Framework
The advantages of this proposal are straightforward. First, to the extent that most
of the reform proposals have been stymied because of concerns about regulators
defining which entities will be deemed "systemically significant," a regulatory
framework that actively involves the financial services industry in the decisionmaking process can both shield the process from political pressure and improve its
accuracy. One of the battles that regulators must perennially fight is to gain some
regulatory power with respect to hedge funds and other unregulated but
systemically dangerous entities. It may be far easier, however, to induce hedge
funds and other private pools of equity to participate in a self-regulatory body if
their prime brokers or counterparties pressure them to do so for their own
protection. To the extent that not all bank holding companies, other financial
services conglomerates, or private pools of equity pose systemic risks, a selfregulatory organization is better suited to identifying the relevant criteria for
determining which entities pose the greatest risks to the system and sparing the
majority of such entities from enhanced regulation or disclosure.
Second, if industry participants have more insight than regulators into
instruments that are likely to pose significant systemic risks, an industry-led body
can better factor that insight into the self-regulatory organization's plan for
allocating responsibility in the event of a crisis. Some firms may avoid novel
products if they believe that their competitors are not adequately gauging the risk of
their use. 312 Firms beset by such qualms, however, have no incentive to push the
industry toward taking a harder look at their risk exposure. If the baseline
assumption is that firms will participate in any industry-orchestrated bailout based
on their share of exposure to a particular product or portfolio, firms that are averse
to certain product lines or instruments will have an incentive to push for rules
designed to cabin the risks from those product lines or instruments.
Third, industry participation in a bailout of a financial services conglomerate
helps address one of the most critical problems faced by government-initiated
remedial action: asset valuation. To the extent that the FRB and Treasury undertake
to purchase (with a view to later sell) securities and other financial products,
holders of dollar-denominated assets and taxpayers are rightly concerned that the
government will buy too dear and sell too cheap. As a result, many government
bailout programs-such as the Resolution Funding Corporation (REFCORP), 1 3 the
Resolution Trust Corporation (RTC),314 and the Treasury's recently announced

312. TETr, supra note 3, at 129-42 (describing JPMorgan Chase's decision not to expand
its synthetic derivatives business in light of concerns about the residual risk of synthetic
collateralized debt obligations).
313. See supra note 181.
314. See supra note 181.
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"Public-Private Investment Program" (PPIp) 3 15 -view public-private partnerships
as a useful means of letting private actors set prices for assets to be sold off from
failing firms. Government agencies, however, must currently give private firms
generous incentives to induce their voluntary participation in such partnerships.
Creating a permanent role for industry alleviates that need.316
Fourth, formalizing the industry's role in a market crisis may hasten the
incentives to develop better industry mechanisms. Often, financial crises can be the
result of negligence in handling routine documentation of master agreements or
confirmations, or in simple risk-reducing measures like netting and novation
through a clearinghouse. A greater chance of collective liability for the mistakes of
individual market participants may, all other things being equal, provide more
incentive to take up such projects during periods of heightened market activity. An
organization of the sort discussed thus far could, through a collective decisionmaking process, develop its own mechanisms for improving the stability of markets
in times of crisis. 3 17 It also might be required to create a temporary liquidity

facility-the size of which could, for example, be calibrated to the net capital
requirement of its smallest member-to assist members or nonmembers to continue
operations while they seek to raise additional capital. 3 I8
Finally, to the extent that bailouts can entail significant fees for the underwriters,
advisers, lawyers, and other individuals who assemble the various transactions
necessary to implement government assistance, it seems that giving major financial
services conglomerates a stake in such transactions can save some expenditures

315. See Press Release, Dep't of the Treas., Treasury Department Releases Details on
Public Private Partnership Investment Program (Mar. 23, 2009), available at
http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/tg65.htm.
316. While it may not entirely solve the problem--the industry might be too willing to
low-ball when purchasing distressed assets-the price-setting process would remain
insulated from government intervention.
317. Cf Grynbaum, supranote 177 (quoting Timothy Geithner, President of the Federal
Reserve Bank of New York, as stating that "[t]he major central banks should put in place a
standing network of currency swaps, collateral policies and account arrangements that would
make it easier to mobilize liquidity across borders quickly in crisis"); Kara Scannell, SEC
Role Is Scrutinized in Light of Bear Woes, WALL ST. J., Mar. 27, 2008, at A6 (describing
Chairman Cox's testimony); Letter from Christopher Cox, Chairman, SEC, to Nout Wellink,

Chairman, Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (Mar. 20, 2008) (asserting that
"[c]ounterparty withdrawals and credit denials, resulting in a loss of liquidity-not
inadequate capital-caused Bear's demise"), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press
/2008/2008-48.htm.
318. SEC officials have advocated such a facility, even with the availability of funding by
the Federal Reserve Board. Regulation of Investment Banks: HearingBefore the Subcomm.
on Secs., Ins. and Inv. of the Sen. Comm. on Banking, Hous., and UrbanAffairs, 110th Cong.
(May 7, 2008) (testimony of Erik Sirri, Director, Division of Trading and Markets, U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission) (noting that "[w]hile the Federal Reserve . . .
forestalled a similar run-on-the-bank from playing out elsewhere, it nonetheless remains for
Congress to determine whether to provide more predictable access to an external liquidity
provider... similar to the framework in the Federal Deposit Insurance Improvement Act and
the Federal Deposit Insurance Act for systemically important investment bank holding
companies").
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around the margins. Several financial services conglomerates are alleged to have
profited significantly from the capital raising and restructuring transactions their
3 19
troubled peers have undertaken to weather the current crisis.
2. Concerns Raised by the Proposed Framework
As discussed above, many commentators look skeptically on proposals
grounded in self-regulation, and a proposed regulatory framework for handling
systemic crises that leans upon an industry body to take the lead in resolving them
raises a host of issues. Among other issues, the framework must deal with the
inevitable opportunity for firms to exploit such structures to profit at the expense of
the taxpayer or to cartelize the provision of financial services. It may also be
difficult to devise rules of governance or risk allocation for such an organization,
and to induce firms to internalize the consequences of a bailout that is a low-risk,
high magnitude event. From the perspective of the industry, moreover, there is a
threat that, if ex ante incentives prove insufficient to stave off an eventual systemic
crisis, solvent firms will be expected to commit themselves financially to a longterm bailout during market conditions in which their own financial position may be
unstable.
First, it is important to recognize that our current ad hoc framework for
addressing systemic crises creates many of the same problems, and in a manner that
may result in greater inequities. For example, in the absence of a systematic way to
address crises, government officials may induce some financial services
conglomerates to accept significant short-term burdens while directly or indirectly
conferring financial benefits on others. At the discretion of federal regulators, some
firms may be encouraged-or, at worst, coerced-into bailing out a failing
competitor to prevent a systemic failure,32° while others might profit handsomely
from the preservation of large counterparty positions without being asked to
participate in the rescue of the defaulting firm. 32' This kind of discretion motivates

319. See, e.g., Liam Pleven & Aaron Lucchetti, AIG Breakup Is Fee Bonanza: Wall
Street Firms Could Collect Nearly $1 Billion for IPOs and Advice, Analysis Shows, WALL
ST. J., Aug. 7, 2009, at Al.

320. For example, in connection with Bank of America's acquisition of Merrill Lynch,
Bank of America CEO Kenneth Lewis' testified that Bank of America had considered
invoking a "material adverse change" clause to terminate the acquisition in light of the
"staggering amount of deterioration" at Merrill Lynch, but that Treasury Secretary Henry
Paulson had told him that "if Bank of America were to back out of the Merrill Lynch deal
the government either could or would remove the Board and management." Letter from
Andrew M. Cuomo, Att'y Gen., State of N.Y., to Sen. Christopher J. Dodd, Chairman,
Senate Comm. on Banking, Hous. & Urban Affairs, Rep. Barney Frank, Chairman, House
Fin. Servs. Comm., Mary L. Schapiro, Chairman, SEC, and Elizabeth Warren, Chair,
Congressional Oversight Panel (Apr. 23, 2009), available at http://online.wsj.com/public/
resources/documents/BofAmergLetter-Cuomo4232009.pdf. Moreover, Lewis testified that
Bank of America did not disclose Merrill's financial condition to Bank of America
shareholders in connection with their approval of the merger "based on direction from
Paulson and [FRB Chairman Ben] Bernanke." Id.
321. See, e.g., Peter Eavis, Goldman'sPriceof Protection,WALL ST. J., Mar. 18, 2009, at
C14 (noting that the AIG bailout enabled AIG to deliver $2.5 billion in collateral and $5.6
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many opponents of consolidating significant remedial authority in a single agency
or branch of government.
Second, cartelization can also result from government control of financial
services conglomerates-whether through direct ownership of common stock or the
right to acquire common stock through the exercise of warrants or convertible
preferred shares. In the automotive industry, commentators have voiced significant
concern that government-owned automakers will enjoy superior access to capital,
financing, and regulatory accommodation to those owned by public or private
shareholders. 322 Ownership or financing by a public-private partnership between
the FRB and the industry may present similar risks but, unlike under the current
PPIP's proposals, the government would play little role in the selection of private
partners and the industry would presumably take the lead in managing the business
or assets of the failing entity until resolution is desirable. Moreover, Congress and
the SEC have been moderately successful over the past several decades in reining
in some of the more egregious anticompetitive rules established by the stock
exchanges; regulatory oversight of the organization's rules can check such abuses
to a degree.
Third, there is a risk that industry members may exploit the information shared
by regulators such as the FRB during a market crisis to profit from trading in public
or private over-the-counter markets. There is ample speculation that Bear Steams
may have been driven into illiquidity and thence insolvency as a result of short
selling of its shares and short positions taken in derivative contracts written on its
securities. 323
Enforcement actions against such manipulation will always occur after the
damage is done. A self-regulatory organization may, nevertheless, develop rules
designed to deter more abusive conduct during periods where the FRR is actively
consulting with systemically significant firms to prevent or contain a crisis. For
example, the self-regulatory organization could, at the instigation of the FRB or
SEC, ban participating firms from betting against the failure of at-risk firms by
taking uncovered short positions for the pendency of the crisis, in much the same
way that the SEC has sought to ban market-wide short selling during periods of
market stress. Industry participants might object to such measures, insofar as they
would naturally hamper the ability of their clients to purchase long securities or to
take long positions in a firm's prospects. To the extent, however, that it is illegal to
billion in cash to Goldman due under Goldman's credit default swaps with AIG, which had a
notional value in excess of $20 billion).
322. See, e.g., Matthew Dolan, Ford to Face Tougher Rivals Following U.S. Rescue,
WALL ST. J., June 8, 2009, at B1 (describing the disadvantages to Ford flowing from
GMAC's receipt of federal funds and ability to offer federally backed debt); Editorial,
Treasury to Ford: Drop Dead, WALL ST. J., Jan. 2, 2009, at A14 (criticizing the gift of
federal funds to GMAC as hurting companies such as Ford and Toyota while helping
Chrysler and GM); George F. Will, Op-Ed, Have We Got a Dealfor You, WASH. POST, June
7, 2009, at A19 (criticizing the federal government's increasing interference in private
industry).
323. See Amendments to Regulation SHO, Proposed Rule, Exchange Act Release No.
59,748, 74 Fed. Reg. 18,042, 18,046-49 (Apr. 20, 2009) (describing the volume of
comments from academics, legislators, and the public regarding the perceived abuses of
short selling during the recent market crisis and the resulting erosion of investor confidence);
Burrough, supra note 1.
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trade in securities on the basis of material, nonpublic information in breach of a
duty of trust or confidence owed to the source, there is little reason to object to such
a prohibition, especially if participating firms are receiving privileged information
from the FRB to assist in containing their own exposure to their competitors.
Moreover, exceptions could be made for bona fide market-making or derivatives
dealing operations.
Fourth, in order to participate in an industry-orchestrated bailout, firms would
have to adjust compensation structures and other internal controls to ensure that
employees internalize the risk of a firm's potential liability. For ex ante incentives
to deter high risk behavior and enhance vigilance, the officers, directors and high
level employees of such firms must share equally in their firm's exposure under the
proposed framework. As discussed above,324 before the era of public financial
services conglomerates, partners maintained equity in their firms for their entire
career and were therefore inherently vested in the fortunes of their firm. With
modem equity-based or performance-based compensation schemes, there is an
incentive for traders to structure transactions in such a way that the risk of the
transaction spikes after the traders' compensation has fully vested and after they are
no longer immediately concerned with their employer's fortunes.
Both regulators and industry participants are actively considering ways to
restructure compensation so that firms can claw back compensation from
executives or other highly compensated individuals. The SEC has, for example,
taken the position that its clawback powers under § 304 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
of 2002325 may be applied against executives even if they are not alleged to have
participated in accounting fraud.326 A fortiori, regulators should be able to pursue
claw-back remedies against individuals who participated in or supervised highly
risky activities that may result in financial stress. It is the design of clawbacks,
however, that poses difficulties. Because equity compensation packages or other
bonus packages typically vest after a fixed number of years, firms would have to
lengthen vesting periods or adopt "hold through retirement" policies to create
appropriate incentives. Otherwise, clawbacks would be fruitless if employees are
permitted to draw upon their compensation in the interim.
Finally, it may simply be too difficult to establish a governance structure for
such a self-regulatory organization or a set of rules for allocating risk in the wake
of a crisis. Many bankruptcy scholars, for example, have noted that bankruptcy
reorganizations under Chapter 11 are increasingly difficult to effectuate because
claims trading, derivatives, and the rise of professional creditors result in
"fragmented and conflicting" ownership interests, and that bankruptcy judges
require "more discretion, not less" to ensure formation of coalitions able to
negotiate a reorganization plan. 327 As a result, bankruptcy reorganization begins to

324. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
325. 15 U.S.C. § 7243 (2006).
326. Complaint, SEC v. Jenkins, No. 2:09-cv-01510-JWS (D. Ariz. July 22, 2009),
available at www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2009/comp21149.pdf; see also Litigation
Release No. 21149A, 2009 WL 2192780, at *1 (July 23, 2009) (noting that the case against
Jenkins was "the first action seeking reimbursement under Section 304 from an individual
who is not alleged to have otherwise violated the securities laws").
327. Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, Anti-Bankruptcy 6, 54 (Univ. of S. Cal.
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look more like the ad hoc processes used in systemic crises, and consequently is a
less useful model for reforming systemic risk regulation than bankruptcy adherents
believe.
This last criticism must, of course, be viewed in light of the reality that the FRB
and Treasury will largely finance remedial efforts in the wake of any systemic
crisis. The goal of the proposal is not to definitively set out each firm's ex ante
share of a prospective bailout package, but rather to bring all of the major firms to a
bargaining table with a rough expectation of their likely exposure. Just as Congress
has delegated to SROs the amorphous task of promulgating "just and equitable
principles of trade" for their members, 328 it is not beyond credulity to suggest that
an industry body-under the oversight of an SEC-like monitor-could develop
similarly equitable principles of contribution to be interpreted by a deep pocket
such as the Treasury or the FRB.
CONCLUSION
Rethinking the scheme for regulating investment banking and handling systemic

risk naturally raises many concerns. There is a danger both that too much ex ante
regulation might stifle the availability of financing while channeling banking
activity into unregulated businesses and that too much ex post regulation might
make market conditions worse by sapping firms of resources when they need them
most. Nevertheless, the broader goals of addressing systemic risk compel at least a
consideration of whether regulation can help internalize (if not socialize) the
foreseeable costs of a federal bailout. Reliance on a system that checks the central
bank's significant leverage over the financial community with a system of rules and
principles for crafting ex post relief might achieve that goal.
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328. 15 U.S.C. § 78f(b)(5) (conditioning registration of a stock exchange on adopting
rules to promote, inter alia, "just and equitable principles of trade"); 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3(b)(6)
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